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Abstract
Death-denial in the modem West has been identified as a concern by 
thinkers who have grappled with issues across the last century and into the 
present. Most recent of these are the emergent harms to the planet and its 
ecosphere that accumulate as ‘environmental crisis’. This dissertation 
examines a strand of contemporary environmental crisis fiction that 
explicitly responds to a Western death-denial and its effects, especially— 
although not limited to—those effects upon the nonhuman world. As the 
‘environment’ is extracted from its state of utility to manifest as a viable 
category in human thought—and indeed to manifest in its own right beyond 
it—it takes over as the definitive casualty of western death-denial. The 
response in this fiction appears as a direct counter to death-denial, envisaged 
in the possibility of a shift from death-denial to death-yhcmg. As such, this 
fiction replicates a turn in theory from its focus on the language problem to 
a new emphasis on the material and the real. At the same time, this fiction’s 
moment of emergence is one in which ‘real’ socio-political response to 
environmental crisis is severely limited, meaning that in depicting death- 
facing, this fiction correspondingly depicts too its tensions and challenges. 
This contemporary phenomenon of death-facing and its problematising is 
explored as it appears in Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy, Cormac 
McCarthy’s The Road, Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods, and Amitav 
Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide. Links are drawn between their depictions of 
death-facing as ecological imperative, and developments in theory that 
move from a concern with language to the new speculative materialisms and 
realisms that reach for the outside of thought. Death-facing emerges as a 
turn toward the material that nonetheless sustains a discursive mode.
Addendum
Correction:
Joshua Schuster 'Death Reckoning in the Thinking o f Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault', Other Voices: 
The (e)Journal o f  Cultural Criticism, 1.1 (1979), n.p.
Should read: (1997) and not (1979).
Please see  p. 18, footn ote  9; p. 23 footn ote  21; p. 86, footn ote 9; and p. 208, bibliography.
Louise Squire, Decem ber 2014.
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Introduction
We find ourselves at a particular moment in history, one at which our very survival appears 
threatened, or potentially so, by events and scenarios of our own making. Having pursued the 
quest for ‘progress’, constructing a modem world that to varying degrees overcomes 
hardships of earlier centuries, we now find that this has incurred costs to the planet and its 
life-forms that may be untenable—not just on ethical and aesthetic grounds (although these 
are a substantial consideration for many) but on grounds, too, that the planet’s long-term 
capacity to sustain us may now be seriously compromised. The extent to which this threat to 
our survival is real may well be the debate of the millennium, despite its being superseded, on 
the whole, by other dominant agendas—not least the state of the global economy, 
international affairs, and so on. Yet while environmental matters in politics and other places 
may take on the guise of the elephant in the room, they are also intrinsically tied up with such 
matters as the economy and international affairs. Therefore, while we may acknowledge the 
advent of a gradual, if partial and at times downright precarious, integration of environmental 
issues into the systems of the day, we may also view such issues as let down by, or exceeding 
the scope of, such systems. Andrew Dobson distinguishes between environmentalism, which 
he says assumes that environmental issues can be managed ‘without fundamental changes to 
present values or patterns of production and consumption’, and ecologism, which assumes 
that ‘radical changes’ are needed, both in ‘our relationship with the nonhuman world’ and in 
‘our mode of social and political life’ if we are to achieve something of a ‘sustainable and 
fulfilling existence’.1 It is perhaps the widespread and persistent rift between these two 
assertions—on one hand that a radical rethink is needed and on the other that present systems 
are adequate for the job (or, indeed, that such a job is overstated in the first place)—that has 
prompted increasing numbers of authors, in recent years, to contribute to the currently 
accumulating range of fictional explorations of today’s ‘environmental crisis’ moment. It 
tends to be established authors who now turn to articulating an environmental crisis moment 
as contemporary citizens of it. The novels analysed in this dissertation—Margaret Atwood’s 
Maddaddam trilogy (2003, 2010, 2013), Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006), Jeanette 
Winterson’s The Stone Gods (2007) and Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide (2004)—all are 
twenty-first-century novels, and together represent a particular strand of this environmental
1 Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought, Fourth Edition (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 2-3.
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crisis fiction.2 Over the next few pages I delineate some characteristics of this particular 
strand of fiction and my identification of it, also explaining my interest in its interrogations of 
the human subject as it is confronted with an environmental crisis moment. A full overview of 
my theoretical approach is given in Chapter One, followed by four chapters, each examining a 
novel (or trilogy), and finally my conclusions.
One feature of the novels I examine is their emphasis, not just on the socio-political 
rift that underpins them, but on a broader underlying question about what it is to be human 
and the nature of our engagement with the nonhuman world. The contemporary divergence in 
thought, between the belief that radical action is needed and business as usual, is thus 
reframed as an ontological dilemma, revolving around a need to ascertain the root cause of the 
problems we face. Most of these novels—as does much currently emerging environmental 
crisis fiction—set their questions within a frame that dramatises ecological and / or social 
collapse by foreshortening these into the narrative past or present. While this places the 
human under immediate duress of its potential demise, demanding of this human what it 
might thus constructively do, such a scenario is inflected in these novels, at the same time, by 
their reconsideration of what this human might actually be. In other words, this fiction 
interrogates the meaning of being human as an ontological question that appears with the 
advent of environmental crisis. This seems to suggest, as far as this fiction goes, that a 
legitimate response to environmental crisis is unimaginable, unless recourse is first made to 
redefining the state of being human.
What characterises these novels as examples of a specific strand of environmental 
crisis fiction, however, is that they all engage with a specific idea: that environmental crisis is 
a result of our denial of death’s inevitability, which in turn is a symptom of our modem quest 
for progress. Correspondingly, these novels all explore the proposition that, in order to 
counter environmental crisis, we therefore now need to relearn our relations with death. 
While contemporary environmental crisis fiction is often perceived as being obsessed with 
doom, this very specific use of a notion of death-facing may suggest that this fiction is 
engrossed in something more or other than doom-mongering. Fiction that superimposes the 
imagined ends of humanity upon depictions of environmental and other kinds of collapse, as 
occurs in most of the novels I examine, may on one level present the advent of a catastrophic 
end as a kind of threat by which to incentivise popular and / or political change via its
2 With the possible exception o f McCarthy’s The Road, which does not name the cause o f  the death o f the world it depicts; 
nonetheless it emerges at a time o f  environmental crisis, and depicts a world in which ‘nature’ (ecology) has ended. I use the 
following editions: Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (London: Virago, 2004), The Year o f  the Flood  (London: Virago,
2010), Maddaddam (London: Bloomsbury, 2013); Cormac McCarthy, The Road  (London: Picador, 2007); Jeanette 
Winterson, The Stone Gods (London: Penguin, 2007); Amitav Ghosh, The Hungry Tide (London: Harper Collins, 2005).
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readership. Such fictional—and other forms of—environmental scaremongering is 
increasingly viewed as unhelpful, given the scale and nature of challenges faced. The 
apocalyptic view of environmental crisis, which for some these novels envisage, in focusing 
on humanity’s evils and possible redemption, seems to gloss over—if not erasing altogether— 
the actual questions posed in an environmental crisis world, such as how unviable modes of 
living might be turned around on a global scale. As Dobson states, to deliver a ‘message of 
impending catastrophe’ is not necessarily to induce social change.3 Timothy Clark further 
observes that there has grown a general mistrust of the idea that radical social change can be 
achieved by ‘targeting personal attitudes’ rather than (as he suggests) ‘directly addressing the 
specific political and economic institutions [...] that determine how people live and think’.4 
Yet, while environmental crisis fiction plainly does dangle a missive of death over its reader, I 
aim to illustrate that, at least as far as the fiction I explore goes, this is not just about leverage 
for change, nor is it a straightforward revelling in our likely doom. If, as seems to be the case 
in these novels, we also see disclosed a level of uncertainty over the capacity of the human 
subject to institute such change, then this fiction’s primary concern seems more to do with a 
technical loss of the very functionality of the subject as it encounters an environmental crisis 
world. It is this difficulty of a problematised subject, and especially the ways these novels go 
about addressing it, that motivates the investigations I go on to pursue.
What also interests me, and which becomes central to discussions throughout the 
dissertation, is the way this fictional concern with the human subject seems to disclose a 
corresponding, and strikingly comprehensive, entanglement with contemporary theoretical 
investigations of the human subject and its relations to its world. This is not just about an 
analogous effect of ‘environmental crisis’ as a new category of thought on both popular and 
theoretical discourses, although that is the broader frame of consideration. The link that I 
make between popular and theoretical domains revolves very specifically around the 
combined idea of the Western self as, first, alienated from death and, second, called upon to 
now learn to face death. This particular fictional pattern of problem and response can be seen 
to be broadly replicated across much contemporary theory, feeding into specific theoretical 
strands in particular ways. While this may seem something of a generalisation, it is worth 
noting that well before the advent of environmental crisis—by which I mean, more properly, 
the advent of our awareness of it—the human subject of Western derivation was already in 
distinct trouble. The emergence of poststructuralist thought within a Cold War era, and
3 Dobson, p. 103.
4 Timothy Clark, The Cambridge Introduction to Literature and the Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), p. 24.
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following on from earlier twentieth-century atrocities, had of course already undermined this 
subject in a variety of ways. The arrival of ‘crisis’ within the physical and aesthetic domain of 
‘environment’ appears subsequently to have placed this already unravelling subject in a state 
of ontological meltdown, since we are confronted—not just as Westerners but as a species 
collective—with the need to acknowledge our anthropogenic effects on the biospheric and 
other planetary systems and life-forms, and then, furthermore, to establish the means to halt 
and even undo them.5 This traumatic manifestation of the exterior world in the form of its 
crisis, as Timothy Morton suggests, seems to render ‘weird’ the ‘Lacanian truth “that there is 
no metalanguage’”—a truth that Morton claims was ‘by no means secured by poststructuralist 
and postmodern thinking’.6 The arrival of environmental crisis thus has the effect of forcing a 
materialising of the external world to enter the aesthetic field of our very being, causing a 
recalibrating of the ways we self-conceptualise. Morton explores how this has implications for 
art, resulting in what he describes as a 'turning to the object’.7 I say more about the ways this 
new attention to the material in fiction is paralleled in contemporary theoretical modes, 
particularly the speculative, in Chapter One.
One way to frame this correlation, meanwhile, is by viewing the contemporary 
moment as a ‘historical rupture’ in the Foucauldian sense.8 The rupture can be said to occur 
where the advent of environmental crisis impacts on an already discredited (particularly 
within the academe) human subject, producing the condition of its irreversibility and in turn 
re-inscribing how the present moment might be conceived. In drastically modifying our 
understanding of our temporal-material existence this makes it impossible to conceive the 
world today as it was conceived yesterday. Clark refers to the irreversibility of the 
contemporary moment as ‘the end of externality’, which includes the realisation that ‘the 
consequences of human action do not go away any more; they build up’, he says, ‘with 
destructive effects in the air and in the street’.9 Morton, with characteristic humour, depicts 
this moment using the metaphor of a flushing toilet. Whereas once we were able to forget 
about that which we flush away, we are now fully aware of the environmental consequences
5 In today’s globalising world, ‘Western’ and ‘Westernisation’ are increasingly slippery and problematic concepts. Where I 
use them, I mainly refer to a collective idea that nonetheless remains culturally embedded, particularly within the fictional 
themes as discussed in this dissertation.
6 Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End o f  the World (London: University o f  Minnesota 
Press, 2013), p. 22. Morton cites Lacan from: Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridon (London:
Tavistock, 1977), p. 311.
7 Morton, Hyperobjects, pp. 22 ,174 (emphasis in original).
8 Foucault often speaks o f  history in terms o f  ruptures and epistemic breaks. He challenges linear versions o f  history that see 
us moving progressively towards increased understanding or enlightenment. Rather, for Foucault, history is a feature o f  our 
emergence in the present, manifesting in discursive formations. See especially discussions in Michel Foucault, The Order o f  
Things, first published in 1966, and Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f  Knowledge, first published in 1969.
9 Clark attributes this concept to David Wood’s Toss o f  externality’, in Wood’s The Step Back: Ethics and Politics after 
Deconstruction (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005), pp. 172-3; Clark, p. 48.
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of our water use, and so on. As Morton puts it, where does it go when you flush if there ‘is no 
away anymore?’10 This sense of the present moment as amplified by the impacts we incur, 
enacted on a range of scales from the personal to the global, also replicates the appearance of 
the material within the aesthetic, which, it turns out, has been there all along. So, while we 
might say that fiction of the contemporary moment sustains a certain continuity, seen for 
example in its further problematising of an already challenged subject, it is also itself 
challenged with the need to grapple with an entirely new sense of how this subject is 
(re)contextualised in its world.
The fiction analysed in this dissertation seems therefore to depict what seems best 
described as a paradigm of the present moment, in which, as the advent of environmental 
crisis confronts us with our impacts on the material world, a corresponding need to relearn our 
relations with death emerges. In this dissertation, mainly for convenience, I refer to this 
phenomenon as the ‘death-facing paradigm’. This paradigm takes form, as already indicated, 
as a response to a perceived alienation from death, which in turn is understood as a cultural 
feature or symptom of the modernising West. The novels I examine depict the death-denying 
subject as incurring a collision, in the present environmental crisis moment, with material 
reality. Hence, having sought to overcome our material vulnerabilities through the modernist 
quest for progress, rather than escaping death as we thought, we have instead put at risk the 
planet’s capacity to sustain us. Given that we cannot escape death after all, it seems inevitable 
that death must now rebound upon us in the form of environmental crisis. This rebounding of 
death incurs the ‘end of externality’ as described by Clark, also giving rise to what Morton 
sees as a "turning to the object’ in art (see notes 8 and 10 above). Meanwhile, this paradigm’s 
imperative that we now learn to face death appears as a necessary corrective to environmental 
crisis in the present moment; such is the paradigm that the novels depict and explore, and 
which they also, in various ways, contend.
In outlining this ‘death-facing paradigm’ we have moved some distance, it may seem, 
from the starting point of a rift between Dobson’s framing of environmentalism and 
ecologism. The difference, for example, between a claim from Defra’s chief economist, 
Richard Price, that ‘[ejconomic and environmental performance must go hand in hand’, and 
Jonathan Porritt’s assertion that ‘a non-violent revolution to overthrow our whole polluting, 
plundering and materialist industrial society’ is needed to create an entirely ‘new economic 
and social order’, appears at first glance to have little to do with the developing idea that the
10 Timothy Morton, ‘What Is Ecological Philosophy?’ Erasmus University, Rotterdam (Saturday, May 25,2013).
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human subject needs to rediscover its own death.11 This stark gap reduces somewhat if we 
consider the death-facing paradigm as reflecting an anti-modernist stance, since it views 
industrial society’s ‘plundering’, as described by Porritt, and the quest for progress generally, 
as symptomatic of an alienation from death. It shares some elements, then, with ecologism as 
seen in Porritt’s stance. Yet, as I illustrate, the death-facing paradigm also discloses links, at 
times, with a general drift of Romantic thought that still holds sway in the contemporary 
moment, particularly around the question of ‘nature’ or ‘environment’. While Dobson himself 
notes the possible links between ecologism and the Romantic response to environmental 
issues, he is also clear to distinguish between them. While ‘radical green politics’, he clarifies, 
does seek ‘explicitly to decentre the human being’ and to ‘question mechanistic sciences and 
its technological consequences’, since it questions whether the ‘project of material affluence’ 
is ‘either desirable or sustainable’, that does not mean, he goes on, that we should see this as 
‘a renewal of the Romantic reaction that the Enlightenment, and [...] early forms of 
industrialisation brought about’. Rather, ecologism is based ‘on a self-consciously hard- 
headed assessment of the unsustainability of current political and economic practices’.12 
While his point is clearly made, it is no guard, even so, against the trajectory of ideas across 
the last few decades that has seen green thinking emerge in a variety of guises, including deep 
green and protectionist versions that often do replicate elements of Romantic thought. The 
broad spectrum of ideas in today’s mix of environmentalisms and ecologisms, as is widely 
acknowledged, consists of a sliding scale of positions, at one end centring on the ontological 
human, and at the other on its institutions. Even as this sliding scale itself replicates political 
divergences, it produces too an extensive zone of uncertainty with regard to possible 
solutions, which—for reasons that ought only to be speculated over—appears to find at its 
farthest point, according to the fiction I examine, a baseline in the problem of the human as a 
mortal being.13
So far, then, this particular strand of fiction can be said to engage with a watershed 
moment that a) is contextualised socio-politically by a contemporary rift in thought over 
responses to environmental crisis; b) is interpreted in terms of the human subject and new
11 Richard Price, ‘Chief Economist’s Forward’, Tim Everett and others, Economic Growth and the Environment, Deffa 
Evidence and Analysis Series, Paper 2, p. 5., March 2010
<https://www.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69195/pbl3390-economic-growth- 
100305.pdf> [accessed 10 November 2013]; Jonathan Porritt and Nicholas Winner, The Coming o f  The Greens (London: 
Fontana, 1988), p. 9, cited in Dobson, p. 6.
12 Dobson, p. 7.
13 For discussions on environmentalist and political stances, see William D. Dunderlin, Ideology, Social Theory and the 
Environment (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 2-5; with regard to speculations on death-facing I mean, simply, 
that when one even hints at how the problem o f death can be traced back in scholarship as far as the Early Greeks, it becomes 
too vast a subject to speak with any certainty on— although many possible observations, comparisons and discussions are 
clearly possible.
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perspectives on its relations with death; and c) discloses links with an analogous watershed 
moment in contemporary theorising. All of this, in turn, has to do with the advent of 
environmental crisis and its possible effect upon contemporary thought-structures and the 
ways the human subject, correspondingly, is understood or defined as a being-in-a-world.14 
This begins to define a rationale, for my analysis to follow, of this strand of fiction; however, 
this set of ideas is yet to be confronted with what will become, throughout the dissertation, an 
ongoing encounter with an underlying layer of paradox. This presence of paradox has 
implications for each of the elements of the watershed moment to which the death-facing 
paradigm is a response: the socio-political, the personal / ontological, and the theoretical (or a, 
b and c above). Furthermore it lies—as will gradually become clear—at the heart of the death- 
facing paradigm, and as such is a paradox with which the fiction I examine also constantly 
grapples.
An initial sense of this layer of paradox can be given by drawing upon an example that 
also illustrates the death-facing paradigm’s trailing associations with nineteenth-century 
thought. Alongside Dobson’s ecologism, at the point where it links to what he and others 
observe as remnants of Romantic thought in today’s discourses of environmental crisis, we 
might consider progress, temporarily, not just in terms of (economic) greed, as associated 
with capitalist hegemonies past and present, but in relation to its entanglement with the 
(humanist) idea of freedom—another key notion of the modernising West. Lewis Hinchman, 
in an article in which he considers the links between environmentalism(s) and humanisms, 
observes: humanism is ‘committed to the principle that human beings are and ought to be 
free’. Such a desire for freedom, as Hinchman makes clear, is problematic for many 
environmental theorists, who find the upholding of freedom ‘at the expense of [...] 
constitutive ties to the natural and cultural settings that give life meaning’ unacceptable.15 The 
idea of freedom that is of concern here seems to correlate with the freedom Maurice Cranston 
usefully describes as Progressive freedom, which he defines as ‘freedom from the constraints 
of nature, from disease and hunger and insecurity and ignorance and superstition’, as drawn 
from Lord Acton’s 1907 proposal to ‘write a history of mankind in terms of its struggle 
towards freedom’.16 This illustrates firstly how the death-facing paradigm in some ways
14 Being-in-the-world (with a capitalised B) is a term used by Martin Heidegger; see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time 12: 
84, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Harper & Row, 1962). While parts o f this dissertation return 
to Heidegger, particularly in relation to Jacques Derrida, here (and elsewhere) I use a lower-case ‘b’ to refer more loosely to a 
state o f being (in the world).
15 Lewis Hinchman, ‘Is Environmentalism a Humanism?’ Environmental Values 13 (2004), 3-29, pp. 3, 5.
16 Maurice Cranston, Freedom 3rd Edn. (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 6 (citing Lord Acton, 1907). See also Louise 
Squire, ‘The Animals Are ‘Breaking Out’! Critical Analysis o f a Discerned Shift in TV Advertising Towards Representations 
o f Animals as Free-Agents’, MA dissertation, University o f  Wales, Lampeter (2011), p. 23.
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barkens back to, and takes form as a response to, the emergent industrialisation of the 
nineteenth century. Yet it illustrates, too, that the alienation from death incurred by this quest 
for progress is, at least on one level, simply an attempt to overcome death in a more basic 
quest for survival. The very plundering of the planet re-emerges as an effort to overcome the 
constraints of nature, sickness and death, making the idea of dzdAh-facing a logical response to 
the harms that progress has caused.
As Hinchman and Cranston both observe, however, freedom—like most concepts—is 
not so easily defined. It can have a positive meaning in the sense of liberation ‘from 
reification and blind, fate-like processes’, as Hinchman observes, or it might, conversely, 
describe ‘self indulgent behaviours’, which in this context takes us back to greed.17 Hence, as 
Cranston helpfully points out, if we are to understand ‘freedom’ in a given situation, we need 
first to ask ‘freedom from what?’18 Cranston illustrates this by contrasting Progressive 
freedom (as just defined) with another coextensive freedom, which he calls Romantic. This 
Romantic freedom—derived, says Cranston, from Rousseau’s Social Contract—requires a 
‘return to more primitive and natural ways of living’, in order to gain ‘freedom from the 
constraints of advanced political institutions of modem European civilization’.19 Hence 
Cranston, while admitting that he generalises both Acton and Rousseau, points to a distinct 
conflict within meanings of freedom—freedom from nature on one hand and from civilisation 
on the other—both of which have currency within the same nineteenth-century period.20 This 
indicates a trace of Romantic freedom also at work in the death-facing paradigm and its 
contemporary call to face death. It also suggests that conflicts in current socio-political 
stances may continue to stand on inconsistent interpretations of humanist notions of 
freedom—a concept that in turn stands in conflict with the concept of death, through its 
connotations of limit. This observation resolves nothing, of course, other than to illustrate the 
way complexities concealed by such terms as ‘freedom’ might give rise to significant, if 
undisclosed, conflicts in the ways the human subject and its material (social, political and so 
on) relations are understood today.
This partial link with Romantic thought also has some influence on the way the death- 
facing paradigm becomes entangled with contemporary theory, particularly where the idea of 
our alienation from death is paralleled with an idea about our alienation from nature. Death- 
historian Philippe Aries, discussing the way conceptions of death alter over time, explores
17 Hinchman, pp. 18-19,25.
18 Cranston, pp. 5-6.
19 Cranston, p. 6 (Cranston cites Rousseau’s Du Contrat Social 1.8).
20 While Rousseau’s dates fall a century earlier than Acton’s, Rousseau did o f  course continue to have considerable influence 
across the nineteenth century.
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death’s transitions from being ‘a household event’ in the mediaeval era, through a state of 
omnipresence in the nineteenth century, to emerge as shocking and ‘unnameable’ in the 
twentieth century. Aries writes:
The old attitude in which death was both familiar and near, evoking no great fear or 
awe, offers too marked a contrast to ours, where death is so frightful that we dare not 
utter its name. This is why I have called this household sort of death “tamed death”. I 
do not mean that death that had once been wild and that it had ceased to be so. I mean, 
on the contrary, that today it has become wild.21
The perhaps unexpected distinction Aries makes here between mediaeval death as ‘tamed’ 
and twentieth-century death as ‘wild’ seems, inadvertently, to draw attention to the 
coterminous idea that we became separated from nature. Hence Aries’ ‘wild’ death becomes 
another symptom of our alienation from nature, an idea that also feeds into today’s anti- 
modernist rejection of progress while disclosing similarly Romantic roots. A difficulty, of 
course, arises with the very idea of separation—whether from death or nature—since in 
bringing the object problematically into view it produces the familiar dualities that stem from 
Descartes and to an extent Kant—for instance, the nature / culture distinction— against which 
the Romantics, in effect, already strove. The trouble with countering such dualities, as can be 
said of the Romantics and also of the death-facing paradigm, is that it relies on an assumption 
of their existence in the first place. Hence, where the ‘Romantic gaze’ sought to reconnect 
humans with the natural, it inadvertently sustained the distinction it sought to undo. While this 
illustrates, again, the way the death-facing paradigm discloses traces of Romantic thought in 
its contemporary paradoxes, it also, in effect, reveals the way its certain complexities lead it 
into problematic relations with contemporary theorising, spanning across such realms as 
phenomenology, poststructuralism, posthumanism, speculative realism, and more. In any of 
these theoretical modes, the pursuit of the question of the human and its relation to its world 
continues, particularly as it is further compounded in the environmental-crisis era. This ripple 
effect of the death-facing paradigm into various theoretical avenues is replicated in the novels 
I examine; hence I variously draw upon these theories in my analysis chapters. I will say more 
about this in Chapter One.
21 Philippe Aries, Western Attitudes Towards Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. by Patricia M. Ranum 
(London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 13-14.
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My central interest, however, lies in the developments in poststructuralist thought as 
it grapples with the contemporary moment. Unsurprisingly, poststructuralism provides some 
insight into our problem of death, also making some inroads—less predictably (and less 
convincingly for some)—into what I refer to as the contemporary phenomenon of death- 
facing. It is within poststructuralist thought, too, that a particularly useful cipher for death’s 
contemporary paradox appears, as will gradually unfold. Poststructuralism has of course 
talked about death since its earliest days, influenced as it is by the works of such thinkers as 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger. A palpable example of poststructuralism’s bearing 
on the questions at hand—although not one that I pursue—appears in the work of Jean 
Baudrillard, who depicts quite strikingly the death-denial to which the paradigm is a response. 
His notion of the ‘hyperreal’—as a media-based reality in the postmodern West that has lost 
its material footing—is based on what he refers to as a Western ‘de-socialisation’ of death, a 
relationship that he contrasts with non-Westem examples.22 This element of his work is 
anthropological, since in talking about death he is not talking about death per se, nor directly 
our relationship with it, but about cultural shapes and forms. He writes:
Our whole culture is just one huge effort to dissociate life and death, to ward off the 
ambivalence of death in the interests of life as value, and time as the general 
equivalent. The elimination of death is our phantasm, and ramifies in every direction: 
for religion, the afterlife and immortality; for science, truth; and for economics, 
productivity and accumulation.23
This statement is an important one for forthcoming discussions, since, as well as depicting 
alienation from death as an aspect of the modem and postmodern present, it illustrates how 
this alienation feeds into the very fabric of this present in its construction, even becoming a 
function of it. The anthropological element of Baudrillard’s work, seen here in his contrasting 
of Western and non-Westem attitudes to death, might be thought alongside Aries’ use of 
historical contrasts to depict our changing relations with death. In both cases, the very idea of 
death becomes contingent on the ways it is perceived within a temporal and spatial context. 
Anthropologists themselves—and archaeologists too—make sense of human cultures in part 
by exploring attitudes towards death via the study of grave goods, burial practices, and so on. 
This anthropological aspect of death turns out to be of some significance in this dissertation,
22 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death (New York: Sage, 1993), p. 130.
23 Baudrillard, p. 147.
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since, as the fiction I analyse illustrates, once one begins to explore the imperative that we 
must now learn to face death, a problem appears: all understandings of death might be 
understood as anthropological, and thus contingent, and this assumedly includes the paradigm 
of death-facing I discuss. Yet, harms done to the planet due to the impacts of progress upon 
the material world, which in turn may be relatable to a refusal of death or limit, appear, at the 
same time, as immutable. The clash of the discursive and the material that occurs here is what 
seems to give rise to the paradox that plagues this dissertation as it has plagued my thinking 
and writing of it, seemingly plaguing the fiction that I examine too. I employ Jacques 
Derrida’s work on death as ‘aporia’—or death as the ‘possibility’ of ‘impossibility’—to bring 
this problem to focus.24 Responding directly to Aries’ suggestion that death has become 
‘wild’, Derrida acknowledges that death is variously understood across different eras and 
cultures, but objects with some vigour to Aries’ unspoken suggestion that one might somehow 
regain an understanding of death. As, again, will be discussed more fully in chapter one, 
Derrida’s view is that death can never be understood as such—it is always, in the end, 
anthropological.25
The novels that I examine all seem to demonstrate both a turn toward death and a 
corresponding problematising of such a turn. They seem to employ the idea of death-facing as 
a solution only to decide, in the end, that nothing is really resolved at all. Of course, to pursue 
the spirit of paradox, no solution may in itself be a solution of sorts, indicating that making a 
double-negative of death is one way to explore the idea of death-facing. With differing 
degrees of postmodern self-consciousness, these novels take on this paradigm of death-facing, 
encountering its challenges and thereby revealing something of poststructuralism’s 
entanglements in contemporary theory. The general movement depicted, both in the novels 
and in the theoretical modes that move alongside them, is one that traverses from the 
discursive to the material. Yet, in fiction, as in theory, the discursive is never fully overcome, 
meaning that any existential understanding sought (in seeking death) reverts to a contingent 
state, perhaps reminding us that death takes us nowhere except in life. Even so, as the novels 
also depict, acknowledging death’s part in life provides some food for thought on how life is
24 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
25 Derrida argues that our ‘fundamental questioning [of death] cannot protect itself from a hidden bio-anthropo-thanato- 
theological contamination’; see Derrida, Aporias, p. 79.
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lived; hence this fiction may have something to say, at least, on the subject of today’s socio­
political rifts.
Chapter one, as already indicated, sets out my theoretical approach. I deal with this in 
two stages. The first consists of an overview of Michel Foucault’s historical approach to the 
human subject, which effectively provides the basis of my approach overall, despite my 
drawing on a somewhat eclectic range of theorists in my textual analyses. The second stage is 
to provide a sense of the way poststructuralist thought, and theory generally, responds to— 
and in some ways anticipates—the contemporary environmental-crisis moment, as 
speculation of the real and the material increases. This of course provides something of a 
challenge to my theoretical approach, since Foucault himself resisted quite adamantly any 
such turn. I handle this across subsequent chapters by applying my analysis specifically to the 
novels’ positioning of their characters. The fictional subjects deployed in the novels are all 
phantasms, after all, of thought as it is conjured up within the historical rupture of a 
contemporary, environmental crisis moment. Within this moment, since a question about the 
discursive and the material emerges, this question is tested out and reformulated in the lives of 
these characters, leading correspondingly to a need to call upon a range of contemporary 
theoretical approaches. Chapter One, therefore, functions both to establish the grounds for a 
Foucauldian subject analysis, and to describe the way the death-facing paradigm, itself an 
attempt to turn towards death, is entangled in shifting contemporary theoretical modes. This is 
supplemented by more detailed accounts of theories as they are applied within subsequent 
chapters.
Chapters Two to Five then present my textual analyses. Together, these chapters 
provide a survey of the ways death-facing as a paradigm is variously broached across this 
strand of fiction, moving chronologically toward the present in theoretical terms. In Chapter 
Two, I read Margaret Atwood’s recently completed Maddaddam trilogy, which provides a 
useful starting point. The trilogy employs an imperative of death-facing quite overtly, 
although Atwood also complicates this with her usual postmodernist vigour. This helps to 
conceptualise how the paradigm to which I refer presents death-facing as a response to 
environmental crisis by countering death-denial. Atwood’s trilogy makes use of 
characterisation to employ two alternative modes of death-facing: a nonhuman / biological 
route and an ethico-performative route. In this first chapter I draw mainly on Judith Butler’s 
performative subject, complemented by some more recent object-oriented ontology from 
Morton, whereby ‘the world’ element of being-in-the-world is reconfigured. My central focus 
is in the trilogy’s concern with redefining the ontological human in relation to its world. In 
Chapter Three I next read Cormac McCarthy’s The Road—a profoundly grim novel that
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engages with death-facing at its point of aporia. I discuss this in connection with Derrida’s 
Aporias, in which he critiques Heidegger’s notion of Being-towards-death.26 This chapter 
hones in on the discursive paradox at the heart of death-facing, and correspondingly the 
dilemma that constitutes environmental crisis, pointing to a shift in focus from ‘death’ to ‘life’ 
(as survival).271 focus on the differing characters’ relation to death-facing in terms of death’s 
imminent possibility alongside its impossibility, illustrating the way death-facing might be 
problematised as much as death-avoidance. In Chapter Four I read Jeanette Winterson’s The 
Stone Gods. Here, the central focus is the figure of the posthuman, to which the novel appears 
to append the function of death-facing. Central to this chapter is an exploration of the question 
of language, a preoccupation in the novel that signals its concern with the persistence of the 
human in the posthuman. Here, I apply ideas from two new materialist posthumanists, Karen 
Barad and Cary Wolfe, illustrating a reconstructive trend that Wolfe sees as gestured by 
deconstruction. Finally, in Chapter Five, I read Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide. This novel 
considers the question of language problem alongside an emphasis on the material and the 
real. Through this the novel demonstrates the functions and risks of hegemonic discourses, 
and emphasises death-facing as an on-the-ground political imperative. In this chapter I apply 
Martin Hagglund’s reprisal of Quentin Meillassoux to illustrate a speculative-materialist 
consideration of death. I conclude the dissertation with a discussion on the implications of the 
death-facing paradigm for fiction, as it seeks to articulate and respond to today’s 
environmental crisis.
These readings together illustrate the way the environmental-crisis novel seems, itself, 
to be caught at a vortex between the discursive and the material; hence its employment of 
death-facing as an ultimate attempt to reunite the human with its material world only 
illustrates, in the end, the discursive nature of this attempt. This, nonetheless, has some value 
for thinking in the contemporary moment.
26 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Harper & Row, 1962), 53, 
p. 307.
27 Derrida discusses a refocusing from death to life in Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview. An Interview with Jean 
Bimbaum, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 52. Derrida’s notion 
o f death as survival is also applied in Martin Hagglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism’ in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi 
Bryant and others, pp. 115-116; p. 116; p. 116. See discussions in both Chapters Three and Five o f  this dissertation.
13
Chapter 1: Theoretical Overview
Death, as a trope for fiction, is of course nothing new; it is the very specific turning towards 
death—as conveyed in the novels I examine in this dissertation—that gives rise to the 
appearance of death as paradox. The paradigm of death-facing that these novels present is one 
in which humanity actively and prudently turns to face a death that is already both possible 
and certain. Death appears as possible in its actuality because humans have altered the 
physical world to the extent that it may no longer sustain us; meanwhile, death is certain 
because death has always been so—for all our placing of death on a plane of avoidance, 
everything dies. Humanity then, it is proposed, in a conscious effort to counterbalance death- 
avoidance, turns to face both a death that we have wrought, and a death that is in any case 
there. At the same time, this death-facing occurs ‘in life’ and, of course, in fiction; hence, it 
remains ever a phenomenon of the realm of ideas, a discursive event, a positioning in relation 
to death that nonetheless has implications for the ways we manage our personal or socio­
political worlds. In this dissertation, I am interested therefore in death-facing as a paradigm 
that gives way to its own paradoxes, a discursive idea that appears in the fiction of today’s 
environmental crisis moment—such a moment being one of historical rupture, wherein human 
subjecthood is undermined and reconsidered.
One way to explore this death-facing imperative might be from a position of 
participation within the paradigm it depicts. I might (and ostensibly do) suggest that 
humanity—or more specifically the affluent, neo-liberalist West—needs to relearn its 
relations with death, or, to put it differently, lacks a vital creative and political engagement 
with the concept of limit. Such a position is currently well-documented in relation to a widely 
conceived Western avoidance of death, for example, in such works as Philippe Aries’ Western 
Attitudes Towards Death, Ernest Becker’s Pulitzer-Prize-winning The Denial o f Death or 
Stephen Cave’s Immortality} Critical commentary on notions of death^/hcmg is, however, 
rather less common. Notable of these might be environmental philosopher Val Plumwood’s 
‘Food-Based Approach to Death’, in which she reflects on her experience of being ‘seized as 
prey by a crocodile’, suggesting that our insistence on human exceptionality has led to our 
depriving the physical world of our deaths as we refuse to become nutrients for the future
1 Philippe Aries, Western Attitudes Towards Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. by Patricia M. Ranum 
(London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974); Earnest Becker, The Denial o f  Death (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1997); Stephen Cave, Immortality: The Quest to Live Forever and How it Drives Civilisation (London: Biteback Publishing, 
2012).
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lives of others.2 Correspondingly, Plumwood calls for a ‘reconception of death’ that might 
‘honour the dissolution of the human into the more-than-human flux’.3 Janis L. Dickinson’s 
‘The People Paradox’ also points to the demand in a climate-changing world for an ‘increased 
confrontation with mortality’, which she bases on a combination of Becker’s work and Terror 
Management Theory.4 With these, one might perhaps turn, too, to longstanding philosophical 
conceptions of death-facing, for example Plato’s view of death as life’s ultimate goal, offering 
a return to full knowledge, or Epicurus’ claim that death is nothing to fear, since in death one 
no longer exists to experience it.5 Since these ideas accord with some narrative elements of 
the fiction I examine, an initial aim, in this dissertation, is to draw together commensurate 
readings of the depiction, in this fiction, of the idea that humanity must learn to face death.
However, while this emergent phenomenon of death-facing constitutes a response to 
the problem of death-denial, I aim to illustrate the ways this fiction also problematises 
contemporary pronouncements of death-facing. As Toby, in Margaret Atwood’s The Year o f 
the Flood—responding to just such a pronouncement—puts it, ‘things are different up close’ 
(4). The history of death is, of course, the history of humanity and life itself; hence death has 
been ‘thought’ in countless ways. We have often envisaged being wiped out by, say, a meteor 
hitting earth, or by malevolent alien forces, or indeed by malevolent forces of our own 
making. Yet there appears to be something new about the discovery that we may have fatally 
altered the life-support systems that sustain us. This impacts, in turn, upon the ways death is 
conceived in the contemporary moment. This does not mean that awareness of environmental 
damage is new; Plato wrote about soil erosion—but he did so out of something more like 
interest than the kind of concern that manifests at a time of environmental crisis.6 The 
contemporary problematising of death, in the fiction I examine, seems to do with a new sense 
of it as appearing up close, as becoming very much a real and material problem. We can 
witness its possibility, for example, in relation to the current plight of bees—a harm in itself, 
of course, but one that also threatens food security across the biospheric system for countless 
species including our own. As our conception of death takes on this material quality, the
2 Val Plumwood, ‘Tasteless: Towards a Food-Based Approach to Death’, Environmental Values 17 (2008), 323-330, p. 323 
(abstract published posthumously).
3 Plumwood, pp. 329-230.
4 Janis L Dickinson, ‘The People Paradox: Self-Esteem Striving, Immortality Ideologies, and Human Response to Climate 
Change’, Ecology and Society 14,1. 34 (2009), n.p. <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/voll4/issl/art34/> [accessed 20 
May 2014].
5 According to Plato, ‘Since the soul is not destroyed by any evil, either its own or another’s, clearly it must be a thing that 
lasts for ever, and is consequently immortal’, The Republic o f  Plato, trans. By F. M. Comford (1941) in D. J. Enright, The 
Oxford Book o f  Death (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 156; according to Epicurus, death ‘is nothing to us, since 
while we exist, our death is not, and when our death occurs, we do not exist’, Letter to Menoeceus 124-25, cited in 
‘Epicurus’, Stanford Encyclopedia o f Philosophy (2005, revised April 2014) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/>  
[accessed 5 June 2014].
6 See Eugene C. Hargrove, Foundations o f  Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1989), pp. 29-30.
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notion of a turning to face death is correspondingly broached as an intensification of the real 
‘possibility’ of actual death.7
This quality of death-facing as intensifying death’s material possibility seems to be 
what leads to this fiction’s subsequent problematising of death-facing. It is one thing to face 
death in the Epicurean sense—to live a simple life in an acceptance of one’s own mortality— 
but it is another, it seems, to face death as actuality, since any attempt to do so only returns us 
to the problem that, for all our good intentions (if we have some), we effectively cannot 
comprehend death—much as the novel cannot fully escape its own discursivity. Death 
remains ever a story, a device with which to think about who we are; while fiction contributes 
to this thinking. The implications of this are various, and manifest in the fiction I examine in 
differing ways. For a start, the impossibility of comprehending death has the effect of 
collapsing any attempt to position a particular response to death as ‘truth’—and this includes 
the paradigm of death-facing that these novels depict. Hence, as they seek to portray death- 
facing as an idea, these novels find themselves caught up in the contingency of death’s 
trajectory, placing them seemingly on a road to nowhere. Their depiction of death’s 
imminence as real results, perhaps inevitably, in their depiction of a turn toward the 
ungraspable. While the idea of death has long invited thoughts of truth or the absolute, a 
forcible backtracking over such idealising thus manifests in fiction as environmental crisis 
appears in our discursive worlds. In response to death’s overt and tragic material appearance, 
fiction attempts to rewrite consciousness itself. Yet, in striving to depict death-facing, this 
fiction finds itself writing its own death in an attempt to abandon the discursivity of its own 
linguistic form.
It is in this entanglement of the discursive and the real that a mirroring pattern emerges 
between the fiction I examine and theory’s efforts to exit its own obsessions with language in 
pursuit of the real. Fiction’s depiction of a turn toward death-facing and a consequent 
encounter with paradox seems to somehow embrace, or allude to, theory’s attempts—in the 
contemporary moment—to reach beyond the designation of the human in both language and 
thought. The task of the present chapter is to outline how, in this dissertation, I go about 
correlating my readings of a strand of contemporary environmental crisis fiction with a 
consideration of a parallel, transitional moment in theory.
7 Derrida discusses the ‘possibility’ o f  ‘impossible’ death in his late book-length essay, Aporias, as will become key to 
discussions in this dissertation. See Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993). Please note that I make reference to death’s ‘possibility’ and ‘impossibility’ throughout the dissertation. In doing so, I 
acknowledge both Derrida’s and Martin Heidegger’s use o f these twin terms; however I also employ them in a more general 
sense, reflecting a wider philosophical acknowledgement o f the difficulties posed by death for thought and representation.
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The dissertation as a whole is contextualised theoretically within a broadly 
Foucauldian framework, beginning with a biopolitical positioning of the death-facing 
paradigm as arising out of modem and Western hegemonic forms of power and discourse. 
However, since the problematising of death-facing in the fiction I examine generally appears 
as a set of concerns to do with the ontological human subject—understandingly so, since it is 
the subject, whether individual or collective, who is confronted with the need to face death— 
these concerns become the focus of discussions across the textual analysis chapters to follow. 
Correspondingly, in much of the dissertation I supplement the historico-political aspect of the 
death-facing paradigm, as produced in a Foucauldian reading, with a more Derridean strand of 
theorising, taking as my basis Jacques Derrida’s late book-length essay, Aporias, in which he 
critiques Martin Heidegger’s Being-towards-death.8 While the projects of Heidegger, 
Foucault and Derrida of course differ in sometimes irreconcilable ways, a loose interface 
occurs around what Joshua Schuster calls their ‘ death-reckoning’.9 It is from a starting point 
of this interface that I allow the theoretical approach in the dissertation to develop, enabling 
an exploration of possible links between the depiction, in fiction, of ecological death-facing, 
and a turn toward the real that develops in theory, not just in reaction to but out of 
poststructuralism’s earlier concerns. This provides, in turn, the means to illustrate how this 
fiction appears to converse, at times problematically, with theory’s more recent forays into the 
speculative realms of realisms and materialisms. Each of my analysis chapters thus draws on 
a particular aspect of contemporary theorising, pointing to specific links between a paradigm 
of death-facing and poststructuralism’s ‘ecological turn’.
In setting out to achieve the above, I focus specifically on the ways this fiction 
variously repositions the human subject through its uses of characterisation. Death is an event 
that impacts, as these novels depict, on the life-world of the subject, played out as an ever­
present possibility within that subject’s life. Yet death remains, too, irreducibly 
anthropological and contingent. Here, I use a combination of (post)Foucauldian and 
(post)Derridean thought to explore how the novels variously position their characters, while 
illustrating how these differing subject positions, in turn, present specific responses to 
environmental crisis. Since I also argue that the death-facing paradigm reflects a more general 
mood and a turning point in contemporary theorising, I treat the novels’ characterisations as 
test-cases of such theorising. Hence, in conducting my subject analyses I draw on a range of
8 Derrida, Aporias; Heidegger states: ‘Death is Dasein's ownmost possibility. Being towards this possibility discloses to 
Dasein its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, in which its very Being is the issue’, Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by 
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Harper & Row, 1962), 53, p. 307; see also pp. 292-311.
9 Joshua Schuster, ‘Death Reckoning in the Thinking o f Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault’ Other Voices: the (e) Journal o f  
Cultural Criticism 1.1 (1979), n.p.
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theoretical ideas, indicating a trajectory of thought that moves from earlier forms of 
poststructuralism to its partial transition into a collection of speculative and new materialist 
approaches, all of which in some sense engage the subject in an acknowledgment of the 
material world and the beyond of thought.
Across the next few pages, I present and discuss these key theoretical groundings, 
beginning with an outline of the Foucauldian underpinnings to my theoretical approach. I next 
reflect briefly on a longstanding suspiciousness of French thought within ecocritical circles— 
a suspiciousness that occurs for reasons not altogether distinct from those of the trajectory of 
speculation within French thought itself. I then look more closely at death-facing as an idea, 
before considering the ways death-facing might also be problematised just as much as death- 
denial. Here I draw largely on the Derridean conception of death as aporia. Lastly, I discuss 
the ways contemporary thought seems, both in fiction and theory, to reach towards a subject 
that lies after, or beyond, the subject as we understand it.
Michel Foucault and thanatopolitics
One way to conceptualise the problematic alienation from death, to which the death-facing 
paradigm forms a response, is via Michel Foucault’s genealogy of the modem West. 
Foucault’s work is, of course, pre-‘environmental crisis’ in character; thus the notion of death- 
facing as described in this dissertation is only, arguably, pointed to in Foucault’s later work. 
Nonetheless, the initial consideration of death avoidance in a biopolitical frame provides 
certain advantages, the fruits of which appear much later in the dissertation. Even Derrida’s 
more metaphysical approach to death—which occupies much of the analysis in my central 
chapters—produces a return to the political in the sense that he designates death-facing as 
always inescapably ‘contaminated’ by the anthropological contingency of living.10 Hence, the 
problematising of death-facing can be shown to re-enter a biopolitical—or thanatopolitical— 
and thus Foucauldian frame, providing a crucial means to theorise the problematising of 
death-facing in the fiction I examine, along with this fiction’s considerations of its possible 
effects.
In his biopolitics, Foucault presents the idea of the emergence of ‘life’ into history, 
which he explains in terms of a historical (and Western) reformulation of power—as 
distinguished from a classic biopower. Stuart Murray describes this ‘important shift from 
classical biopower to modem biopolitics’ as follows:
10 Derrida, Aporias, p. 79.
18
Classical biopower is summed up as the sovereign decision “to take life or let live,” 
whereas modem biopolitics is conceived as “the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die.” 
The decision to kill or let live is replaced with a productive biopolitics that is twofold, 
that “makes live” and “lets die.” ... deaths are never “caused” as such; officially, they 
are merely “allowed,” a passive event, collateral damage.11
This historical shift, seen by Foucault, towards an emphasis on ‘making live’ rather than 
‘letting live’ in turn discloses a corresponding and emergent repositioning of death in relation 
to the collective human subject. Through our ‘valorising’ of life and living, death is 
effectively placed on a plane of avoidance; or as Foucault describes it: we see ‘the famous 
gradual disqualification of death’.12 It is not of course just Foucault who observes this 
alienation in the realm of the modem; it is foundational, as indicated earlier, to the works of 
several poststructuralist thinkers from Derrida, who acknowledges while problematising it, to 
Jean Baudrillard, whose theories are in a certain way based on it. It is observed, too, by 
historians such as Aries who describes modem death as ‘wild’, and in various other scholarly 
quarters.13 The significance of Foucault’s work, amongst these, is specifically the way he 
frames this phenomenon as an historical rupture that discloses new forms of power in the 
modem era, making visible—too—the problem of ‘letting die’, which Foucault refers to as 
‘thanatopolitics’.14
We can extend our view of this Foucauldian approach as it relates to contemporary 
ecological concerns, and to how the death-facing paradigm equates death-evasion with 
environmental crisis, by borrowing from Murray’s discussions on the ‘biopolitical hegemony 
of the West’; Murray states: ‘Those who are “made to live” better and longer lives frequently 
do so only at the cost of those who are “allowed to die” — and they are not killed, not 
directly, even though their deaths bear some consequential relation to the lives death 
enables’.15 This illustrates the way death-evasion, conceived here as ‘biopolitics’, in 
sustaining ‘life’ at all costs, becomes thanatopolitical in its reliance on the ‘death’ of other. In 
not directly killing but allowing to die, such death-evasion might be said to give rise, say, to 
such matters as the global increase in ghetto living, described by Slavoj Zizek as being a
11 Stuart J. Murray, ‘Thanatopolitics: Reading in Agamben a Rejoinder to Biopolitical Life’, Communication and  
Critical/Cultural Studies 5.2 (2008), 203-207, p. 204. References to Foucault are from: Michel Foucault, ‘"Society Must Be 
Defended”: Lectures at the Colle'ge de France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 241.
12 Michel Foucault, ‘Society Must Be Defended’, y . 247.
13 Ariès, pp. 13-14; reflections on a modem alienation from death appear across the humanities and human sciences.
14 Michal Foucault, ‘The Political Technology o f Individuals’ in Technologies o f  the Self: A Seminar With Michel Foucault, 
ed. by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 160.
15 Stuart J. Murray, ‘Thanatopolitics: The Living from the Dead’, Stuart J. Murray website 
<http://stuartjmurray.com/research/thanatopolitics-2/> [accessed 19 August, 2013].
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consequence of globalising capitalism.16 If we then replace our notion of the death of other 
with the death of the nonhuman and the nonhuman world, we thereby locate environmental 
crisis as thanatopolitical. Hence it is precisely here, on a Foucauldian approach, that a 
connection appears between the emergence of environmental crisis and humanity’s refusal to 
face death, where our living is ensured at the direct cost of the nonhuman world.
Correspondingly, a biopolitical conception of the death-facing paradigm identifies it as 
countering the thanatopolitical, thus offering a response to environmental crisis. Such a view 
of the death-facing paradigm also makes visible issues of power that characterise 
environmental crisis. The nonhuman world services the needs of the wealthy and stabilises 
growth; it functions as cheap labour (or, indeed, abuse). While death-facing clearly has 
implications for the individual, in its collective form it becomes the (imagined) collective 
socio-political deed of retracting monopolies over life’s primacy by one group (say, the 
affluent capitalist West) in relation to other groups, whether human or nonhuman. However, 
the deeply problematical question of how such a retraction of power as that of life itself might 
effectively be engendered is one that all the novels I examine contend with as a key concern. 
In Atwood’s trilogy it emerges as a question of Kantian versus utilitarian ethics: either the 
individual is the site of value and thus of change, or the larger picture must be accounted for 
regardless of the cost to individual lives. In Cormac McCarthy’s The Road we see only the 
profoundly bleak post-apocalyptic outcome of a continuation of hegemonic cultural forms, the 
question remaining at the ends of existence being one, again, of ethics. In Jeanette 
Winterson’s The Stone Gods, humans are depicted as repeatedly falling into the same trap, 
whereby abuses of power eventually backfire by resulting in environmental crisis—love being 
cited as the only intervention. But it is in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide, as discussed in 
my final textual analysis chapter, that we see most successfully illustrated the problematic 
effects of hegemonic power in a time of environmental crisis; for, even as the affluent West 
turns toward death-facing via its environmentalist movements, so, this novel depicts, death- 
facing itself has the potential to reconvene as a hegemonic force within a world of unequal 
powers. What this draws attention to, crucially, is the dangers of normalising discourse 
whereby any ethics—as observed by Isiah Berlin—has the potential to become totalising, in 
turn risking resulting in despotism.17 Such a point does not necessarily negate death-facing 
but it does demand a certain caution in its regard. Here, a Foucauldian consideration of the
16 Slavoj Zizek, ‘Nature and its Discontents’, SubStance, 117,37.3 (2008), 37-72, p. 40.
17 Isiah Berlin’s concern was with the notion o f positive  freedom, whereby individual freedom is attained via a process o f  
moral engagement with life, which, in Berlin’s view, risked resulting in despotism. Berlin’s view is that we should aspire to 
negative freedom, which instead promotes the attainment o f  emancipation via the removal o f  barriers to freedom. See Isiah 
Berlin, ‘Two Concepts o f Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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death-facing paradigm thus allows us to view its problematising as a socio-political issue, a 
matter that I follow up in my engagement with a selection of ideas from today’s speculative 
thinkers. If the idea of death-facing is to sustain any creditability as a response to 
environmental crisis, which I tentatively (at this point) suggest that it might, then the 
difficulties that arise as a result of its condition as discourse must also be accounted for.
The Foucauldian subject: What are we today?
Since my textual analysis chapters mainly focus on the site of the human subject as depicted 
in the novels’ uses of characterisation, my use of a Foucauldian baseline is extended into 
elements of his subject theorising, which in turn relate to his conceptions of history. Foucault 
views history as being pieced together and constructed from within the present moment, 
rather than as a continuum from the past. As Patrick Hutton states, for Foucault, 
‘[hjumankind’s point of departure for self-understanding [...] begins today, not in some 
hypothetical beginning of historical time’.18 This idea of history as descending from the 
present—genealogy, as Foucault calls it—emphasises the way the subject is also a construct 
of the present, rather than focusing on, say, its biological make up. Foucault describes the 
emergence of a ‘new pole’ of philosophy appearing from the end of the eighteenth century in 
which more traditional philosophical questions such as, ‘What is the world?’, ‘What is man?’, 
‘What is truth?’, and ‘What is knowledge?’ give way to another kind of questioning, more 
like: ‘What are we in our actuality?’ or ‘What are we today?’.19 Contrary to earlier efforts to 
understand the world and our place in it as an enduring phenomenon, this new emphasis is 
characterised by what Foucault calls the ‘analytic of finitude’, whereby the human subject 
comes to view its emergence as arising within its own limits.20 It is a time when history, as 
Joshua Schuster explains, confronts ‘an end which is not its fully realized completion or 
totalizing closure but its undoing and dissolution’, meaning that all understandings, all self­
conceptualisations, are thus rendered non-enduring, leaving ever open the question: what are 
we today?21
This Foucauldian view of the subject, as self-constituting whilst also conceiving its 
own limits, provides a valuable critical backdrop for the analysis of the strand of
18 Patrick Hutton in Technologies o f  the Self ed. by Martin, Gutman and Hutton, p. 134.
19 Foucault, Techologies o f  the Self, ed. by Martin, Gutman and Hutton, pp. 145-146.
20 Michel Foucault, The Order o f  Things, 2nd edn. (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 340-346.
21 Joshua Schuster, ‘Death Reckoning in the Thinking o f Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault’ Other Voices: the (e) Journal o f  
Cultural Criticism 1.1 (1979), n.p.
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environmental crisis fiction I examine, since, in framing its explorations of the human subject 
within a moment of a historical rupture, this fiction also becomes engrossed in the 
implications of this. The subject it depicts tends to be one that is deeply undermined in terms 
of any claims to ontological certainty. That our behaviours have resulted in the threat of 
death’s rebound upon us means that whatever or whomever we thought we were now appears 
as either false or flawed, rendering all continuums of thought—about who or what we are—as 
unsustainable at this point. Yet the outcome of this, in this fiction, is a sense of its constantly 
seeking to re-establish the subject via a process of a historical questioning, its attempting to 
ascertain which prior, or indeed future, historical moment might depict humanity as 
ontologically more sustainable—and therefore more viable—as a species for a climate- 
changing world. ‘Where did we go wrong?’ this fiction appears to ask. At what point in the 
history of human endeavour did we take a turn that led to the damages we see today? Was it 
with the emergence of agriculture and a shift in our relations with landscape from symbiotic 
to dominant? Was it with the rise of the modem and a gradual disjunction between the self 
and its world? Was it to do with the shift to mechanistic processes in the nineteenth-century 
industrialisation era? Or is the problem the contemporary globalisation of capitalist politics? 
These are not just questions for fiction but questions of our time, responses to which have 
implications for the ways the human subject conceives the future of its own living practices 
today. Are agrarian lifestyles the problem or the solution? Should we resist all forms of technë 
and find ways of reintegrating ourselves with natural processes? Should we alternatively go 
forward by building on ‘progress’? And, importantly, should we be (and are we) ‘human’ or 
‘post’ human?
Forming a conceptual backdrop to the narratives of the fiction I examine, such 
questions indicate the lingering presence of a further, underlying question: that of whether our 
flawed behaviour is ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. Is it in our nature to destroy—a nature that must 
therefore be curtailed—or did modem living wrest us from earlier, more benign forms of 
living? To seek to understand this is to seek to establish whether we ought now, in a prudent 
response to environmental crisis, become more like ourselves, or less like ourselves. This 
whole line of questioning is of course inherently problematic from a Foucauldian perspective, 
since for Foucault the subject is always contingent on its own self-constituting discourses 
within a given historical moment. Hence whether or not we possess such a thing as a ‘natural’ 
state of being, and, if so, whether or not it might help us to respond with some kind of greater 
ecological wisdom, is understood from a Foucauldian perspective as a contemporary 
discourse, one that assumes ‘natural’ and ‘nature’ to be categories by producing a further 
category of unnaturalness. The value of this, though, is not just that it enables a Foucauldian
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critique of this fiction’s figurations of the human subject, although such a task informs my 
approach across the textual analysis chapters. It can also be said, as will become clear in the 
course of the dissertation, that this strand of fiction seems itself to hold the same question in 
mind about the ways the subject is conceived. A tension thus appears, in this fiction’s 
interrogations of the human subject, between its depictions of the subject as (possibly) 
possessing inherent capacities as may be requisite for an effectual response to environmental 
crisis, and notions of the subject as always discursively defined in its moment of emergence. 
This illustrates the way longstanding distinctions between constructivist and essentialist 
subject conceptualisations are newly challenged by the emergent category of environmental 
crisis within our discursive worlds.
The question that underlies my dissertation—and to which its chapters constitute a 
response—is that of the role death-facing plays in this problematising of the subject in fiction. 
Death is a concept that also possesses an inescapable material function, since death marks the 
material end of life and, furthermore, everything dies. I propose that this fiction’s intense 
interrogation of death is therefore less about producing a leverage for change—although such 
a utility may ensue—than about taking the problem of defining the subject, in relation to its 
world, to its bottom line. The turn to death-facing performs a reuniting of the subject with the 
material at the point when environmental crisis appears as a category and forces the subject to 
address its mortal state. This, in turn, appears as a necessity if we are to respond to 
environmental crisis. However, the difficulty—as already indicated—is that, in this turn 
toward death as the ultimate delineation of the material, a discursivity not only remains, but is 
emitted. Death may consist in a material function but such a function, nonetheless, can only 
be described—in human terms—in life. Death’s unrepresentability thus seems to sit at the seat 
of our struggle to respond to environmental crisis.
If the question Foucault finds emergent in the early nineteenth century, ‘What are we 
today?’, appears unanswerable at this point, the outcome of this is that there is no apparent 
means to prescribe our response to environmental crisis. Ontologically speaking, the subject 
either exists as a mere construct of the moment and so can be assigned no agential capacity, 
or, its subj ect-capacities, if it has some, nonetheless remain contingent on the processes of 
power—either as subject to them or as producing new discourses and, subsequently, 
hegemonies. Within a poststructuralist domain, particularly at the point of high theory as 
dominated by the language problem, it may not be possible to satisfactorily address ways 
forward for the subject in its (crisis-ridden) world. However, if to an extent it depicts such a 
scenario, this fiction also shows that the abandonment of the insights of the poststructuralist 
thinkers is not so much inappropriate as futile: the difficulties just do not go away. So while
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the need for an abandonment of poststructuralism may be indicated for some, my task in this 
dissertation becomes one of exploring how this problem is tackled in theoretical interventions 
that retain some relation to poststructuralist insights, even as they seemingly oppose them. 
Hence I explore routes offered by subsequent developments arising withm poststructuralist 
thought, in a turn toward seeking for the real.
Environmental literary criticism and the perils of French thought
By pursuing developments within poststructuralist thought, alongside a consideration of 
fiction concerned with environmental crisis, I acknowledge placing myself in some contention 
with much environmental literary scholarship, especially that of first-wave ecocriticism, 
which has tended to eschew ‘theory’ as unable to deal with such concerns. This dismissal 
corresponds broadly with the post-theory era of literary scholarship generally, which at the 
very least conceives theory as in need of re-evaluation. The concern here is with the ‘high 
theory’ movement (particularly poststructuralism) of the late twentieth century, rather than 
with a more broadly conceived literary practice of applying a defined critical lens to the 
literary text. My discussions in this dissertation are primarily in relation to the former, 
although I also make room—in my textual analyses—for its dissolution, not as a static ending 
but as a transition to ongoing developments that continue to carry elements of poststructuralist 
thought.
The discomfort some ecocritics have with theory is worth saying more about, since it 
expresses specific concerns. These are to do with the way an emphasis on text creates a 
perceived circularity of thought, and thus its enclosure. Reader and text are thus entrapped, so 
that ‘the real’—in this case the physical world and our relationship with it—remains ever in a 
disjunctive state, rendering all explanations constructs. One problem with this, for ecocritics, 
is that it obfuscates the possibility for representation of the natural in literary form. It also has 
political implications, since, if no real world can be said to exist, if it is always a construct, 
then how might one argue that such a world should be defended? Thus, for Glen Love: 
‘Teaching and studying literature without reference to the natural conditions of the world and 
the basic ecological principles that underlie all life seems increasingly short-sighted, 
incongruous’.22 Love’s response to this is to recommend ‘eco-consciousness’ over ‘ego- 
consciousness’, a position from which one favours writing and critique that begins from an 
acknowledgement of the nonhuman, and thereby acknowledges the role and presence of ‘the
22 Glen A. Love, Practical Ecocriticism: Literature, Biology and the Environment (London: University o f  Virginia Press, 
2003), p. 18.
24
natural’ in literary form.23 This distinction refers to and replicates—although it fails to 
resolve—an aesthetic tension between subject and world that underlies much discussion in 
this dissertation.
A brief anecdote about Foucault provides a convenient means to consider this problem 
of a circularity of thought and its subsequent enclosure in more detail. Foucault was not 
interested in nature, as is demonstrated in a story told by a colleague of his, Jacqueline 
Verdeaux, who accompanied him on a car trip through the Italian Alps. She recalled that, 
‘whenever she showed him some magnificent landscape -  a lake sparkling in the sunlight -  he 
made a great show of walking off toward the road, saying “my back is turned to if” .24 One 
might be concerned here with Foucault’s implied lack of interest in ‘nature’ per se. However, 
the more telling point seems to be that of Foucault’s resistance to gazing upon nature where 
such gazing upon designates our constructing of ‘nature’ as an idea. While the ‘nature-as- 
culturally-constructed’ claim, as Dana Phillips acknowledges, can appear hubristic at times— 
as might Foucault’s demonstration of hubris towards landscape, it does not, as he also notes, 
amount, necessarily, to the solipsism that is so often attributed to it.25 As Phillips notes, 
‘Many theorists would take the position that “the ego” is effectively dead as an object of 
critical interest because of the manifold ways in which “the subject” [...] is defined, but also 
delimited and undercut, by the forces of history and by cultural assumptions’.26 Hence, ‘ego- 
consciousness’—or the solipsistic ruling out of the existence of the world beyond our 
reckoning of it—‘would seem’, says Phillips, ‘to be the least of the dangers posed by 
contemporary criticism and theory’.27 In other words, the workings of discursive formations 
to which Foucault consistently draws attention in his work are also outcomes of his 
antihumanist decentring of the subject; hence his act of turning his back on the vistas of 
nature can be no solipsist denial of the natural world.
The decentring of the subject, as I discuss later on, nonetheless becomes one the 
problematics for poststructuralism at a time of environmental crisis. The need for the subject 
to now ‘act’ requires capacities that its decentring has (with good reason) undermined. 
Differing evaluations of theory’s role thus feed into the differing accounts of agency 
appearing in emergent posthumanisms.28 So, too, the question of the natural world as a real
23 Glen A. Love, ‘Revaluing Nature: Toward an Ecological Criticism’, in The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary 
Ecology, ed. by Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm (Athens: University o f  Georgia Press, 1996), p. 232.
24 Discourses o f  the Environment, ed. by Éric Darier (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999), p. 6.
25 Phillips, Dana, ‘Ecocriticism, Literary Theory, and the Truth o f  Ecology’, New Literary History 30.3 Ecocriticism (1999), 
577-602, pp. 578-80.
26 Dana Phillips, The Truth o f  Ecology: Nature, Culture and Literature in America (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2003), 
p. 136.
27 Phillips, pp. 136-137.
281 discuss various definitions o f posthumanism in Chapter Four; see especially pp. 121,123.
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phenomenon becomes an issue, colliding with established poststructuralist ideas to produce 
new strands of French thought within contemporary philosophising, particularly the 
speculative realisms. Foucault’s denial of the landscape (or our thinking symbolically about 
this denial) nonetheless retains its value amidst contemporary developments, since it equals 
recognition of the dangers of normalising discourse. At the same time, viewed from the 
perspective of the contemporary scene—that of our discovered failure to acknowledge the 
complexities and vulnerabilities of ‘landscape’ (that is, of the nonhuman world)—the image 
of Foucault’s turned back provides an anecdotal moment whereby, without creating another 
layer of false assumptions about ‘nature’, the human subject is now faced with the need to 
somehow turn and confront its relations with its world at a time of environmental crisis. It is 
this turning and confronting, as variously figured in the fiction I explore, that remains the 
focus of consideration in this dissertation.
The denial by the ‘regarding figure’ of the (real) landscape of its emergence is also 
evocative of, although it differs logistically to, the corresponding poststructuralist extraction 
of ‘the text’ from its embeddedness in supposed metaphysical realms of truth, notably seen in 
Derrida’s famous claim: HI n ’y  a pas de hors-texte1 P  Nonetheless, this claim—that ‘there is 
no outside-text’—is similarly problematic for ecocritics since (especially if translated as 
‘there is nothing outside the text), it seems to deny the (real) existence of any external 
referent, returning us to the problem of solipsism. Foucault’s anecdotal refusal to 
acknowledge the landscape now becomes a refusal that ecocritics, particularly those in the 
US, counter quite literally by taking students out on rambles into the countryside. The self- 
reflexivity of high theory, as encapsulated in Derrida’s statement, does clearly date 
poststructuralism as an exemplar of the linguistic turn that infiltrated philosophy and the 
humanities across the late twentieth century. Nonetheless, a concern with language and the 
text also recurs at a time of environmental crisis, as is notably apparent in the fiction I 
examine. The tendency to see Derrida’s claim as solipsistic is discussed by Joseph G. 
Kronick, who reminds us of Rodolphe Gasché’s point that, rather than ‘denying altogether’ 
the external referent, the phrase il n ’y  a pas de hors-texte ‘points to the structural 
impossibility of the text fulfilling itself either in some extra-textual referent or in some 
internal identity with which it could coincide’.30 Cary Wolfe, whose posthumanism I discuss 
in Chapter Four, takes this further by proposing that Derrida’s deconstruction itself gestures
29 Jacques Derrida, O f Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p.158.
30 Rodolphe Gasché, cited by Joseph C. Kronick, Derrida and the Future o f  Literature (Albany: State University o f  New  
York Press, 1999), p. 59 (emphasis added). Original source: Rodolphe Gasché The Tain o f  the Mirror: Derrida and the 
Philosophy o f  Reflection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 281.
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toward the reconstructive.31 Here one can begin to see a movement that seeks to free itself 
from asphyxiation by high theory; yet nonetheless takes its innovations and builds from them 
into the contemporary situation. Here, as in poststructuralism generally, it remains 
problematic to view the text as providing some kind of direct representation of reality— 
although this tendency reappears in some eco-mimetic practices today; however, it is equally 
problematic to see Derrida as wholly denying reality per se. As Timothy Morton 
correspondingly remarks, ‘When I’m feeling charitable toward Derrida I imagine he thinks 
that by imploding generalization he is leaving nontextual objects intact’.32 Foucault’s turned 
back may, thus, depict either the sense of a (supposed) denial of reality per se (nature), or a 
denial of our construction(s) of it, perhaps illustrating one way to distinguish between the two 
broad planes of Derridean and Foucauldian thought.
Nonetheless, as my use of this anecdote also suggests, the distinctions between the 
two planes blur in certain ways. The novels I examine all concern themselves with both the 
cultural problem of death-evasion (and correspondingly death-facing) and issues of language 
and textuality; hence the ways these two planes coincide is worth further remark. In effect, 
they form different categories of resistance to the same sorts of metaphysical assumptions, as 
found in Western thought, that go back as far as Plato among others. Where Plato saw ‘truth’ 
as lying in a world of forms (the location of which is assumedly unworldly), subsequent 
traditions of Western thought have located truth somewhere—on an inside—effectively 
stabilising the very notions of meaning or truth.33 Where Foucault resists this by displacing 
the human subject from its reliance on truth, relocating it in history as a product of the 
workings of power and politics, Derrida unfastens writing from its reliance on assumptions of 
an interior truth, redistributing meaning—along with its complexities—into the interplay of 
signs. Hence, although the two conceptual planes are distinct as strands of poststructuralist 
thought, they nonetheless possess a degree of commonality reflective of the broader concerns 
of Continental thought more generally. It is in relation to these broader concerns, to which the 
two broad categories accordingly relate, that the starting points for a turn toward the material 
emerges.
Despite poststructuralism’s general unpopularity among ecocritics, a number of 
scholars continue to explore its possibilities at a time of environmental crisis.34 Verena
31 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism! (London: University o f Minnesota Press, 2012).
32 Timothy Morton, ‘Here Comes Everything: The Promise o f  Object Oriented Ontology’, Qui Parle: Critical Humanities 
and Social Sciences 19.2 (2011), 163-190, p. 178.
33 For discussion on Plato’s world o f forms, see ‘Plato’, Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/> [accessed 25 June 2014].
34 Among these we could list Morton and Wolfe; also Timothy Clark, ‘Towards a Reconstructive Environmental Criticism’, 
Oxford Literary Review  (2010) 46-64; Adeline Johns-Putra, 'Ecocriticism, Genre, and Climate Change: Reading the Utopian
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Andermatt Conley suggests, even, that poststmcturalism was inherently ecological at its 
outset, but that this was lost in the course of its development; thus by working back through 
theory’s canon, she argues, it may be we who discover poststructuralism’s ecological 
potential.35 My project contributes to such a line of thought by demonstrating the ways in 
which a turning toward death, as seen in contemporary fiction, discloses links with a 
corresponding contemporary theoretical movement that extends from linguistic toward 
material concerns. This depicts poststmcturalism as it engages with the ecological at a time of 
environmental crisis. Meanwhile, the layers of paradox encountered in fictional form as these 
novels seek to figure an imperative of death-facing may in turn say something about the 
contemporary socio-political impasses that the human subject, faced with environmental 
crisis, appears to depict today.
Facing death
Despite the many ways to explore historical practices of alienation, to which the death-facing 
paradigm is effectively a response, my discussions in the textual analysis chapters mainly 
revolve around the countering notion of a death-/<7cmg imperative. That is, the novels I 
examine all focus primarily on investigating this notion of ‘facing’ death. Such death-facing is 
clearly depicted as response to environmental crisis, countering the problematic alienation 
(whether from nature or from death) out of which it emerged. If by valorising life to the extent 
of having refused death we have let die the nonhuman other (or some of its parts), then a turn 
to death-facing assumedly reverses the conditions that wrought environmental crisis; at least, 
such is the proposition that these novels explore. Death-facing is at the same time, clearly, 
problematic, since it is so drastic. Why would any human collective or individual opt to face 
death? There are (at least) two possible answers to this. One is that death-facing can be 
understood as an ethical choice based on ecological grounds; such ethical behaviour might be 
productive or at least might provide a feel-good factor. The other is that death-facing 
becomes, conversely and thus paradoxically, a form of self-protection. The very appearance 
of environmental crisis signals the rebound upon us of the death that we have refused. As 
Claire Colebrook—in a recent dialogue exploring the Anthropocene as a doomsday device— 
more succinctly puts it, the very act of our ‘intentionality’ or ‘mastery’, in developing the
Vision o f Kim Stanley Robinson's Science in the Capital Trilogy', English Studies, 9 1 .7  (2010), 744-760; Dana Phillips, The 
Truth o f  Ecology: Nature, Culture and Literature in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Serpil Oppermann, 
‘Ecoriticism’s Theoretical Discontents’, Mosaic 44.2 (June 2011), 153-169; and possibly various others.
35 Verena Andermatt Conley, Ecopolitics: The Environment in Poststructuralist Thought (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 10.
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technë of life enhancement, has ‘the tragic quality of coming back to destroy us’.36 Now that 
the world’s capacity to sustain us appears threatened, suggesting our collective demise, we 
begin to recognise the value of limit. Given this, the turn to death-facing begins to appear less 
a project of ethics than one of survival, an act of self-preservation in the guise of self- 
sacrifice. This in turn, however, presupposes that there might be something wrong with the 
desire for self-preservation. The situation is clearly complex, as the fiction I explore also 
illustrates. Whereas the desire for survival, as a driver for progress, produced an alienation 
from death, it is now through facing death that we see our survival as possible. Death-facing 
as self-sacrifice thus functions by retracting the human subject from its assumed place in the 
world, whether out of this subject’s new generosity, or out of its reconsideration of the 
possibilities for its own future. At the same time, either way, it involves this subject coming to 
terms with the material world as existing with and beyond its own living practices, enabling it 
to address in real terms the limits and opportunities of its relationships with the nonhuman 
world. Yet, since one can only adopt a stance or belief—one can only face anything—in life, 
then death-facing, ultimately and paradoxically, remains a stance of the living.
Philosophy has of course long taken the view that one might live better or more 
comfortably (and so on) by first coming to terms with death, as is seen in the significance of 
the death problem within philosophical discourse generally—even as it produces differing 
views. This illustrates that the death / life paradox is not new. However, what seems to occur 
at a time of environmental crisis, wherein the links between our modes of living and the 
condition of the physical world become so apparent, is that the idea of death-facing— 
reinstated in today’s postmodern era—becomes anchored to the possibility of ‘actual’ death. 
The planet may die; we may die; vast swathes of rainforests and other biospheric regions are 
being stripped away; endless numbers of species are being lost to history; and so on. These 
material instances of death problematise human survival in innumerable and very real ways, 
the result being that death-facing now appears to produce two contrasting meanings: one 
philosophical / abstract, and the other literal / material. Since the neo-Malthusian notion of 
actual limit retains some currency in the contemporary moment, even—in its more extreme 
movements—recommending human euthanasia as means to ‘save the planet’, then a
36 Claire Colebrook, pers. com., Cary Wolfe and Claire Colebrook, ‘Is the Anthropocene a Doomsday Device?’ Jan 12th 
2013, The Anthropocene Project, Hans der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin (YouTube, Jan 23,2013) 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLTCzth8H 1 M> [accessed 28 December 2013].
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materialist notion of death-facing must, it seems, uphold this sense of actual death as we 
understand i t 37
The material or real aspect of death-facing appears to produce a range of possible 
forms. This includes its relation to the notion of ‘limit’ assumed in Andrew Dobson’s 
ecologism, which proposes that runaway lifestyle habits, fuelled by neo-liberalist notions of 
human rights and freedoms—or more particularly the political structures that support and rely 
upon them, must be curbed.38 Death-facing also refers to a certain mode of contemporary 
theorising, seen in the speculative realisms and new materialisms that currently seek to 
establish means of reference to the material or external world as a ‘real’ thing. Here, while 
death-facing pertains, again, to life, not death, the emergent conception is one of the real as 
radically overstepping the bounds of the human dimension. This in turn gives rise to the 
posthumanist thought (which notably appears in the mind of the human): the thought of the 
world as existing with but also without us—a phenomenon Greg Garrard has referred to as 
‘disanthropy’.39 I consider posthumanism and its links to the contemporary phenomenon of 
death-facing specifically in Chapter Four, in relation to Winterson’s The Stone Gods. There, I 
explore the key difficulty and perhaps also the value of posthumanism, which is its inexorable 
perpetuation of the human, even as it eclipses so much of what this human stands for. 
Winterson’s novel grapples constantly with the difficulty of the perpetuation of the human in 
the posthuman figure that lies beyond it, so much so that its key protagonist seems unable, 
even at the moment of her eventually-faced death, to overstep the subjective or existential 
viewpoint.
The various constituents of the contemporary phenomenon of death-facing, 
particularly its materialist element, can be understood—as far as the present project goes—as 
responses to the (very real) advent of environmental crisis and its manifestations (global 
warming, toxicity, species and habitat loss, depletion of resources and so on) within the 
epistemological rupture of the contemporary moment. There is more, though, to this 
apprehension—in a contemporary death-facing mode—of the catastrophic effects of human 
practices, than just the discovery of damages. For a start, there is the irreversibility of these 
effects—the irrecoverability of lost species and ecosystems, not alleviated by the cultivation 
of replacements; there is also the impossibility of returning to some prior, possibly benign,
37 For example, the slogan o f  the Gala Liberation Front’s Church o f Euthanasia is ‘Save the planet, kill yourself. The four 
pillars o f  The Church o f  Euthanasia, founded by Reverend Chris Korda in 1992, are: suicide, abortion, cannibalism, and 
sodomy, all o f  which help reduce population <http://www.churchofeuthanasia.org/index.html> [accessed 17 May 2012].
38 Dobson, pp. 2-13.
39 Greg Garrard, ‘Worlds Without Us: Some Types o f Disanthropy’, SubStance 127,41.1 (2012), pp. 40-60.
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position, and the realisation of a loss of externality in the present, and so on.40 Then there is 
the way these effects, in becoming a signifier for our possible demise, give way to 
unprecedented aesthetic complexities. Morton—who proposes that the world has in any case 
already ended (hence it is pointless to panic)—explains this well with his notion of 
hyperobjects.41 Whereas the world, says Morton, is (more or less) a ‘container in which 
objectified things float or stand’, we have now ‘entered the time of hyperobjects’.42 
Hyperobjects are ‘things that are massively distributed in time and space relative to humans’, 
such as the biosphere, the solar system, the ‘sum total of all the nuclear materials on Earth’, 
long lasting products of human manufacture such as Styrofoam, or ‘the sum of all the 
whirring machinery of capitalism’ (and so on).43 They are responsible for the end of the 
world, Morton states, because the very idea of a world ‘depends on backgrounds and 
foregrounds’.44 Existing on scales we cannot grasp, hyperobjects can only partially be 
perceived; hence they have realities that we cannot account for, and any thought of ‘the 
world’ becomes no longer comprehensible. I discuss Morton’s hyperobjects in Chapter Two 
where I consider the appearance of the nonhuman as an ethical dilemma impacting on human 
thought itself. In a similar vein, Colebrook describes the Anthropocene era (the geological 
epoch of human effect on the earth’s systems) as ‘a threshold at which all “our” concepts of 
horizon, milieu, ethos and polity are voided’; this indicates in turn, she says, that ‘our 
dwelling is no longer inhabitation’; nor do we ‘partake in an organic interdependence or 
ecology’.45 Any thought of a return to a wholeness as beings in-the-world is thus invalidated. 
Whatever capacity we thought we possessed, which might complete this wholeness, now 
becomes inadequate or false. This radical shift in our aesthetic apprehension of the world 
contributes to the emergence of our material death-facing response, since our apprehension of 
ungraspable material phenomenon reconditions us, and even effectively ‘finishes us off. As 
Morton puts it, hyperobjects ‘bum a hole in our minds’.46
The significance of this aesthetic element for the phenomenon of death-facing is the 
way it also confounds all directionality for the human subject, having the effect, in turn, of 
disturbing any attempt—including in the fiction I examine—to reposition this subject. On one 
hand, death-facing appears as a conscious, agential, ethico-performative act; on the other, it
40 For discussion, see Introduction, pp. 4-5.
41 Morton, Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End o f  the World (London: University o f  Minnesota Press, 2013). 
pp. 2 ,7 ,99-133 .
42 Morton, Hyperobjects, pp. 2, 99.
43 Ibid., pp. 130-135.
44 Ibid., p. 99.
45 Claire Colebrook, ‘Not Symbiosis, Not Now: Why Anthropogenic Change is Not Really Human’ Oxford Literary Review  
34.2(2012), 185-209, p. 188.
46 Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 130.
31
seems determined by our sense of the world and its parts as coming towards us—from 
nowhere or everywhere—imploding any intentionality we may think we have, enfolding 
death back upon us. This ‘intra-action’ between the subject and its world is aptly described in 
the title of Karen Barad’s book, Meeting the Universe Halfway, a reconsideration of life in 
quantum terms that I will say more about, again, in my discussions on Winterson in Chapter 
Four.47 The aesthetic character of death-facing, as results in this confounding of directionality, 
is a phenomenon not limited to the narratives of any one of the novels I examine; it is a 
feature of them all. It appears, furthermore, to at least partially explain their constant 
grappling with an underlying tension, which variously manifests in such paradoxical narrative 
features as the evocation and subsequent countering of a dialectic of life; the overlaying of 
humanism with posthumanism and the subsequent retraction of it; or more generally the 
demand for death-facing, which nonetheless can never, it seems, be fully followed through.
Death-facing problematised
Throughout the dissertation, I tend generally to consider these difficulties, which the novels 
face as they attempt to figure death-facing, in relation to Derrida’s notion of death as aporia. 
In building on Heidegger’s notion of death as the ‘possibility’ of ‘impossibility’, Derrida 
illustrates the problematics of the death-facing paradigm whilst helping to conceptualise its 
contingent nature.481 say more about Derrida’s conceptualising of death as aporia in Chapter 
Three, where I apply it specifically to my reading of McCarthy’s The Road—a novel that 
depicts death-facing with such intensity that it virtually tips the reader into death’s aporia. 
Nonetheless, some introductory points might usefully be made here, in particular by way of 
contextualising Derrida’s argument, which is founded upon his reading of and certain 
objections to Heidegger.
In Being and Time Heidegger famously describes humans as Beings-toward-death—a 
claim of some philosophical density. To say that we are Beings-toward-death is to say that 
death in some sense completes us. As Schuster, referring to Heidegger, puts it, ‘[sjtrictly 
speaking, dying reveals itself not as “is” but as is not. Thus the totality of Being is 
fundamentally linked to its own negativity, its own non-Being’.49 Heidegger posits this in 
relation to his subsequently problematic notion of a proper and authentic self. This involves
47 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement o f  Matter and Meaning (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007).
48 Heidegger describes death as ‘the possibility o f  the absolute impossibility o f  Dasein’; see Being and Time, p. 294.
49 Schuster, n.p.
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an addressing of ‘mineness’, whereby death ‘is Dasein’s ownmost possibility’.50 One’s 
‘Being-a-whole’, says Heidegger, is correct if ‘care, as Dasein’s basic state, is “connected” 
with death—the uttermost possibility for that entity’.51
While this very cursory précis inevitably leaves out much of the complexity it relies 
upon, certain of the elements of Heidegger’s Being-toward-death that find resistance in 
Derrida’s work are laid out, at least in provisional form. While Derrida and Heidegger both 
speak in terms of death as the ‘possibility of an impossibility’, each acknowledging death as 
non-representable (there is no ‘is’ of death), Heidegger nonetheless conceives death’s 
mineness as the completion of Dasein, whereas Derrida refuses such authenticating. Derrida 
wonders whether it is even possible to speak of ‘my death'.52 For Derrida, to say that death is 
the ‘possibility of impossibility’ is to recognise death as the ultimate aporia: while death is 
always ‘possible’ (we assume it will happen at some point) it nonetheless remains irreducibly 
‘impossible’; we can never understand death as such.53 Derrida therefore resists, in the last 
analysis, Heidegger’s attempt to establish a pre-theoretical or existential conception of death, 
since for Derrida all conceptions of death are irrevocably contaminated by the mind of the 
living self. We cannot find a place in thought that would be free from the traces of influence 
that bring us to any particular moment in our thinking toward death. Even the attempt to 
establish a pre-theoretical conception of death is in itself, already, to disclose a certain 
intentionality—including that of Heidegger’s notion of the authentic self.54
This problem of ‘mineness’, which Heidegger himself, as Schuster also points out, 
later largely abandons as he turns his attention more particularly to ‘being’, is alleviated in the 
work of Foucault and Derrida by their use of the ‘we’.55 This is discussed in depth by 
Schuster in his essay on ‘death-reckoning’ in the works of Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida.56 
The emergence of a ‘we’ is of course seen in Foucault’s work in the question ‘What are we 
today?’ and in his discussions on the emergence of ‘humanity’ into history.57 Pointing to an 
imperfect parallel between Foucault’s ‘analytic of finitude’ (‘How is knowledge constituted 
by its own limits, limitations, and death?’), and Heidegger’s ‘placement of death (finitude) 
within humanity such that the limits of knowledge link with the disclosure of the ability to
50 Being and Time, p. 307.
51 Being and Time, p. 103.
52 Schuster, n.p.; see also Aporias, p. 21.
53 Derrida, Aporias, p. 36.
54 For Heidegger, Derrida uses Sein und Zeit, 16th ed. (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1986), and Being and Time, trans. John 
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962). See Aporias, p. 86.
55 For Foucault, see Madness and Civilisation (London: Vintage, 1998) and The Order o f  Things (New York: Random 
House, 1970); for Derrida see ‘The Ends o f  Man’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30.1 (September 1969), pp. 
31-57.
56 Schuster, n.p.
57 Foucault, Techologies o f  the Self, ed. by Martin, Gutman and Hutton, pp. 145-6.
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know’, Schuster cites Foucault as concluding that ‘To be finite [...] would simply be to be 
trapped in the laws of a perspective’.58 Foucault’s ‘death of man’ thus marks ‘the failure of 
the ability to meaningfully ask the question, ‘What is the essence of humanity?’. Yet, Derrida, 
in his early essay ‘The Ends of Man’, considers this repositioning of ‘we’ in discourse and 
argues that ‘man’ nonetheless retains a relation to ‘the truth of being’, since ‘we’ as a category 
remains open to understanding.59 ‘Man’ is always, says Derrida (appealing to 
phenomenology) ‘that which is relative to his end’. Derrida, however, pluralises the ‘ends’ of 
man, thereby avoiding the Nietzschean eternal return and any ‘autism’ of closure.60 In 
Derrida’s work, says Schuster, ‘The End is an open ended question: the ends are perhaps 
endless’. It is this suspicion of any idea that ‘the ends might meaningfully meet the 
beginnings in a fuller realization of the presencing of Being’ that is seen again (much later) in 
Derrida’s critique of Heidegger’s Being-toward-death, in his Aporias.61
Derrida’s disagreement with Heidegger is, of course, only partial, since both seek to 
overcome a metaphysics of presence in the Western tradition, as does Foucault. It is the 
correspondences between these three, despite the conceptual differences that also appear 
between them, that makes possible the use of Derrida’s claims about death within a more 
Foucauldian-style subject analysis. In pushing death-thinking beyond the circularity of 
closure, one is able to view death as an ongoing occupation of and difficulty for the human 
subject, as Derrida permits it to be, while nonetheless leaving relatively undisturbed the 
broader contingency of the Foucauldian subject.
Derrida’s ‘death as aporia’, as applied to a subject analysis, at the same time provides 
a useful means to view the difficulties fiction appears to encounter as it seeks to represent a 
turn toward the material and toward death. Specifically, Derrida illustrates that death-facing— 
depicted in the novels I examine as the imperative to tame, to engage with, and to move 
willingly toward death—only ever evokes death’s possibility; death itself remains, 
irreducibly, ‘impossible’. Derrida takes this further, suggesting that the very idea that we 
might somehow approach the border of death only serves to illustrate our own habitual 
thinking of horizons or borders. As Schuster observes, ‘Derrida clearly sees no gain in 
dissolving or absorbing the impossible, rather he questions whether or not the place of 
impossibility can be located at all’.62 What is particularly valuable here is that Derrida, 
therefore, effectively, views all conceptions of death, including Heidegger’s, as
58 Schuster, n.p. (emphasis in original).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. See also Derrida, ‘The Ends o f Man’, p. 56.
61 Schuster, n.p.
62 Ibid. See also Derrida, Aporias, pp. 1-42.
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anthropological or discursive—as steps across a border that is not really there; at least, I apply 
his ideas this way in chapters to follow. The stories we tell about death, our belief-systems 
and cultural practices, our differing modes of death-thinking, are on one hand inevitable, since 
we recognise death’s ‘possibility’ via the death of the other, and thus death has its presence in 
our discursive worlds. On the other hand, death remains impossible; we can never in any 
conclusive sense say what death ‘is’ (there being no ‘is’ of death).63
There are, of course, implications here for fiction generally, as well as for the strand of 
fiction I examine. Derrida’s ‘death as aporia’ appears as a demonstration of deconstruction, 
marking the point at which our discursive worlds become irreducible, whilst recognising too 
that we, nonetheless, can and do tell stories of the world as a world, even as this world is 
conditioned by death. This seems to support Kronick’s point: that Derrida’s ‘z7 n ’y  a pas de 
hors-texte' is not a claim that nothing exists beyond the text, but that the text can never fulfil 
itself in that which it seeks to represent—in the material, actual or real world.64 The discursive 
function of text is thus upheld along with its capacity to represent the real. Where death is 
understood as always ‘possible’ and ‘impossible’, text performs both functions; yet these are 
mutually conditioning, not two separate things—such raising of borders being just a 
phenomenon (says Derrida) of our habitual thinking practices.65
The implications for the strand of fiction I examine are, however, particularly useful, 
since the difficulties these novels encounter seem to arise—as I argue—in their attempts to 
breach the question of the real, such attempts being a response, in turn, to the challenges of a 
time of environmental crisis. This time might itself, as already stated, be thought of as an 
epistemological rupture, in which a revisioning of notions of the human subject (and its 
capacity to respond) occurs. If the aesthetic disturbances generated by the peculiarities of 
phenomenon in our time—hyperobjects as Morton describes them—result, as Colebrook 
states, in a voiding of our ‘concepts of horizon, milieu, ethos and polity’, then it is a time in 
which we encounter, in any case, death’s aporia.66 We realise that our stories are just stories; 
yet the very real manifestations of the real in our (discursive and material) lives—since they 
implode our self-world relations—demand a recalibration of ourselves as material and 
discursive beings. Since we find that our stories were malign we seek to exit them, yet find 
ourselves just telling new stories all the same. The novels I examine thus work, like Russian 
dolls, from inside the very problem they attempt to figure.
63 Schuster also discusses this problem o f an ‘is’ or ‘is not’ o f death in Heidegger’s work. Schuster, n.p.
64 Derrida, O f Grammatology, p. 158.
65 Derrida, Aporias, pp. 1-42.
66 Morton, Hyperobjects, pp. 2 ,99; Colebrook, ‘Not Symbiosis, Not Now’, p. 188.
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Theory of course has similar difficulties, since any theorising, including that which 
seeks to establish an encounter with the real, retains the traces and challenges of its own 
discursivity—as I explore in subsequent chapters. Even the opposite of theory—praxis—may 
be described as textual to a degree, or at is least anthropological, and anthropologists, too, 
take death into account in their readings of cultures. This is not, though, to reinstate the never- 
ending circularity of a textuality that excludes the real from either reference or even existence. 
The turn to death-facing in fiction reflects, correspondingly, a new theoretical movement that 
often quite successfully depicts possible approaches to representing the materiality of life and 
its events beyond the domain of the human—perhaps because it factors in its inability to 
grasp reality in its entirety. This nonetheless signals a qualitative shift in, not the exclusion of, 
its own discursivity.
Such thoughts begin to indicate how Derrida’s ‘death as aporia’ might usefully 
account for, or provide the means to consider, certain difficulties that fiction encounters in its 
attempt to turn toward death-facing at time of environmental crisis. But what is the use of this 
insight and how does it carry beyond the ideas of Derrida, or Foucault, or other established 
poststructuralist thinkers? We may well attempt, in theory or in fiction, to rediscover or gain 
access to the realities of a world we find ourselves to have abandoned or concealed from 
view; undoubtedly it is crucial that we do. What begins to emerge across the chapters to 
follow is some sense of the way an unmaking of ourselves also becomes a discursive act of 
remaking; this may have some value after all, for, as Schuster remarks: ‘We, busy unlearning 
and unthinking the world, cannot leave its completion to the dying’.67
Who comes after the (poststructuralist) subject?
I began this chapter with an outline of Foucault’s biopolitics and a reflection on his 
observation of the appearance, in history, of the question, ‘What are we today?’ (see note 19 
above). A central feature of this dissertation is that I aim to observe, through reading a 
particular strand of fiction, the ways this fiction references key theoretical ideas and moments 
that participate in the breaking up and re-emergence of theory across the late twentieth 
century and into the twenty-first. As this fiction grapples with the challenges of an 
environmental crisis moment, it seems to seek and test out possibilities for how it might figure 
the subject as able to deal with such challenges, extracting ideas, if somewhat randomly at 
times, from certain theoretical moments. The idea of the subject as performative, for example,
67 Schuster, n.p.
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appears in Atwood’s trilogy in relation to death, so that death-facing is considered in 
performative terms. Atwood mixes this up with the related linguistic performative, whereby 
repeatedly claiming death to be nothing to be afraid of becomes a means to facilitate death- 
facing. Most of the novels, including Atwood’s, explore a range of questions around such 
ideas as earlier capacity-based conceptions of the human subject (agency, rationality, and so 
on), the subsequent ethical subject, and the decentred and posthuman subject, and a range of 
considerations to do with the ways this subject participates in its world. In this, they reflect a 
corresponding trajectory of poststructuralist concerns, reaching up to and including those of 
the present moment. Whilst the variously positioned subjects, in the novels, may or may not 
succeed as death-facing subjects for today’s world, they all appear to be drawn into a 
difficulty with the role of language or text—a problematic both for the subject and for the 
means by which its possible categories are variously figured.
While these novels illustrate at work the question ‘What we are today?’, in depicting a 
shift toward the real / material and displaying, too, this problematising of the possibilities of 
representation, they might be said to embark on the chase after a question perhaps more like 
that posed in the 1990s by Jean-Luc Nancy: ‘who comes after the subject?’.68 Nancy’s 
emphasis, as B. C. Hutchens tells us, is on a ‘think[ing] through our own times’ rather than a 
return, say, to Enlightenment humanism.69 While these novels do linger here and there on 
remnants of humanist thought, reminiscing on a once-secure subject, their interrogations are 
also firmly located in reference to the impact of environmental crisis on thought in the 
present, with regard to an uncertain future. In asking where we are going right now, they seem 
both to represent and interrogate the space that lies between the questions: a) what is the 
subject, and b) what (if anything) comes after it? Is the (poststructuralist) subject, in some 
sense, sustained in a time of environmental crisis; should we reinstate elements of earlier, 
more grounded conceptions of the human self (if so, which?); or are we now awaiting or 
discovering some ‘beyond’ of thought that will reveal a solution in the present—some 
emerging post, posthuman figure that might enable us to tackle environmental crisis, as we 
have so far failed to do?
In accord with the remit of this dissertation, I view these layers of questioning, these 
testing out of possibilities, as themselves being, at the same time, a feature of the present, 
epistemological rupture of the environmental crisis moment, a pronouncement of the real as
68 (Emphasis added). This question appears in the title o f a book edited by Jean Luc-Nancy and others, Who Comes After the 
Subject? (London: Routledge, 1991), as also noted by Ian James, The New French Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press 
2012), p. 13.
69 B.C. Hutchens, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future o f  Philosophy (Chesham: Acumen, 2005), p. 24.
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ungraspable but inescapable. It is precisely here that their depiction of the death-facing 
paradigm seems to cut across various domains such as the popular (including fiction, at least 
this strand of it) and the theoretical, as these novels negotiate the ideas of an era of which they 
are also themselves an expression. I focus primarily, in the chapters to come, on illustrating— 
through textual analyses—the kinds of theoretical moments that these novels appear to draw 
on as they engage with an imperative of death-facing. This not only illustrates how the novels 
apply resources out of the history of the present. By tracing it, it also serves to pinpoint some 
aspects of the ways theory has itself changed or evolved as it is challenged by emergent issues 
and events, particularly that of ‘the environment’ as ‘crisis’ in our epistemological and 
discursive worlds, and also—importantly, since it forms the heart of all these disturbances— 
in the real world.
hi selecting the theories for use in the textual analysis chapters, I apply a certain 
rationale with requisite parameters, since the possibilities would otherwise virtually be 
endless.70 As far as possible, I maintain the principle of working with theorists whose ideas 
best seem to fit the ideas at play in the novel(s) concerned. At the same time, I focus on a 
selection of key theoretical moments or critical arenas that play some part in the ways the 
subject has variously been—and continues to be—considered. These work, as stated, from a 
Foucauldian baseline and observe certain developments in the rejection of Enlightenment 
humanism and subsequent efforts to reconsider what it is to be a human in a world, 
particularly as the idea of ‘the world’ per se comes into tension with a post-Kantian trajectory 
of thought. As also already indicated, I allow a broad sweep of Derridean and post-Derridean 
theorising to enter discussions. This dual prominence of Foucault and Derrida, which 
produces a certain discomfort in theoretical terms, is in fact important since it reflects the way 
the death-facing paradigm, as the novels portray it, seems constantly to entangle its politics in 
its metaphysics and vice versa. Death-facing is a political idea but has metaphysical 
implications; it can be conceptual (abstract or psychological), or it can pose (again disclosing 
the tensions of the material turn) as physical, manifesting the idea of death as a real 
possibility. This reflects in turn, if somewhat broadly, the sense of impasse that is 
characteristic of the present global socio-political scene, in the rift between the assertion on 
one hand that a radical rethink is needed, and the assertion on the other that present systems 
are adequate for the job. The paradox that to avoid death we must face it, as an emergent
70 Some omissions may be more significant than others. For example, my general trajectory toward the present day 
speculative realists may, arguably, be benefitted by some discussion on the work o f Jacques Lacan. However I have been 
more concerned with the grappling with the real that occurs in the present; furthermore, while psychoanalysis may clearly 
have been a fruitful means to consider the question o f death-denial and death-facing, I elected not to take that route. Another 
notable omission is that o f  the work o f Jean Baudrillard— although I do refer to him briefly in my introduction.
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paradigm, appears to leave humanity standing on the brink of uncertainty. Is it ‘true’? And if 
so, what does it mean? How can such a thought be made accessible in the real world? It is 
here that a turning toward contemporary theorising, with its movement towards an 
engagement with the real, comes into play. What is the relationship between humanity and the 
real, or material, world? How do we, or for that matter can we, say what ‘it’ is, since we are 
always caught up in our own, often precarious, apprehending of it? Can we find a way to ‘be’ 
(to live, to act) that somehow addresses the problem of perspective? What comes after the 
subject?
The trajectory I follow, in my investigation of the subject as it is rethought in a time of 
environmental crisis, builds on an initial Foucauldian notion of the subject (as constituted 
within the structures of the present) by drawing on subsequent developments, divergences and 
innovations. Foucault’s anti-humanist decentring the subject, in particular his rejection of the 
idea that we possess intrinsic or enduring capacities, has a value for thinking the subject at a 
time of environmental crisis, in that—as Todd May puts it—‘if we do not have to see things 
the way we once did, if we do not have to be who we once were, then we do not have to be 
who we are now’.71 It also gives rise to questions, for example about agencies, including those 
of nonhuman kinds. For example, Judith Butler, whose ideas I draw on in my reading of 
Atwood’s trilogy in Chapter Two, responds to the question of agency as she builds on 
Foucault’s work on subject formation. Her notion of the performative takes a different route 
to that of Foucault on the question of ethics. Foucault’s own later work considers the ways the 
constructed subject might function in the world—including its agency, its capacity to 
respond—and proposes the notion of ‘technologies of the self—a kind of personal 
‘performance’ whereby we elect forms of self-constitution, albeit discursively given.72 Butler 
is more concerned with the ways we ‘account for’ ourselves, whereby our responses to the 
violence of existence are the means by which we might ‘become human’.73 The very need to 
say who we are constitutes our becoming as subjects in the world, while our ethical capacity 
takes on—in Butler’s work—a Levinasian ontology, whereby one’s ethical relation to other is 
prior to one’s ontological relation to oneself.74 These ideas produce some means for a liberal 
response to environmental crisis, which Atwood, in her trilogy, contrasts with a more 
utilitarian conception of limit. However, by the time she reaches the third book in the trilogy, 
her outcomes rely on an idea of the world beyond the human not catered for in Foucauldian
71 Todd May, The Philosophy o f  Foucault (Chesham: Acumen, 2006), p. 98.
72 Foucault, Technologies o f  the Self, ed. by Martin, Gutman, and Hutton, pp. 16-49.
73 Judith Butler, Giving an Account o f  Oneself QAtvi York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 106,136.
74 P.. Kearney, Dialogues vAth Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 1984), p. 57; Butler, pp. 83-101.
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ideas of the subject.75 This is addressed in my reading of Atwood by incorporating Morton’s 
more contemporary theorisations of an object oriented aesthetic, which adds a sense of the 
world not just already given but as populated with ‘strange strangers’—a world where 
agencies exceed our possible comprehension of them.76 Death-facing thus becomes a death of 
the destructive outcomes of human endeavour, whilst the nonhuman world emerges in new 
forms.
The consideration of death as aporia in Chapter Three, however—applied to my 
reading of McCarthy’s The Road—exposes a problem for contemporary death-thinking that is 
seen in all of the novels I examine. This is the way death-thinking is always caught up in what 
Derrida calls a ‘trespass’ of death’s border, a telling of death’s and thus life’s meaning that 
renders it irreducibly contingent.77 Atwood’s novels, as with all the novels I examine, are 
subject to a kind of ‘paranoia of telling’ that leaves one unable to fully think the outcomes that 
are proposed or delivered. This limit or finitude of human thought itself, an additional 
preoccupation of the novels I examine, results, in this strand of fiction, in its calling upon new 
ways to address ‘impossibility’, even as it otherwise inhabits familiar modes of subject 
conceptualising, whether humanist or anti-humanist.
This movement, within these novels’ subject interrogations, from the familiar to the 
new—arising in an encounter with the real as a crisis of the material world—demands a 
theoretical correspondence that I treat distinctly in each chapter, although the chapters also 
interrelate. In Chapter Two this is achieved using the work of Morton. In Chapter Four, I 
consider the way Winterson’s The Stone Gods seems to depict the idea of death-facing as a 
posthumanist response to environmental crisis. I apply Barad’s performative posthumanism 
alongside Wolfe’s posthumanist incorporation of Derrida’s ‘logic of the gram’ and systems 
theory.78 This combination allows an exploration of The Stone Gods' underlying tension 
between the human and the posthuman, whilst exploring how ‘the real’ beyond thought is 
envisaged in a prevalent contemporary idea of the human subject (or what comes after it): the 
posthuman. In the final analysis chapter, Chapter Five, I return, in my reading of Ghosh’s The 
Hungry Tide, to the Foucauldian, thanatopolitical baseline; however I supplement this with 
the incorporation of speculative materialist and realist ideas. Thus, the novel’s tensions
75 It is necessary to distinguish between Foucault’s anti-humanism and the posthumanism now appearing in Atwood’s fiction 
(and others o f the novels I examine). Anti-humanism has more to do with a non-essentialism o f the subject, whereas 
posthumanism, while also rejecting humanist capacities o f the self, explores a non-anthropocentric subject in relation to the 
nonhuman (also referred to by some as more-than-human or other-than-human) world.
76 ‘Strange strangers’ is a term Morton uses to imply the radical impossibility o f  knowing other. See Morton, The Ecological 
Thought, w .  14 -15 ,17-19 ,38-58 .
77 Derrida, Aporias, p. 24.
78 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?.
40
around the possible hegemonies of death-facing are considered alongside a distinction 
between the ideas of Quentin Meillassoux and Martin Hàgglund.79 While Meillassoux 
proposes a means to think the beyond of thought as an inaccessible real that he argues can 
nonetheless be acknowledged, Hagglund turns to a real that is before us right now, as a death 
that is always present in (all) life, and which demands our attention to the pragmatics of life in 
all of its forms.
While my chapters thus each take on a distinct thematic with regard to contemporary notions 
of the subject at a time of environmental crisis, these themes also interrelate. Posthumanism, 
for example, is not limited to the final chapter, even though it is here that it receives particular 
attention; likewise, since Morton’s hyperobjects may be discerned in any of the novels, they 
participate in each of the chapters whether I mention them or not; similarly, the aporia of 
death is a means to understand the difficulties seen in each of the novels as they seek to depict 
death-facing; and so on. What I intend to offer, in all this, is a broad but considered depiction 
of the way this strand of fiction can be said to orientate itself toward questions of the real, in 
the face of an emergent material imperative, at a time of environmental crisis. This general 
orientation is presented in this fiction as a need for humanity to learn to face death, by which 
it might respond to environmental crisis. The death-facing paradigm can thus be understood 
as a contemporary rupture in thought that seeks to re-orientate the human, ‘post’ everything- 
that-has-come-so-far, with the hope that it might find the means to repair its relations with a 
disenfranchised world.
79 Martin Hagglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique o f Meillassoux’, in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Bryant 
and others (Melbourne: re.press, 2011); Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: an Essay on the Necessity u f Contingency.
2008, trans. by Ray Brassier (London: Bloomsbury, 2012).
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Chapter 2: Ethics and the Nonhuman in Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam 
Trilogy
Across its three novels, Margaret Atwood’s recently completed Maddaddam trilogy enters the 
mind of the reader as an intense, chaotic, and often troubling interrogation of what it is to be 
human at a time of environmental crisis. The novels disturb and regurgitate whole chunks of 
the history of Western thought—from the urbane to the intellectual, including swathes of 
literary theory and scientific and philosophical discourse—to re-envisage how we might do 
things differently. Through their layers of often heavily satirical social critique, the novels 
amplify both present and possible outcomes of our worst behaviours, yet also consider ways 
in which we might succeed in our journey of being humans-in-a-world. In this first of four 
textual analyses, my interest is in the way Atwood’s trilogy interrogates the death-facing 
paradigm (as outlined in my introduction) in relation to the ontological make-up of the human 
subject and its ethical relations to the nonhuman world. If fear in the face of death is at the 
heart of the problems we see today, how might we overcome this fear? For Atwood, this 
appears as a philosophical question about what, exactly, defines us as human—a question that 
comes under intense scrutiny at a time of environmental crisis. Are we somehow distinct from 
the nonhuman world, or are we part of it, erroneously perceiving ourselves as distinct? Such a 
problem begins to touch on a post-Kantian question that will become more prominent in 
chapters to come: how far are we trapped, as subjects, in perspective? Atwood’s trilogy, 
however, focuses mainly on exploring the ways our (variously defined) ontological status 
might impact on or inform where we go from here—and how.
Correspondingly, in this chapter, I trace the ways the trilogy variously repositions the 
animal in relation to the human, and explore the questions to which this repositioning gives 
rise. Important among these is a question about naturalness and the role of the human 
imagination. When scientist Crake, in the first novel Oryx and Crake (2003), decides that it is 
our ability to see death coming that causes our problematic behaviours, leading to poverty and 
environmental degradation, he distinguishes us—as does much Western philosophical 
thought—from the nonhuman, or animal.1 Yet, he also renders ambiguous this same question 
of difference, since he views our imagination (by which we foresee death) and related 
behaviours as having evolved from the ancient primate brain (0C, 305). This ambiguity in
1 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake (London: Virago Press, 2004).
42
Crake’s thinking replicates a paradox at the heart of death-facing: does acceptance of death’s 
role in life somehow return us to nature, or is death avoidance itself the more natural state? 
Crake’s subsequent drastic act of wiping out humans and replacing them with his modified 
eco-hominid, the Crakers, breaks open this question. It sets up an ongoing exploration of the 
way this ambiguity, starting from the baseline of our thinking, goes on to manifest in our lives 
and our socio-political worlds. The Crakers depict the trilogy’s first embodiment of an animal 
ontology. Having had their imaginative capacity genetically removed, they do not foresee 
death. A question is thereby raised when, as the Crakers evolve, their imaginations start to 
redevelop. What are the implications of this for the ways we understand ourselves as beings- 
in-the-world and the ways we might go forward from here? The novel next provides an 
alternative route for the re-emergence of the animal in the human. Snowman, once known as 
Jimmy and friend of Crake, survives Crake’s apocalypse as caretaker to the Crakers. As all 
markers of humanity fall away, with no need for genetic modification Snowman gradually 
reveals his animal self. He also relinquishes his fear of death, yet in doing so becomes a tragic 
figure, undone by the loss of all he knows. This constantly recurring ambiguity, emerging 
from Crake’s ideas and their effects, remains anchored throughout the trilogy to a problem of 
the human as mortal. The novels thus continue to demonstrate but also complicate the idea 
that, to resolve today’s crisis, we must resolve our relations with death, enfolding all routes to 
such resolution with further layers of ambiguity.
The disturbing and intriguing activities of Crake, and associated ethical and 
ontological conundrums, are followed through in the trilogy as the novels continue to 
interrogate the problem of death-facing in different ways. The second novel, The Year o f The 
Flood (2010), provides a counter to Crake’s impeccable utilitarianism with its more liberal 
approach to death-facing, based on an assumption that the human has the capacity to 
consciously change its ways.2 Here, it is proposed that the human imagination might—rather 
than being removed—be reinvested in a death-facing ideal, as demonstrated in the eco-cult 
The God’s Gardeners. The Gardeners promote an Epicurean ideal of simple living based on 
an acceptance of death; death, for the Gardeners (who are notably the main survivors of 
Crake’s plague on humanity) is a natural process by which we give nutritionally back to the 
planet. ‘How terrible it would be’, they claim, ‘if there were no death!’ (TF, 4). The linguistic 
performative means the Gardeners employ to achieve this—constantly repeating, in their daily
2 Depending on one’s view, Crake’s utilitarianism might also be viewed in terms o f a problematic Social Darwinism. I tend 
largely to give Crake the benefit o f  the doubt, since my reading considers him in relation to limit rather than prejudice. I take 
his Crakers as representing radical behavioural change in humanity, rather than designating a favoured race; Margaret 
Atwood, The Year o f  The Flood (London: Virago, 2010).
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sermons, the idea that death is good—have the most pronounced effect in the character Toby, 
who repeatedly demonstrates a personal strength combined with a pragmatic ethics. Yet Toby, 
as do the other Gardeners, at the same time presents death-facing as a form of survival, 
returning us to the paradoxes of death-facing. Toby’s story thus participates in a dialogue with 
Crake’s, providing yet another strand in the trilogy’s double-dealing in death-facing. This 
dialogue* continues right through to the final pages of the third novel Maddaddam (2013), in 
which a posthuman vision of community and inter-species cohabitation is upheld by an 
evolved mix of utilitarian and liberal ethics.3 Even in this last novel’s heartening ecotopia, an 
underlying question is raised when Toby teaches a young Craker boy to read—an event that 
promises to reinstate the human in the posthuman. Since, by this point, the three novels in the 
trilogy have explored a range of concerns about language and text, none of which are 
resolved—nor indeed appear resolvable—this, at the very least, reopens, yet again, any 
possibility of closure to ongoing disturbance.
My aim in this chapter is to illustrate how Atwood’s trilogy brings the problematics of 
today’s world—from its excessive consumerisms to its stark inequalities—all down to a 
question about our status as mortal beings, and in turn to its ethical implications. In 
subsequent chapters I turn attention to the way death-facing enacts a turn toward the 
materiality of the world as real, based on its manifesting of crisis, and thereby encounters a 
difficulty with its own discursivity. My reading of Atwood’s trilogy, in effect, anticipates this 
difficulty, which the trilogy in any case also demonstrates. Its emphasis on the human / 
nonhuman binary as an ontological problem at the heart of death-facing is, after all, linked to 
the appearance of the world as a material category in human thought. Atwood’s trilogy thus 
contributes to my explorations of a death-facing paradigm in contemporary fiction by 
illustrating the problematics of an ontological enquiry at work at its heart. In approaching 
Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy I apply a mix of theoretical ideas that bring out its concern 
with humans, nohumans and posthumans, with agency and the self, and with the self as a 
subject-in-a-world. Of the four textual analysis chapters, the ideas applied here deal most 
particularly with the earlier makings of a turn in poststructuralism, which (arguably) gestures 
toward the non-representational and speculative theorising seen in more contemporary 
philosophical thought. I include some preliminary consideration of the question of the human 
in the posthuman, although this is a matter I deal with more fully in Chapter Four. Throughout 
Atwood’s trilogy, the human of humanist conceptions seems frequently to vie with the 
posthuman subject—which the trilogy depicts, in the end, as the subject for our time. As this
3 Margaret Atwood, Maddaddam  (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
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frequently appears as a play-off between the human imagination and the animal in the human, 
my discussions follow the ways this play-off unfolds. I consider Crake’s utilitarian ethics as 
an intervention that seeks to directly overturn the Thanatopolitical hegemonies of the modem 
world, as achieved by his reclaiming the animal in the human in his posthuman Crakers, as 
well as by his calling down an absolute halt on humanity. A difficulty arises however, first, 
when the Crakers emerge as mild-natured, trusting and pacifist to the extent of being overly 
naïve, and subsequently, when their imaginations begin to develop. This leads the narrative 
into a consideration of the ways the capacities we have traditionally thought of as human, 
such as agencies, rationalities and so on, might be reconceived in performative terms. Here I 
apply Judith Butler’s post-Foucauldian analysis of the subject.4 Taking form in the first novel 
via Crake’s friend Snowman, but fulfilled in Toby in The Year o f The Flood, Atwood’s 
trilogy explores the idea of a performative agency that is a response to, as well as impacting 
on, the world of its being. Butler’s subject also incorporates a Levinasian ethic, whereby the 
ethic is understood as preontological—a concept that helps to explain Toby’s death-facing 
ethic as comparative with Crake’s.5 However, as the trilogy works towards its posthuman 
solution, I address its depiction of the subject as interpellated by the nonhuman realm using 
Timothy Morton’s notion of ‘hyperobjects’.6 I begin the chapter with a brief consideration of 
Atwood’s oeuvre and critical responses to the trilogy to date. I then provide a more in-depth 
account of the theoretical ideas applied in the chapter. Finally, in my textual analysis section, 
I first examine each of the novels separately, and then provide a more general discussion of 
the trilogy as a whole and its contributions to the contemporary phenomenon of a death-facing 
paradigm.
Although the Maddaddam trilogy might be said to represent a new direction in Atwood’s 
work with its focus on environmental crisis, this focus is nonetheless informed by themes that 
have been prevalent throughout her career. Atwood’s strong affinity with wilderness as an 
aspect of her homeland, Canada, and her concern with the way ‘incomers’ to the land reject, 
fear, or embrace it, in contrast with indigenous Canadians, has often underlain her broader 
criticisms of socio-cultural issues. The themes of ‘death’ and ‘environment’—or, more often, 
‘landscape’—in particular are familiar spectres from the larger body of her oeuvre, sliding 
through her works to repeatedly re-emerge. For example, her short story ‘Death by
4 See Butler, Giving an Account o f  Oneself (New  York: Fordham University Press, 2005).
5 Butler, pp. 83-101.
6 Hyperobjects are objects that are too vast in scale and impact for us to fully perceive. See Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects: 
Philosophy and Ecology After the End o f  the World (London: University o f Minnesota Press, 2013), p. 1 and various; also see 
also this dissertation, pp. 32-33.
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Landscape’, in which a young girl vanishes, swallowed up by the landscape, never to return, 
combines both themes.7 While the title points to the notion of a death that rebounds on us, as 
conceived in the death-facing paradigm, it has also been described in terms of Atwood’s 
views on the tendency to overplay landscape (‘nature’) as ‘dangerous place’.8 This divergence 
reflects the ambiguity that emerges in the trilogy around the question of human fear in the 
face of death.
Also significant in Atwood’s oeuvre is her tendency to refer to the ‘wild’ and the 
‘animal’ as lost or sought by the human. As far back as 1979, the closing pages of her novel 
Surfacing describe a young woman who goes feral, living in the garden like an animal, 
rejecting every iota of ‘the human’ and waiting for her fur to grow, which she is certain will 
eventually happen.9 Like the Maddaddam trilogy, Surfacing is not just about humans and 
nature; it is a political novel that explores the emergence of a Canadian national identity. Its 
interrogations of the human / nonhuman binary play a similar role to that seen in the trilogy, 
undermining problematic socio-cultural constructions at a foundational level. This is reflected 
too, again in Surfacing, in Atwood’s consideration of language. ‘The animals have no need 
for speech,’ Atwood writes, ‘why talk when you are a word’.10 According to M.T Clark this is 
about the way language possesses ‘autonomy’, thus creating a reality that is ‘inextricably 
linked both to our destruction and creative survival’.11 This idea might feed into Atwood’s 
trilogy whereby human language is retrieved, in the linguistic performative, from a 
metaphysics that locates humans as qualitatively different to nonhumans.
The Maddaddam trilogy also of course inherits Atwood’s fluid but chaotic postmodern 
stylistics, interweaving endless intertextualities and mixing earnestness and satire, in often 
equal portions. The effect of this is to hand to the reader the responsibility of untangling ideas. 
The risk is thus posed, in the trilogy, that the reader might be enticed into a false sense of 
security by the socio-ecological harmony depicted towards the end of the third book—a trap 
that its more popular reviewers seem often to fall into. While the posthuman subject of this 
hope-filled vision clearly does outdo the alternative subject ontologies explored, the 
cumulative sense of security produced in this last novel’s depiction of cooperation and 
community is clearly also undermined by the warnings its narratives enfold.
7 Margaret Atwood, ‘Death by Landscape’, Wilderness Tips (London: Virago, 1992), pp. 109-129.
8 F. Hammill, Canadian Literature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), p. 64.
9 Margaret Atwood, Surfacing, (London: Virago, 2 0 0 1 ,1st pub. 1979), pp. 170-186.
10 Atwood, Surfacing, pp. 175.
nM. T. Clark, ‘Margaret Atwood's “Surfacing”: Language, Logic and the Art o f Fiction’ Modern Language Studies 13.3 
(1983), 3-15, p. 3.
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To date, critics have focussed mainly on the trilogy’s first two novels, since the third is too 
recent to have accumulated responses. Attention is often given to the ways the novels satirise 
consumer capitalism as a destructive hegemonic force, and on their depictions of a stark social 
divide. The first book of the trilogy depicts a scientific elite supported by corporations driving 
excessive consumerism, and an underclass, rife with pleasure-seeking and corruption, 
concealing further layers of poverty, abuse, and environmental degradation. J. Brookes 
Bouson, for example, explores this critique of ‘unbridled consumption’ in relation to a ‘trope 
of corporate cannibalism’.12 Others explore these first two novels’ early hints of an alternative 
future that will come to fruition in book three. For example, Gerry Canavan explores how 
they open up a ‘space for imagining a post-capitalist future’, while Roman Bartosch describes 
them as envisaging a ‘postnatural world’ in which dualist thinking is ‘dissolved’.13 Crake’s 
act of genocide and the resulting post-apocalyptic devastation is of course also central to 
discussions, forming as it does the central pivot for both novels. Crake tends often, 
understandably, to be negatively viewed. Dannette DiMarco sees him as the classic 
instrumentalist or ‘homo-faber; while for Bouson he represents the dangers of unregulated 
genetic experimentation in science.14 Yet, again, some critics find ecological significance in 
Crake’s perspective. Bannes Bergthaller remarks on his ‘terrifying perspicacity’, asserting 
that we should not dismiss him too easily; while Lee Rozelle goes so far as to say that he 
reminds us ‘that place is always being bom’—that life emerges to ‘reconnect pieces that have 
been broken’.15 As will become clear in this chapter these latter perspectives take on 
increasing significance in relation to the third book, Maddaddam.
Of these readings, Bergthaller’s is perhaps closest to mine—or at least informs 
elements of it. While surprisingly few readings take up the question of death-facing or even 
death in relation to these first two books, Bergthaller notes the references to ‘humanity’s 
frailties’, a notion that conceivably includes the way death-fear sits at the root of our self- 
conceptualising as mortals.16 Bergthaller also considers, as do I, the novels’ deliberations over
12 J. Brookes Bouson, ‘“We’re Using Up the Earth. It’s Almost Gone”: A Return to the Post-Apocalyptic Future in Margaret 
Atwood’s The Year o f  the Flood', The Journal o f  Commonwealth Literature 46.9 (2011), 9-26, p. 9.
13 Gerry Canavan, ‘Hope, But Not for Us: Ecological Science Fiction and the End o f  the World in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx 
and Crake and The Year o f  The F lood’, Lit: Literature, Interpretation, Theory, 23.2 (2012), 138-159, p. 139; Roman 
Bartosch, ‘’’Zero Time” and the Apocalypse: Postnatural Survival in Oryx and Crake and The Year o f  the Flood' 
EnvironMentality: Ecocriticism and the Event o f  Postcolonial Fiction (New Y ork and Amsterdam, Rodopi, 2013), p. 221.
14Homo faber: ‘he who labors to use every instrument as a means to achieve a particular end in building a world, even when 
the fabrication o f  that world necessarily demands a repeated violation o f  its materiality, including its people’, see Dannette 
DiMarco, ‘Paradice Lost, Paradice Regained: Homo faber and the Makings o f a New Beginning in Oryx and Crake' Papers 
on Language and Literature, 41.2 (2005), 170-195; Bouson “‘We’re Using Up the Earth', p. 9.
15 Hannes Bergthaller, ‘Housebreaking the Human Animal: Humanism and the problem o f sustainability in Margaret 
Atwood's Oryx and Crake and The Year o f  the Flood', English Studies 91.7 (2010), 728-743, pp. 735, 737; Lee Rozelle, 
‘Liminal Ecologies in Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake', Canadian Literature 206 (2010), 61-72, p. 62.
16 Bergthaller, p. 739.
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the human imagination. However, he relates these to what he calls ‘the foundational 
assumption of ecocriticism’: that ‘the roots of the ecological crisis are to be found in a failure 
of the imagination’.17 Bergthaller is concerned that this is sometimes taken to mean that our 
imagination should be reapplied to an understanding of our kinship with the natural world; yet 
this kinship, as he suggests, is ‘already there’. He sees Atwood, rather, as revising such 
thinking: the imagination requires us instead to see ‘something that is, in an important sense, 
not there’—which is that the ‘behavioural patterns that lead to environmental destruction are 
not in any way “unnatural” [but are] lodged in “the ancient primate brain” (OC, 305).18 Here, 
it is not so much the foundational assumption of ecocriticism that Bergthaller questions, but a 
corresponding tendency to romanticise the relation of the human to the natural world. One is 
reminded of Timothy Morton’s suggestion that our conceptual thinking about nature has 
become damaged.19 To call for a reuniting with nature is to view our behaviours as 
constituting a separation in the first place. The call for death-facing appears also to assume 
such a separation; hence my reading complements Bergthaller’s by investigating the 
difficulties that contemporary death-facing poses.
The key theorists I draw upon in this chapter are Butler, whose performative subject builds on 
the historicism of Foucault’s, and Morton, who theorises the ways our encounters with the 
nonhuman impact aesthetically on our self-conceptualising and our engagement with the 
world. Although arising from within very different paradigms, Butler’s and Morton’s work 
shares a sense of our being interpellated by the world of our arrival. A key distinction between 
them is, of course, that Butler’s thinking operates within a domain of the (decentred) human, 
whereas Morton’s includes, and indeed emphasises, that of the nonhuman (although he 
nominally resists the posthuman). My aim in working primarily with these two thinkers in this 
chapter is not to attempt to synthesise them. Rather, I seek to show not only the way 
poststructuralist theorising gives way to an ecological theorising, but the way the 
poststructuralist subject seems to become interpellated by an ecological theorising. Here, an 
already decentred poststructuralist subject is challenged by appearances of the nonhuman and 
the real as materialising agential categories at a time of environmental crisis.
In Giving an Account o f Oneself Butler proposes that it is through the often violent 
relationality between self and the world that we become moral and responsible beings and
17 Ibid., p. 741.
18 Ibid., p. 741.
19 See discussions in Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature (London: Harvard University Press, 2007).
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thus human.20 In making such a claim, she directly counters common complaints that the 
poststructuralist and particularly the Foucauldian subject—as seemingly incoherent—makes 
no room for the grounding of an ethics of responsibility.21 Butler incorporates ideas from a 
range of theorists, notably Theodore Adorno, Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean 
Laplanche, to illustrate ways we might see this incoherence or inhumanness as being, instead, 
precisely that which enables a grounding for ethics. On a Foucauldian view, we are always 
caught up in norms that condition our emergence as we respond to the interpellation of other, 
leaving us always to some extent opaque to ourselves; yet, Butler argues, qua Adorno, our 
humanness not only therefore contains our inhumanness but comes about because of it.22
As she works toward this position, Butler draws together a rich set of ideas on the 
ways we address the demands of the world by ‘giving an account’ of who we are. For 
example, she discusses the process of narration, noting that ‘the “I” has no story of its own 
that is not also the story of a relation—or set of relations—to a set of norms’; yet, she again 
suggests that rather than denying the subjective ground for ethics, this ‘dispossession’ of the I 
becomes its condition for emergence.23 She justifies this in part by building on Foucault’s 
later work on the ethical subject. Foucault, as Butler discusses, sees our relation to a 
conditioning ‘norm’ or ‘regime of truth’ as also being a relation to ourselves; he sees this in 
turn as setting the stage ‘for the subject’s self-crafting’.24 Butler seems inclined to work with 
Foucault on this; however, her main concern—and the point upon which she builds—is that 
Foucault leaves insufficient room for the ‘you’, or ‘other’. She states: ‘What he does not say 
is that sometimes calling into question the regime of truth by which my own truth is 
established is motivated by the desire to recognize another or be recognized by one’.25 Thus it 
is precisely at the point when we are called upon to account for who we are to another—for 
Butler—that we enter into negotiation with the conditions of our emergence, thereby entering 
the grounds of ethics.
In bringing forward her ethical subject, Butler incorporates a combination of a 
Levinasian ethics and Adorno’s discussions on a ‘violence’ of arrival. From Adorno, she 
takes the idea that our arrival into being incurs a kind of ‘violence’ upon the self, saying that 
the way ‘we respond to injury may offer a chance to elaborate an ethical perspective and even 
become human’.26 From Levinas’ she applies the idea that one’s ethical relation to other is
20 Butler, pp. 106,136.
21 Ibid., pp. 19,22-26.
22 Ibid., p. 106.
23 Ibid., p. 8.
24 Ibid., pp. 19-26.
25 Butler, pp. 19, 24,
26 Ibid., p.* Î 01. '
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preontological, which leads her to clarify the meaning of responsibility. It is not, she states, 
that T  or ‘we’ bring this violence upon ourselves and thus must ‘account for it by recourse to 
our deeds’; rather, it delineates ‘a physical vulnerability from which we cannot slip away [...] 
which can provide a way to understand that none of us is fully bounded, utterly separate, but, 
rather, we are in our skins, given over, in each other’s hands, at each other’s mercy’.27 Thus, 
Butler explains, although we are not responsible for this violence, it nonetheless grounds our 
responsibility by creating the conditions under which responsibility is assumed. She 
concludes her delineation of the ethical subject by emphasising, again, that we ‘become 
human’ through our responses to the world: ‘We must recognise’, she states, ‘that ethics 
requires us to risk ourselves precisely at moments of unknowingness, when what forms us 
diverges from what lies before us, when our willingness to become undone in relation to 
others constitutes our chance of becoming human’.28
Morton is concerned with a different set of violences, namely those incurred by 
humans upon the nonhuman world, and those incurred where our acts of harm to other 
accumulate to pose a risk, in turn, to ourselves. He is concerned, like Butler, with the violence 
of an interpellation by other, whereby that other is beyond our capacity to comprehend; 
however, in Morton’s work, this is a nonhuman other, and includes those risks created by and 
not created by ourselves. Morton’s ethics might therefore be considered more in terms of 
aesthetics, his work incorporating what has more recently been shorthanded as OOO, or 
object-oriented ontology, which originates in the work of Graham Harman.29 The notion of 
violence explored by Butler seems best considered in relation to objects Morton describes as 
‘hyperobjects’. These are objects too vast or persistent in temporal-spatial terms for us to fully 
perceive them—objects which are there, yet which remain partially or profoundly withdrawn 
from our perception. Morton gives such examples of hyperobjects as Styrofoam cups, or the 
workings in its entirety of the capitalist machinery.30 A further example is that of 
environmental crisis, also understood as climate change—an event too vast for us to 
comprehend, since we are already inside it.
The significance of Morton’s notion of hyperobjects, for this chapter, has to do with 
the ways in which they impact on human thought. Such an impact is described in Morton’s 
term ‘the ecological thought’, which explains how the nonhuman world, in all its strangeness 
and vulnerability—as newly acknowledged by us, is currently taking position in our minds.
27 Ibid., pp. 185-101,101.
28 Ibid., pp. 136.
29 This originates in Harman’s doctoral dissertation, published as Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics o f  Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2002).
30 Morton, Hyperobjects, p. 1. See also this dissertation, pp. 42-43.
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The ‘ecological thought’, Morton explains, ‘hugely expands our ideas of time and space’, 
forcing us to ‘invent ways of being together that don’t depend on self interest’.31 This 
‘ecological thought’ is ‘elicited’ by ‘other beings’ that ‘summon it from us and force us to 
confront it’.32 So where Butler is at pains to bring to our attention a ‘you’, whom we seek to 
address in our accounting for ourselves, in Morton’s work this becomes a nonhuman ‘you’. It 
is the ‘you’ of other, and the ‘you’ of the hyperobject. Humanity, at this moment, thus 
discovers itself to be a participant of what Morton calls ‘the mesh’— an interconnectedness of 
all life and non-life, of experiences and events within which we are entangled. ‘The mesh’ 
signifies, as Morton states, that ‘nothing is complete in itself.33 This means that as humanity 
seeks to ‘account’ for itself at a time of environmental crisis, it is forced to examine and re­
orientate its own ontological (and mortal) status, as it assimilates its new engagement with 
‘the ecological thought’.
Morton’s work effectively points towards a prevalent mood in much recent speculative 
and particularly environmentalist theory. It is a time when the problem of the human 
undergoes a kind of interpellation by the world as a new category, effectively overwriting 
prior conceptions of human subjecthood. This problem of ‘the world’ also becomes a question 
about the real, a point to which I return throughout the dissertation in relation to different 
theorists. Such a question seeks to establish how we might speak of or understand that which 
is beyond our perceptive grasp. How can we know, in epistemological terms, the existence of 
that other that effectively escapes our comprehension? We have enough difficulty grasping 
other (human) minds, never mind the not human. Morton applies the term ‘strange strangers’ 
to refer to those entities that are not (and are) us, thereby circumventing our habit of making 
things appear familiar or known to us by a naming process (‘mouse’ ‘animal’ etc.).34 Yet, as 
with Butler, Morton holds to the question of the human, as much as to that which it is not. 
Hence, at this point in the dissertation, attention is focussed onto the ontological human 
subject and how much we are distinct in the first place from that which we are not.
Oryx and Crake
The first of the trilogy’s three novels, Oryx and Crake (2005), tells the story of boyhood 
friends, Jimmy and Glenn, who grow up in the enclosed, high-security worlds of the scientific
31 Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p 135.
32 Ibid., p. 135.
33 Ibid., pp. 28-33.
34 ‘Strange strangers’ is a term Morton uses to imply the radical impossibility o f knowing other. See Morton, Tae Ecological 
Thought, 14-15,17-19 , 38-58.
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compounds. Glenn, of high, autistic intelligence, becomes scientist Crake who destroys 
humanity to replace it with his eco-hominids, the Crakers; while hapless, arts-loving Jimmy 
outlives him as Snowman, unwitting caretaker to the Crakers. The novel opens with 
Snowman, a traumatised figure who has taken to living in the trees amid the ruins of Crake’s 
post-apocalyptic world. As the novel proceeds it intersperses its main storyline of Snowman 
and the Crakers’ adaptation to this world with layers of extensive analepsis, introducing the 
reader to Jimmy and Glenn and their friendship, up to the point of Crake’s act of devastation / 
(re)creation.
In this section, I consider how this novel sets up the initial stages of a contrast between 
Crake’s route to re-taming death and that of Toby and the God’s Gardeners in the second 
novel. The novel achieves this by initiating two main strands of philosophical enquiry through 
the characters of Crake and Snowman. Crake instigates a largely scientific and materialist 
perspective but pre-empts an approaching new materialism, which I relate in this section to 
Morton’s notion o f ‘the ecological thought’ (see note 31 above). Snowman instigates a related 
but distinct performative route, which he fails to fulfil—this route instead being picked up 
again later in the character of Toby. I also discuss this novel’s corresponding explorations of 
the ways we might reunite the human, in ontological terms, with the animal of its own origin. 
My discussions focus on the way the various developing philosophical ideas in the novel 
revolve around a concern with long-held distinctions between humans and nonhumans. Later 
in the trilogy, these distinctions become heavily blurred; however, at this stage, they are under 
close scrutiny. Overall, this novel sets up and explores elements of philosophical enquiry that 
function to reconsider the ontological human subject at a time of environmental crisis. These 
initial ideas are then developed or revised as the trilogy heads towards a culminating 
speculative posthumanism in the third novel, Maddaddam. It is the (philosophical) difficulties 
that arise in this first novel that become the fuel for such a development.
This first novel asks tough questions about where we are headed in a world increasingly 
dominated by the corporations of a globalising capitalism. In the backdrop scenes of Jimmy 
and Glenn’s boyhood the extremes of social stratification are fed by unregulated corporate 
monopolisation of the advancements of high-end science. In the luxurious compounds, built 
by biotech companies, the boys are immunised from the Pleeblands, where the masses live 
lives of corruption and danger, although not from its pervading presence on the web. While 
Jimmy alternately frets about or engages with all that he encounters, Crake draws attention to 
the global extremes of human poverty and environmental degradation that lie behind this 
polarised scene. The reality of life in such extremes is represented in the storyline of Oryx,
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whom the boys first encounter as one among many young Asian child-actors in the online 
pom movies they watch. Later, Crake employs her to work with his Crakers, and while both 
he and Jimmy become competitively obsessed with Oryx, she introduces a layer of reality and 
humanness to the novel that neither of the boys seems able to fully grasp. She also gradually 
fades from the novel, illustrating how easily real matters are overlooked.
Amid this depiction of a dangerously imbalanced world, the novel’s explorations of a 
death-facing paradigm are drawn forward through Crake’s assessment of the problems he 
sees. ‘Men can imagine their own deaths’ he explains to Jimmy. ‘They can see them coming, 
and the mere thought of impending death acts like an aphrodisiac. A dog or a rabbit doesn’t 
behave like that’ (OC, 139). For Crake, this ‘fear in the face of death’ leads to overpopulation 
and correspondingly, he says—‘as we’ve seen in spades’—‘to environmental degradation and 
poor nutrition’ (OC, 345). Crake’s position is important in the novel for a number of reasons. 
Firstly he flags up—therefore also placing under scrutiny—the basic populationist argument 
that the planet can only support so many people, and that overuse of resources in one comer 
relies on depletion of resources—and thus on harms to other lives—in another.35 Secondly, in 
relating this to a problem of the human imagination, he brings to the table a question about the 
ontological human subject, which revolves, for Crake, around our biological make up. This 
leads to him taking a biogenetic route to death-facing, which some see as purely 
instrumentalist on his part.36 However, I view this as an aspect of this first novel’s 
explorations of biological science and Darwinism in relation to emergent materialisms.37 
Thirdly, Crake provides a view on the situation that is non-sentimentalised. His utilitarian 
position is augmented by his possible Asperger’s profile, hinted at in his character traits: his 
aloofness, his tendency to focus intently on high achievements within narrow formats 
(endlessly playing the online game Extinctathon, and winning nine times out of ten), his 
exceptional intelligence, his always wearing the same black T-Shirt. Furthermore, the 
Watson-Crick Institute, which he attends after graduating from high school, is known by the 
students as Aspergers U, these students also being described as ‘[d]emi-autistic, genetically 
speaking’ and as having ‘single-track, tunnel vision minds’ (OC, 228). The implications of 
Crake’s Asperger’s profile appear when one considers that a key diagnostic element of
35 This originates in the work o f  Thomas Malthus and was popularised by Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb (1968). The 
key difficulty with the attribution o f environmental crisis to population is that it addresses human populations as a whole, 
rather than addressing the first-world patterns o f over-consumption largely responsible for such impacts. Crake represents 
the dangers o f  populationism, since he wipes out humanity as a whole; however he also complicates this since he appears 
himself to have concerns about third-world poverty, and operates within an ethical equanimity.
Notably Danette Diîvlarco, see note 14 above.
37 Crake’s ‘ecological thought’ thus may also have allusions to the problems o f  Social Darwinism.
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Asperger’s is a lack of imagination.38 Correspondingly, Crake hones in on the human 
imagination as the cause of human suffering and environmental degradation, since it results in 
our fear of death, or, as he also puts it, ‘the human condition’ (OC, 355).
It seems significant, in reading Crake, that he himself lacks the fear-based emotions 
around death that he identifies as a key problematic. The effect of this is twofold. His 
correspondingly pragmatic approach means that as a teenager he is able, for example—and 
somewhat chillingly, to watch his own mother’s death with fascination rather than distress; 
this is contrasted in the novel with Jimmy’s profound grief at the death of his mother, the 
effect being to portray Crake as being, in many ways, disturbingly inhuman. However, it also 
means that Crake makes the decision to manufacture his own death along with that of the rest 
of humanity, which, while on human terms hardly alleviates the horror of his genocide, 
nonetheless places his ethics on an equitable plane. Crake’s own reduced fear of death— 
although he becomes notably distressed as the genocide unfolds—thus produces the 
pragmatism of his utilitarian ethics, an ethics based on the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number. Although this clearly does not equate with the extremes of his slaughter, Crake’s 
inhumanness functions to align him with the nonhuman. Hence, Crake is concerned with a 
quantification of happiness that exceeds the sum of humans living within the bounds of the 
present, extending it to the future lives of humans—or at least humanoids—and nonhumans of 
all kinds, of flora and fauna, far into the future.
Therefore, one can view Crake’s whole project, which includes but is not restricted to 
his destruction of humanity, as a posthuman project—if a problematic one. In wiping out 
humanity, Crake disables a trait (the imagination) that he views as having developed 
problematically in the course of human evolution. Crake’s act is based on the premise that (a) 
humans are not going to change their ways, and (b) any opportunity for an effective, or indeed 
any, political response lies in the past. However, he acts upon the possibility for a posthuman 
future, since his eco-hominid Crakers are created from the human genome. In developing the 
Crakers, Crake therefore responds to the world as a more-than-human site in which humans as 
posthumans might continue to play a part. He also, arguably, qualifies as a candidate for 
subjecthood based on Morton’s ‘ecological thought’. Crake is interpellated by the nonhuman 
world in such a way that his ideas of time and space are vastly expanded. His actions 
correspond with Morton’s definition of the ecological thought as forcing us to ‘invent ways of
38 Diagnosis for Asperger’s is currently underdeveloped; generally used is a ‘cluster’ approach in which a sufficient number 
out o f a range o f  potential characteristic features must be identified. While lack o f imagination on its own is o f  course no 
diagnosis for Asperger’s, it is almost always present where Asperger’s is diagnosed within the Autistic spectrum range. For 
information see ‘What is Asperger Syndrome’, The National Autistic Website <http://www.autism.org.uk/About- 
autism/Autism-and-Asperger-syndrome-an-introduction/What-is-Asperger-syndrome.aspx> [accessed 6 June 2014].
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being together that don’t depend on self interest’ (see note 31 above). Crake’s inventiveness, 
on this view, is extreme, to say the least, but is nonetheless aligned with an ecological vision 
that outstrips the needs of humans living in the present.
Only a slight shift in perspective, nonetheless, positions Crake’s act of wiping out 
humanity as misanthropic or ecofascist, calling to mind the view that humanity, on whatever 
grounds, is a plague or cancer on the planet. Such a stance is not unfamiliar and clearly has 
currency within some environmentalisms today, particularly those of a deeper green. George 
Gessert remarks, reading Oryx and Crake, ‘Maybe we deserve to go extinct. Maybe we want 
to. We are our own worst enemies’.39 A similar sentiment appears in Attwood’s 1996 novel, 
Life Before Man, when palaeontologist Lesje wonders: ‘Does she care whether the human 
race survives or not? She doesn’t know. The dinosaurs didn’t survive and it wasn’t the end of 
the world. In her bleaker moments ... she feels the human race has it coming’.40 As Canavan 
remarks, reading Crake this way can lead one to view the novel as ‘a deeply conservative and 
cynical anti-utopia’, one that ‘endorses Crake’s naïve, scientistic reduction of all human 
institutions to evolutionary hard-wiring’, thereby denying ‘any possible solution to 
environmental crisis’.41 Canavan follows this with the cogent suggestion that Crake and his 
Crakers should be read as offering allegorised rather than literal solutions. However, one 
might further remark that, even to endorse Crake’s assessment that our behaviours and 
institutions are, as Bergthaller puts it, ‘not in any way unnatural’, is not necessarily, in itself, 
to negate all solutions.42 Even if, as Crake proposes, we are hardwired to self-destruct, the 
novel’s temporal aspect must also be accounted for; the shrinking window of possibility in 
which effective change might occur has, in the trilogy, already shrunk, despite it being set, as 
Canavan puts it, only ‘twenty minutes’ into the future.43 As Crake sees it, things have already 
gone far too far. Politics have collapsed and corporations have taken over. Hence, his rewiring 
might be understood as an extreme response based on a reduction, not of his thinking, but of 
possibility itself.
Crake’s thinking, as he designs the Crakers, nonetheless focuses on halting the 
excesses of human behaviours, based on the assumption that our fear in the face of death 
drives a problematic desire for immortality. Crake links this quite specifically to the human 
imagination, and as we find out later (via flashbacks in The Year o f The Flood), he also relates 
this to language or grammar, which again he brings back to the human genome:
39 G. Gessert, ‘O /jx and Crake’, Leonardo 37.5 (2004), 416-417, p. 416.
40 Margaret Atwood, Life Before Man (UK: Vintage, 1996), p. 19.
41 Canavan, p. 151.
42 Bergthaller, p. 741.
43 Canavan, p. 142.
55
Glenn used to say the reason you can’t really imagine yourself being dead was that as 
soon as you say, “I’ll be dead,” you’ve said the word I. And so you’re still alive inside 
the sentence. And that’s how people got the idea of the immortality of the soul -  it was 
a consequence of grammar. And so was God, because as soon as there’s a past tense, 
there has to be a past before the past, and you keep going back in time until you get to 
I  don’t know, and that’s what God is. It’s what you don’t know - the dark, the hidden, 
the underside of the visible, and all because we have grammar, and grammar would be 
impossible without the FoxP2 gene; so God is a brain mutation, and that gene is the 
same one birds need for singing. (YF, 377)
Crake’s positioning here of immortality as a kind of textuality borne of language emphasises 
not just the naturalness of the difficulties we face but the potential for us to consider them in 
different ways. It also provides some insight into Crake’s ideas about immortality. Crake’s 
cover-project is the BlyssPluss pill, which he claims offers protection from sexually 
transmitted diseases, unlimited enhancement of libido, and the prolonging of youth. This pill 
is supposedly intended to sterilize its unsuspecting user as a means to lower population levels. 
However, when it goes to market it turns out to contain, not a sterilization drug, but the lethal 
virus with which Crake wipes out humanity. His real project, it transpires, is not the pill with 
its promises for eternal youth, but the Crakers whom Crake designs to replace humanity. In 
the Crakers, the meaning of immortality is revised, since Crake describes them as immortal, 
despite programming them to drop dead at the age of thirty. Crake explains to Jimmy: 
‘Immortality is a concept. If you take “mortality” as being, not death, but the foreknowledge 
of it and the fear of it, then “immortality” is the absence of such fear’ (OC, 356).44 Thus, in 
rendering the Crakers immortal, Crake also reinstates the animal in the human. No longer 
living in fear of death, no longer mortal, the Crakers are able to live peacefully in the 
unconstructed and nonhuman world.
The Crakers have been variously interpreted, being taken with differing degrees of 
seriousness. They are depicted in Oryx and Crake, although far less so in Maddaddam, with a 
humour that often amounts to absurdity. They have UV-resistant skins, live outdoors, limit 
their sexual activities to polyandrous breeding cycles, and are herbivores whose main diet
44 Cf. Wittgenstein: ‘Death is not an event o f life. Death is not lived through. If by eternity is understood not endless temporal 
duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present. Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is 
without limit. The temporal immortality o f  the human soul, that is, its eternal survival after death, is not only in no way 
guaranteed, but this assumption will not do for us what we have always tried to make it do. Is the riddle solved by the fact 
that I survive forever? Ts this eternal life not as enigmatic as cur present one?’ Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Project 
Gutenberg’s Tractatus, Logico-Philosophicus 6.4311-6.4312, trans, by C. K. Ogden (ebook, October 22,1010), pp. 88-89.
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takes advantage of a virulent shrub. However, they also feature oddities ranging from feline 
purring to waggling blue penises, meaning that some critics, such as Stephen Dunning, find it 
‘hard to take them seriously’.45 Clearly the Crakers pose some problems, since, if they are 
intended to improve on humanity, many of their improvements not only appear as ridiculous 
to our sensibilities, but exceed the realms of possibility. The idea that we might be supposed 
to read the Crakers literally thus seems nonsensical. However, they clearly do play an 
important role in the novel’s explorations of the human subject at a time of environmental 
crisis; furthermore, their contribution to such explorations increases in seriousness as the 
trilogy unfolds. As Rozelle notes, the Crakers ‘embody genetically what Atwood’s millennial 
“green” readers might aspire to behaviourally’; that is, they are inherently eco-friendly.46 
This does not, though, make them the ‘noble savages’ that Bouson proposes.47 While, as 
Canavan remarks, the Crakers do function in one sense as a ‘hyperbolic version’ of the 
‘fantasy’ that we can turn back the clock and somehow undo civilisation, several critics, 
nonetheless—including Canavan, see them as saying something in the present, in relation to 
our going forward today.48 As Rozelle puts it, they serve as ‘metonymic “floor models’” , 
exhibiting ‘alternative versions of humanity within millennial contexts, not simply in arrière- 
garde outrage but in far more unsettling philosophical speculation’.49 It is this context of an 
‘unsettling philosophical speculation’ that is of interest in my reading. Here the Crakers might 
become, as Canavan suggests, an allegory of the ‘radical transformation of both society and 
subjectivity that will be necessary in order to save the planet’.50 Such a transformation is noted 
in Bergthaller’s description of the Crakers as ‘already domesticated’ or ‘housebroken’.51 That 
is, the Crakers represent not so much a return to some prior natural state, but an indication of 
the extent to which we, as humans, need to change our behaviours going forward if we are to 
reduce our catastrophic impacts on the planet.
Bergthaller’s point also, however, leads us back to the question of paradox at the heart 
of death-thinking. As a feature built into the Crakers, the notion of death-facing purports to 
overcome—but therefore also assumes in the first place—a human / nature binary. In my 
reading, I view Crake’s construction of the Crakers as seeking to re-instate the animal in the 
human. This occurs quite specifically in the attempt to disable the imagination within the
45 Stephen Dunning, ‘Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake; The Terror o f  the Thereputic’, Canadian Literature 186 (2005), 
86- 101.
46 Rozelle, p. 69.
47 Bouson, p. 17.
48 Canavan, p. 152.
49 Rozelle, p. 68.
50 Canavan (my emphasis), p. 152.
51 Bergthaller, p. 734.
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human genome. The immortal Crakers become animal in that they no longer envisage death 
coming, and therefore have no recourse to associated death-denial behaviours. At the same 
time, as noted earlier, Crake’s actions seem ambiguous at this point, since while he effectively 
reinstates the animal in the human, he simultaneously sees our problematic behaviours as 
(already) originating in the ancient primate brain. This effectively raises questions not just 
about human / nonhuman distinctions but about the ways we relate to and understand them. 
This novel plays around with these distinctions in various ways, for example, through its 
constantly recurring motif, Alex the Parrot. This refers to a real-life African Grey parrot, 
Alex, who was renowned for his apparently cognitive, not merely mimetic, use of language.52 
His presence in the novel signals the longstanding philosophical debates over the cognitive 
capacities of nonhuman animals, stretching back to Descartes and the Cartesian divide. The 
assumption that the nonhuman lacks imagination and thus awareness of death is thus placed in 
question, referring the reader to the need for a reconsideration of narrative events. Alex’s 
presence effectively positions our difficulties with death and associated behaviours, and the 
proposed imperative of death-facing, as an ontological paradox to do with the ways we define 
ourselves as human. The question this places over narrative events is further compounded 
when Crake’s modifications to the Crakers fail to sustain. Led in part by Snowman’s 
predilection for feeding them absurd origin myths, the Crakers’ imaginations begin to 
develop. They want to know where they have come from, and they start to perform minor 
rituals. This suggests that one may not be able to simply sever the imagination from the 
human after all. It also points to a question to do with the persistence of the human in the 
posthuman—a question next considered in relation to the humanistic qualities of Snowman.
As some critics note, Snowman (aka Jimmy) appears to represent the arts and 
humanities, in the trilogy, whereas Crake represents the sciences.53 In my reading I view this 
distinction in terms of the two characters’ epistemological perspectives on death-facing as an 
ontological problem. Accordingly, I view Crake in terms of a science-based and materialist 
approach to death-facing, but in a way that begins to pick up on certain new materialist 
concerns. Crake becomes a possible candidate for Morton’s ‘ecological thought’ (see note 39 
above) in that he demonstrates an aesthetic perspective that exceeds the temporal and spatial 
scope of the difficulties at hand. Snowman, on the other hand, begins to raise the trilogy’s 
concerns with words and language, offering a differing view of the human imagination.
52 He can be Googled!
53 For example, Bergthaller, ‘Housebreaking the Human Animal’, and J. Brooks Bouson, “It's Game Over Forever”: 
Atwood's Satiric Vision o f  a Bioengineered Posthuman Future in Qry’x and Crake’, The Journal o f  Commonwealth Literature 
39. (2004), 139-156.
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Snowman is also the initial site for the trilogy’s consideration of the role of the individual 
subject in relation to its world. I consider this using Butler’s notion of the performative 
subject. The appearance of a performative element in Snowman, effectively, runs in parallel 
to the biological materialism of Crake’s thinking. In combination, these serve to illustrate the 
way Atwood’s trilogy seems to assimilate aspects of poststructuralist and related thought, 
while at the same time moving toward more recent developments in speculative and new 
materialisms. In the second novel. The Year o f the Flood, Snowman’s epistemological 
contributions to the first novel’s narrative questions are carried through in the character of 
Toby, who, as I later discuss, does far more with them than Snowman ever seems to manage. 
Despite his being viewed as the (humanist) site for change by critics such as DiMarco, 
Snowman seems on the whole to demonstrate, above all, the unreliability of the human as 
agent.54
The question of the subject’s performative relation to its world arises in the novel’s 
opening pages as we first meet Snowman. Crake’s destruction of humanity has effectively 
halted time, accentuating Snowman’s plight as devoid of ‘other’, both without and within. 
Suspended in a world wherein all that he knows has ended, he finds he ‘doesn’t know which 
is worse, a past he can’t regain or a present that will destroy him if he looks at it too clearly. 
Then there’s the future; sheer vertigo’ {OC, 173). Snowman’s inability to respond to his 
circumstances is linked to the loss of a human socio-cultural context. Despite being 
surrounded, not just by the ruins of the human world, but by the emerging ‘luminal zones’ of 
biota—as described by Rozelle—which ‘continue to adapt and grow’, even in ‘zero hour’, 
these are of no interest to Snowman.55 Nor, particularly, are the Crakers who live nearby and 
with whom he interacts, but only minimally. This break between subject and world is further 
demonstrated as words lose meaning for him, there being no one to receive them: ‘He wipes 
his face on a comer of the sheet. “Pointless repinings,” he says out loud’ {OC, 51). Yet, 
Snowman does gradually adapt, and as he does so his subjecthood qualitatively changes. 
Deprived of a human context, his human behaviours are gradually supplemented with 
distinctly animal characteristics. He runs on the beach and ‘laughs like a hyena or roars like a 
lion’ {OC, 11). Protecting himself from the now feral experimental hybrids, such as wolvogs 
and pigoons, he takes sanctuary like a primate in the trees. While at first he is isolated and 
defensive, one day he watches a caterpillar letting itself down on a thread and feels a ‘sudden, 
inexplicable surge of tenderness and joy’ {OC, 46). This signals a new recognition of other,
54 DiMarco, p ; 170.
55 Rozelle, pp. 61-62.
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redefining the boundaries that previously defined his human self and realigning him with the 
world of his emergence. Gradually, with no need for genetic modification, Snowman becomes 
animal.
This gradual shift in Snowman’s ontological state appears to draw upon the notion of a 
subject performativity as seen in the work of Butler and others. From an initial position of 
isolation in the immediate post-apocalyptic moment, a certain pseudo-presence of ‘other’ 
gradually slides up around him. Often, we read, ‘he feels he has a listener: someone unseen, 
hidden behind the screen of leaves, watching him slyly’ (OC, 51). This conjuring up of ‘other’ 
highlights the performative aspect of our being-in-the-world, our existence as being within a 
world that already contains our arrival. As Butler remarks, ‘It would seem that one is always 
addressed in one way or another, even if one is abandoned or abused, since the void and the 
injury hail one in specific ways’.56 Gradually, as Snowman is hailed by this void of 
apocalypse, he comes to accept it as the other within which he is contained. It seems it is only 
when he is able to reformulate this other that he is able to re-enter, or arrive at, the present as 
an in-the-world being: ‘So here it is then’, he observes, ‘the moment, this one, the one he’s 
supposed to be living in. His head’s on a hard surface, his body’s crammed into a chair, he’s 
one big spasm. He stretches, yelps with pain’ (OC, 312). This arrival, however, takes 
Snowman most of the novel to achieve. While the extreme violence of this arrival might 
evoke sympathy for such a delay, nonetheless it leaves no room for his further development. 
Snowman, furthermore, is repeatedly depicted as lacking in all personal autonomy. This is 
illustrated in the aphorism he recalls: ‘Each one of us must tread the path laid out before him’ 
(OC, 26). For all his love of words and the arts, Snowman primarily consents to a 
deterministic view of life.
In the closing pages, however. Snowman demonstrates the beginnings of an ethics, 
arising out of the violence of his arrival. This performative episode provides the narrative 
thread that will be picked up again by Toby in the next novel. On discovering that the Crakers 
have unexpectedly encountered a band of human survivors, he wonders whether or not he 
should teach them about guns, about rape. While their naivety could put them at risk, 
Snowman wonders what effect such words as ‘war’ and ‘rape’ might have were they to enter 
their vocabularies, and thus their lives. Realising the possibilities, Snowman decides that all 
he will say to the Crakers, before leaving to seek out the strangers, is merely: "Crake is 
watching over you; and Oryx loves you' (OC, 426). It might be that, in choosing not to 
prepare them, he has left the Crakers open to danger. On the other hand he might instead have
56 Butler, p. 51.
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forestalled their departure onto a journey towards the bleaker aspects of humanity. In 
engaging with the Crakers’ imaginations in a certain way, he may have done more than Crake 
towards safeguarding their future as a species. Even so, in the closing pages of the first novel, 
this future remains uncertain.
The Year o f the Flood
The Year o f the Flood is described by Atwood as simultanial, meaning that it is set within the 
same temporal frame as the first novel and revolves around the same event: Crake’s 
destruction of humanity and his design of the Crakers. This novel, however, is written from 
the alternate perspectives of two God’s Gardeners, Toby and Ren, who have no knowledge of 
Crake and his immortality project. The Gardeners, a back-to-the-land resistance movement 
and spiritual group, believe that the ‘Waterless Flood’ {YF, 7) is imminent as God’s 
punishment for humanity. Hence, when Crake’s lethal virus spreads, they assume that their 
prediction has materialised. On the whole, the Gardeners survive this waterless flood, since, 
expecting a disaster, they prepare for it in various ways. They are also engrossed in countering 
the runaway degeneracy of the social world by teaching themselves the importance of death- 
facing.
In this section, I explore this novel’s reconsideration of the ontological human subject 
in terms of its performative and ethical possibilities. This is tied, again, to language; but rather 
than being primarily a (philosophical) marker of the distinctly human, language in this novel 
also becomes performative—a marker of precognitive functions that shape human subjects as 
much as being shaped by them. The performative aspect of this novel is carried over from its 
starting point in Snowman; however, it is now taken much further, resulting in an alternative 
route to re-taming death, which I discuss mainly in relation to Toby. Where Crake seeks to 
immobilize death-fear using a technological fix, the idea is now put forward that humans can 
transform themselves through performative acts and practices, thereby developing full 
recognition of the mortal state of the self. This also produces an ethics that differs to, although 
to an extent justifying, Crake’s utilitarian ethics. I discuss this using Butler’s notion of the 
ethical subject, including her incorporation of the ideas of Foucault and Levinas, among 
others. The death-facing proposed in this novel is depicted as producing the capacity to take a 
more ethical stance to living, which potentially might reduce human impact on the natural 
world. Nonetheless, as with Crake’s biological materialist route, this route is also shown to be 
partial.
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This second novel’s ethico-performative route to death-facing is demonstrated through the 
God’s Gardeners and represented mainly in Toby. The Gardeners themselves produce an 
uncertain mix of seriousness and satire on Atwood’s part. They embody an odd amalgamation 
of Judeo-Christian and Darwinian beliefs, and while the blend often appears as incongruous 
or absurd, this bringing together of two modes of thinking—the abstract and the material— 
nontheless seems to make a serious point. In an interview, Atwood remarks:
If we don't quite have a religion yet that fits that bill we will soon. By that I mean 
people are going to have to stop squabbling about religion and science being two polar 
opposites and come to some kind of accommodation around that or else a lot of crucial 
time will be wasted.57
Even so, as the object of Atwood’s relentless humour the Gardeners also clearly function to 
satirise elements of normative and religious practises. They see themselves as the paragons of 
virtue, yet are prone to all the usual human foibles such as arrogance and duplicity, their 
teachings ranging from the expedient to the illogical and the absurd. They are led by Adam 
One, who is served by many Eves, demonstrating typical gender bias as is common to many 
religious and other groups. Adam One is shown, furthermore, to manipulate followers ‘for 
their own good’ whilst heading a concealed, politically active inner circle. On the other hand, 
this inner activist group, known as Maddaddam, is the main environmentalist mouthpiece of 
the trilogy and also discloses links with Crake (although these are not fully made clear, either 
to the reader or to most of the Gardeners). Whatever can be said of the Maddaddams, they 
succeed in toppling runaway corporatism and its hegemonies, and, while most of humanity is 
wiped out in the process, they almost all—if somewhat implausibly—survive to begin again 
in the ‘new world’ of the third novel.
It is in God’s Gardener Toby, however, that the trilogy’s second route to death-facing 
is both portrayed and interrogated. We are introduced to this role immediately, as The Year o f  
the Flood opens into Toby’s story. On the second page we read: ‘Vultures are our friends, the 
Gardeners used to teach. They purify the earth. They are God’s necessary dark Angels o f 
bodily dissolution. Imagine how terrible it would be i f  there were no death! ’ {YF, 4). This first 
encounter with Toby—as with Snowman—takes place in the post-apocalyptic moment, where 
we find her recalling the Gardeners’ constant mantra: that death is nothing to be afraid of. The 
Gardeners, as the flashbacks in Toby’s narrative inform us, are fond of pointing out the
57 Margaret Atwood. K Coyne, ‘Interview with Margaret Atwood’, Bookseller 5385 (May 6,2009), pp. 20-21.
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virtues of such creatures as carrion beetles, putrefying bacteria and vultures, whose work is to 
return flesh to earth as compost. Their combined Judeo-Christian and scientific ideologies 
also attune to the same point, as expounded in their daily sermons:
Let us pray that if we must sacrifice our own protein so it may circulate among our 
fellow Species, we will recognize the sacred nature of the transaction ... Should your 
life be required of you, rest assured that it is required by Life. Let us sing. (YF, 415- 
16)
Toby, we learn from the outset, retains a scepticism about the Gardeners and their teachings, 
despite having become one of them and absorbed many of their ideas. Importantly, though, 
Toby herself is also represented as being sceptical in character, as well as forthright and 
resilient. Thus she functions to interpret for the reader the value of the Gardeners’ teachings, 
whilst filtering out some of their more absurd behaviours and overlooking, in the main, their 
pious sanctimonies. Through Toby, certain of the Gardeners’ ideas, including their 
performative practices and their environmentalist ethics, are thus assimilated for the reader. 
Toby demonstrates the possibility of treading a line that avoids succumbing to spiritual or 
ecological discourses, whilst also not wholeheartedly rejecting them. That is, she upholds the 
common-sense viewpoint that differing ideologies often have valid and mutually compatible 
components, while none represents the whole of truth or value; nor, indeed, need it trouble 
us—she seems to indicate—if they purport to do so.
Accordingly, following the reference on page two to the Gardeners’ insistence that ‘it 
would be terrible if there were no death’, Toby responds immediately by asking herself: ‘Do I 
still believe this? Everything is different up close’ {YF, 4). The significance of this hesitance 
is upheld throughout this second novel and on to the end of the third. While death-facing may 
direct one to a more ecological stance, its material reality is less glamorous than the abstract 
idea indicates. Not only that, but death-facing in actuality asks one to face the more-or-less 
inconceivable. I explore this difficulty in Chapter Three in relation to Derrida’s work on death 
as aporia. Meanwhile, Toby, in The Year o f the Flood, anticipates some of that discussion. 
She refuses to allow a glamorising of death and as such engages in a critique of death-facing, 
even as the trilogy largely supports it. At the same time, Toby herself, more than any other 
character in the trilogy, embodies the philosophical notion of death-facing—learned from the 
Gardeners—within her daily living.
Death-facing in this second novel is primarily produced through a linguistic 
performative repetition of death’s importance, as enacted by the Gardeners in their daily 
sermons and perpetuated in their daily living. This can be considered in relation to Butler’s
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ethical subject, which incorporates aspects of Foucault’s late work on care of the self. 
Foucault specifically refers to ‘technologies of the self, by which he means practices adopted 
or carried out by a subject as it engages with the given world of its emergence.58 Such 
technologies, says Foucault, enable subjects to ‘transform themselves in order to attain a 
certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality’.59 While this indicates a 
level of agency, the Foucauldian subject is only able to respond agentially from a position 
already given. Building on this, Butler emphasises the ‘other’, or ‘you’, that must therefore 
interpellate this subject.60 For the Gardeners, this ‘you’ or ‘other’ is the subject’s ideological 
other, an eco-pantheist-scientific notion of death-facing with which, as practitioners, they 
performatively engage. Their teachings locate the human subject as just one small part in a 
vast whole, and paradoxically as both infinitely valuable and entirely dispensable. The 
Gardeners are perpetually interpellated by these ideas through the daily sermons of Adam 
One, and accordingly perform ‘technologies of the self (see note 59 above)—in their words, 
actions and living practices, thereby adopting a living stance of death-facing. Such, at least, is 
the idea, although the novel also illustrates the Gardener teachings to display inconsistencies, 
interrupting this performative process; furthermore, success appears governed by the varying 
levels of human response.
The Year o f the Flood supplements this notion of performative death-facing with a 
motif of snakes, paralleling the first novel’s use of Alex the Parrot. But while this snake motif 
is scattered throughout the second novel, one has to look beyond the novel to Atwood’s 
‘Snake Poems’ to find the meaning of snakes in relation to death-facing. For example the last 
three stanzas of her poem ‘Quattrocento’, which describes being eaten by a snake, read:
Here you can praise the light,
having so little of it:
it’s the death you carry in you
red and captured, that makes the world
shine for you
as it never did before.
This is how you learn prayer.
58 Foucault, Technologies o f  the Self ed. by Martin, Gutman, & Hutton, pp. 16-49.
59 Ibid., p. 18.
60 Butler, pp. 8 ,19 ,24 .
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Love is choosing, the snake said.
The kingdom of God is within you 
because you ate it.
Margaret Atwood.61
Here, the performative act of choosing death is the means to attain the Kingdom of God. As 
Branco Goqup states, the snake ‘holds out the possibility of ... the fullness of a life that 
rejects annihilation from the body and accepts the inevitability of death’.62 The snakes in The 
Year o f The Flood then add to this idea more generally. For example, one of many feast days 
in the God’s Gardener calendar is ‘The Feast of Serpent Wisdom and the importance of 
instinctive knowing’ (YF, 279). On this feast day, Adam One gives a lengthy sermon about 
the many meanings of the snake, and concludes the most important one to be that:
The Serpent is wise in that it lives in immediacy, without the need for elaborate 
intellectual frameworks Humankind is endlessly constructing for itself. For what in us 
is belief and faith, in the other Creatures is inborn knowledge. (YF, 279)
Here, death-facing is described as an act of immediacy in life, posing the possibility of 
dealing directly with the present moment, rather than supplementing it with additional mental 
construct. A distinction appears quite clearly here between Crake’s material disabling of the 
human imagination and the Gardeners’ parallel disablement of it, which repositions it through 
a linguistic performative process.
The effect of this mode of ideological living is illustrated in the Gardener children, 
who are blatently unafraid of death. Despite frequently hearing the adults speak about death, 
about turning to compost, and about the ‘Waterless Flood’—the great retribution that will 
wipe out the human race—as Toby observes: ‘None of this scared the real Gardener kids, they 
were used to it. They’d even make fun of it’ (YF, 71).
“We’re all gonna diiiiie,” they’d say, making dead person faces. “Hey, Ren. Want to 
do your bit for the Cycle of Life? Lie down in that dumpster, you can be compost.” 
“Hey, Ren. Want to be a maggot? Lick my cut!” (YF, 71)
6'Margaret Atwood, ‘Quattrocentro’, The Art o f  Wondering (Saturday 22 January 2005) 
<www.https://wonderingart.blogspot.co.uk/2005/01/quattrocentro.html> [accessed 23 April 2014].
62 Branko Gon'up, ‘Margaret Atwood's Poetry and Poetics’, in The Cambridge Companion to Margaret Atwood, ed. by C. A. 
Howells (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 142.
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The Gardener children are also taught about their biological place in the natural world, 
through the repetition of such phrases as ‘Running away makes you prey’ (YF, 26) or ‘Nature 
is our playground’ (YF, 78). They learn too about positive thinking: 'The No Cup is bitter, the 
Yes Cup is yummy - /  Now, which one would you rather have in your tummy?' (YF, 135). 
These ‘lessons’ all emphasise a combination of death-facing and performative living, whilst 
repositioning the human subject within the wider, natural world. Since the Gardeners are 
expecting a Waterless Flood, this is not, of course, just about instilling an ethic; it also 
prepares the young Gardener children for survival.
The ethical aspect of performative death-facing is nonetheless significant, since it is 
constructed as a response to environmental crisis. In delineating her notion of an ethical 
subject, Butler reaches a principle of ‘responsibility’ through her incorporation of the work of 
Levinas.63 This includes an exposition of the role of language, which remains a central theme 
in this second novel throughout. Discussing the work of Levinas, Robert Eaglestone writes:
It is from this understanding of language as the relation to other expressed, not 
represented, that the ethical importance of language emerges. Language is where and 
how we are put into question by the other, and drawn to our responsibilities: the 
‘calling into question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the other in the 
face we call language.64
Butler enlists this notion of the T  that calls us into question, relating it to Adorno’s 
discussions on the violence that characterises our ‘arrival’. It is from this that she discerns our 
‘opportunity to become human’.65 In any given situation, it is thus our response that governs 
the possibility for an ethics to arise. Atwood explores what it means to become human at a 
time of environmental crisis through the character of Toby, who acts on the responsibilities 
that draw her as she is interpellated by the Gardeners’ teachings and engages with friends and 
with socio-environmental concerns. She also constantly struggles with her thoughts and 
responses; thus Atwood demonstrates, through Toby, that it is in the struggle to respond that 
possibility arises.
This reading of Toby becomes clearer if placed in comparison with the earlier reading 
of Snowman. Atwood notably aligns Toby’s circumstances with Snowman’s. Both are 
described, from the outset of each novel, in relation to their response to the post-apocalyptic
63 Butler, pp. 83-136.
64 Robert Eaglestone. Ethical Criticism: Reading After Lcvir.ss (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 1997), p. 219.
65 Butler, p. 101.
66
moment. Toby, like Snowman, is suspended in time. Snowman’s response to this is one of 
profound trauma as he considers a past ‘that he can’t regain’, a present ‘that will destroy him 
if he looks at it too clearly’ and a future that is simply ‘sheer vertigo’ (OC, 173). However, 
when Toby experiences a similar sentiment she expresses not so much trauma but simply 
frustration. She reflects: ‘She can’t live only in the present, like a shrub. But the past is a 
closed door, and she can’t see any future’ {YF, 114). Immediately, Toby appears less 
impacted by death-fear at the apocalyptic moment than Snowman.
Toby also demonstrates the significance of inner struggle to the process of becoming 
human. She finds herself grappling with the fact that she has survived the flood and at this 
point undergoes a brief crisis of faith. Why is it she that has survived, she wants to know, and 
not someone ‘more useful biologically’ {YF, 114)? However, Toby quickly decides to deal 
with this crisis through performative means. She considers taking death mushrooms, but 
instead demonstrates the value of death-facing to life by eating honey, which doesn’t decay. 
As Toby recalls, ‘the ancients called it the food of immortality’ {YF, 115). Toby also forces 
herself to remember the extracting of the honey from the hives as a pleasurable experience, 
even though it wasn’t. Toby ‘prefers to deceive herself because she ‘desperately needs to 
believe such pure joy is still possible’ {YF, 115). By choosing to eat honey, Toby thus 
consciously ingests the teachings of the Gardeners, using performative means to activate her 
faith that a future might be possible. While it may seem odd for death-facing to involve the 
food of immortality and not death-mushrooms, Toby’s act is linked to the death-facing 
Crakers, who were also described as immortal. Meanwhile, Snowman, who has recourse 
neither to the Crakers’ nor the Gardeners’ route to death-facing, lacks the means to respond to 
the challenges he faces, other than to take each day as it comes. This distinction between 
Toby’s inner struggle and Snowman’s passivity is illustrated in the very different aphorisms 
at work. The Gardeners teach that ‘You create your own world by your inner attitude’ {YF, 
376), whereas Snowman remembers that each ‘must tread the path laid out before him’ {OC, 
26). Both ideas depict a sense of forward movement, but one is generative and the other 
merely given.
A further distinction between Toby and Snowman is seen in her full engagment with 
the nonhuman other. In the post-apocalyptic moment, Toby immediately recognises the 
liminal zone of emerging biota as the other face of apocalypse, as described by Rozelle.66 At 
the opening of The Year o f The Flood, Toby observes: ‘There still is life’, ‘Birds chirp; 
sparrows, they must be’ {YF, 3). In contrast, Snowman’s first observations are of the horizon
66 Rozelle, pp. 62 ,65.
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‘lit with a ‘rosy, deadly glow’, while birds screech over an ocean ‘grinding against the ersatz 
reefs of rusted car parts and jumbled bricks’ (OC, 4). Both descriptions include birds, but 
Toby sees the birds as birds, noting that life—specifically nonhuman life at this point—is still 
present, whereas Snowman sees birds as mere parts in the larger image of collapse and decay. 
Toby’s experiences with the Gardeners have thus enabled her to respond immediately to the 
indescribable violence of the apocalyptic moment with a sense of life and possibility, whereas 
Snowman sees only ruin. Toby’s response contains an ecological ethic, whereas Snowman’s 
arrival at a point of ethics takes him far longer to achieve. Nonetheless, the beginnings of an 
ethical care in Snowman, as depicted in the closing scene of Oryx and Crake, does seem to 
point to the developments we go on to see in Toby.
In The Year o f the Flood, this demonstration of a performative death-facing ethic is 
taken one stage further, effectively rendering ethics as a kind of natural law, a law that of 
course might be, and manifestly is—repeately and with consequences—broken. This can be 
understood by looking more closely at Butler’s apportioning of responsibility to the ethical 
subject—an idea she takes from Levinas. The crucial point about responsibility as proposed 
by Levinas is that it is already there, as arrival occurs. Thus Levinas argues that our ethical 
relation to other is prior to our relation to self.67 Discussing this aspect of Levinas’ work, 
Eaglestone explains:
each of us is always already responsible for the others who people the world. Their 
very otherness imposes a duty upon us, before we are able to deny it. [...] Our 
unconditional responsibility is not something we take on or a rule by which we agree 
to be bound: instead it exists before us and we are ‘thrown’ into it without any 
choice.68
This provides an important clue to understanding how a paradigm of death-facing relates to 
the problem of environmental crisis in The Year o f The Flood. Effectively, it is a performative 
given that simply through being in the world we acquire responsibility for its wellbeing. Thus 
environmental crisis is understood as an outcome of the denial of this responsibility—or, 
indeed, simply a failure to recognise it.
We can apply this link between ethics, responsibility and death-facing to an episode 
late in the second novel. Toby and Ren come across one of their Gardener companions, Oates,
67 Emmanuel Levinas, in Richard Kearney, Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Philosophers: The phenomenological 
heritage (UK: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 57-58.
68 Eaglestone, pp. 137-138.
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who has been slaughtered and hung in a tree. Ren is distraught and, despite their exposure to 
danger, wants desperately to stop and conduct a burial ceremony. Toby urges her on, refusing 
to allow such risky behaviour. Toby, we find, is no less distraught, but holds firmly to the 
point that they need to survive. Within minutes Toby is gathering the limbs of a fallen 
Mo’hair to cook, putting aside Gardeners teachings on veganism, again making survival the 
overriding concern. All this may seem to render the Gardeners’ teachings dispensable, but I 
suggest that this might be the point after all. Atwood also sets up an alignment between 
Oates’ death and that of Laurence Titus Oates of the Scott Expedition, reminding us of his 
famous words: ‘Let his immortal last words be an inspiration to us on our journey: “I am just 
going outside and may be some time’” (TF, 486). This double-death of Oates elucidates 
Levinas’ claim that the ethical relation with other is prior to the ontological relation with self. 
Lawrence Titus Oates, in ‘going outside’, sacrificed himself to enable the survival of his 
companions.69 Sacrifice is of course a tricky idea. On an environmentalist reading, it might 
mean that the human race should make itself scarce and allow the natural world to recover. 
Crake’s act is one of sacrifice in this sense, since he destroyed himself along with everyone 
else. However, where the ethical relation to other is prior to the ontological relation to self, 
sacrifice might actually mean, simply, acknowledging a relation of responsibility between 
one’s self and the world. Hence this reference, in the novel, to Lawrence Titus Oates 
functions to position the life of the self in the wider context of the world within which it 
dwells. Toby, coming across her slaughtered friend, is of course deeply disturbed by it; nor 
could she exonerate it in any way. Nonetheless she acts on a broader recognition of sacrifice 
that hands over to survival. She accepts Oates’ death as sacrifice on this grounds, meaning 
that any subsequent putting themselves at risk would be a violation of this sacrifice. This 
behaviour, on the part of Toby, directly counters a Foucauldian biopolitical valorising of life 
at any cost, and is thus a form of ethical death-facing.
Maddaddam
Maddaddam is the recently completed final book of the trilogy (published September 2013) 
and still awaits critical reviews, although popular views are accumulating and it was long- 
listed for the Bailey’s Prize. This novel differs to the first two, since they are simultanial, 
whereas Maddaddam provides a sequel to both. Maddaddam's depiction of a posthuman
69 It would be interesting, here, to explore Derrida on ‘the gift o f  death’. In his book o f the same name (London: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1996) he examines the extraordinary position o f  Abraham, wherein God asks him to sacrifice his only son.
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future incorporates elements of each of the first novels. Picking up from the final pages of The 
Year o f the Flood, this last novel develops the story of the Maddaddams, the resistance group 
at the core of the God’s Gardeners. Toby, with other Gardener characters, joins forces with 
the Maddaddams, as do the Crakers, along with a frail and disorientated Snowman. The first 
part of the novel is devoted mainly to telling the back-story of Zeb, who, as half-brother of 
Adam One, plays a primary role in Maddaddam activities. The novel evolves into an 
exploration of the idea of a posthuman future. Toby’s narrative maintains a central focus as 
romance develops between her and Zeb. The Crakers, gradually, become more accessible to 
the reader and develop a more proactive presence. Toby even teaches Blackbeard, a young 
Craker boy, to read. The world is finally inherited by the posthuman as the Maddaddams, 
Crakers and Pigoons join forces to wipe out the last of the dangerous Pleeblands criminals, 
the Painballers. However, this ending is complicated by the re-emergence of the recurrent 
subtext of writing, as Blackbeard sets out to pen ‘the Book of Toby’ (M, 385).
In this section, I focus mainly on the way this novel amalgamates two forms of death- 
facing ethic and related ontologies into its vision of a posthuman future. As the Crakers and 
the Gardeners join forces, materialist and performative elements of the trilogy’s overall 
storyline are merged, bringing this novel into the orbit of more recent ecological theorising. 
The novel is distinctly posthumanist, depicting new possibilities through increasing 
hybridisations. As a notable example, accidental matings between Crakers and Gardeners—as 
the polyandrous male Crakers misread the biological features of female sexuality—lead to the 
birth of a new generation of hybrid hominids. A posthuman standpoint is depicted through the 
gradual centring of the Craker perspective. However, this novel also retains the trilogy’s 
concern with questions about language and particularly writing. This, again, anticipates 
discussions in Chapter Three, where I consider death-facing from a Derridean perspective. In 
the present section I view this underlying concern as consciously undermining the novel’s 
premise that an untroubled life of ecological harmony is possible or even desirable. This 
novel’s ecotopia is, after all, built upon a rubric of death-facing and therefore involves 
difficult collaborations and constant efforts to reshape and reform the self in relation to other. 
The novel’s veneer of peace and harmony, much enjoyed as it is by popular reviewers, only 
thinly covers its underlying insistence that human behaviours require ongoing attention.
The trilogy’s explorations of a death-facing paradigm have evolved in this last novel, and now 
underlie narrative events. Whereas each of the first two novels engages with a different notion 
of death-facing; both means are now enfolded into the emerging depiction of a posthuman 
future. Therefore, this posthuman future represents an envisaged outcome of death-facing as a
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response to environmental crisis. Generally speaking, death is mentioned in this novel far less 
than the first two. The novel focuses instead on repositioning the subject in life where death 
has already been faced. One might view this, in terms of Butler’s performative subject, as the 
‘assimilation’ of the process of ‘becoming human’ in response to the violence of one’s arrival 
(see notes 27, 56 and 68 above). By combining this with Morton’s thought, one might further 
say that this assimilation is explored in terms of the implications of being ‘summoned by 
other beings’ at a time of environmental crisis.70 In this sense the novel is an exploration of 
‘the mesh’, an entanglement of phenomena described by Morton as signifying that ‘nothing is 
complete in itself (see note 33 above).
The underlying presence of death-facing within this emergent posthumanism is 
established early on in the novel by Toby. At this point, the Maddaddams, Gardeners and 
Crakers have joined forces, and Toby is sleeping in a Maddaddam cobhouse, dreaming that 
she is at home at a time prior to the trilogy’s apocalyptic events.
Inside this dream she was dreaming of animals. One is a pig, though six-legged; 
another is cat-like, with compound eyes like a fly. There’s a bear as well, but it has 
hooves. These animals are neither hostile nor friendly. Now the city outside is on fire, 
she can smell it; fear fills the air. Gone, gone, says a voice, like a bell tolling. One by 
one the animals come towards her and begin to lick her with their warm, raspy 
tongues.
At the edge of sleep, she gropes towards the retreating dream: the burning city, the 
messengers sent to warn her. That the world has been changed, utterly; that the 
familiar is now long dead; that everything she used to love has been swept away.
As Adam One used to say, The fate o f Sodom is fast approaching. Suppress regret. 
Avoid the pillar o f salt. Don’t look back. (M, 25)
This extract from Toby’s narrative serves to remind the reader of the Gardeners’ teachings 
about death. It also calls upon these teachings in relation to the events of the first two novels, 
updating the extended narrative of the trilogy to this novel’s narrative present. At the same 
time, this extract performs other tasks in relation to the mind of the reader. For example, it 
allegorises the sense of the loss involved in a contemporary facing of environmental crisis. 
Potential sacrifices, such as the luxuries of first-world lifestyles, are thus imagined as 
processed and stepped beyond based on a premise of ‘don’t look back’. This reflects a
70 Morton The Ecological Thought, pp. 28-33.
71
difficulty with contemporary imaginings of a response to environmental crisis, which is that 
they immediately evoke, for many, the fear that the security of the cultural base is under 
threat. Of course, this is a homogenised response that fails to take account, for example, of 
local or global distinctions in levels of loss. Nonetheless it is a popular response, and one to 
which the death-facing paradigm itself alludes. It also assumes, notably, that such a loss is 
incurred by responding to environmental crisis; that is by facing death, rather than the other 
way around. Here one can see how a paradox of death indeed appears to play a role in 
contemporary cultural and political impasses on environmental concerns.
The posthuman landscape of Maddaddam emerges as posthuman because death-facing 
is already a component of its emergence. It exists because of Crake’s Waterless Flood, and it 
is founded on Crake’s utilitarian and the Gardeners’ performative death-facing. Crake’s 
‘terrifying perspicacity’, as Bergthaller describes it, enables him to unemotionally encompass 
the scale of ‘the mesh’ in his thinking; his grasp of the hyperobject and of the presence of 
‘other beings’ is such that his thought is ecological in the sense Morton describes.71 Crake 
therefore does seem to represent an idea about natural law rather than an idea about the evils 
of mad scientists. That is, he may represent the common discourse that ‘nature’ will put things 
right if we fail to do so. Putting things right need not, of course, be interpreted in pantheistic 
or apocalyptic terms; it may equally refer to the general consequences of non-action. The 
Gardeners, on the other hand, may represent the possibility that humans can still (individually 
or collectively) choose to face inevitable change by adjusting behaviours and moving forward 
with a considered response, rather than passively waiting for change to arrive. Each route is 
also, of course, problematised in the novels as discussed already. The question remains as to 
how we might understand the way these two broad ideas come together, as Gardeners and 
Crakers start again in the emergent landscape of Maddaddam. The evolved mix of utilitarian 
and liberal ethics that underlies this emergent socio-cultural scene might be understood, in 
performative terms, as mutually determining. That is, one may elect to choose new 
behaviours, new ethics, new politics, and so on; nonetheless there is effectively no choice 
involved. Interpellated by environmental crisis as hyperobject, the landscape of the human 
mind inevitably and drastically—albeit somewhat inconsistently—is reformed.
Given the trilogy’s extensive investment in this depiction of a posthuman future, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that Atwood intends to delineate, by allegory, at least its real 
possibility. This future is based on a death-facing that by now conditions one’s arrival in the 
world of the present, and, as such, this posthuman future endorses death-facing as a paradigm.
71 Bergthaller, p. 735; Morton, see note 33 above.
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In constituting the emergence of death-facing this future is one in which several of the 
trilogy’s established problematics now fall away. A new capacity manifests in the characters 
to act from a death-facing stance whilst recognising and dismissing layers of human 
weakness. The Maddaddams often express their displeasure with Crake, denouncing his 
renegade act of genocide, or complaining about his refusal to collaborate on the design of the 
Crakers. Clues also emerge that the cult of God’s Gardeners was in some ways a sham. When 
someone suggests that Adam One would have ‘advocated clemency’ in relation to the 
Painballers, ex-Gardener Amanda responds, saying: ‘Maybe he’d have been wrong [...] You 
weren’t there, you don’t know what they did to us. Me and Ren. You don’t know what they’re 
like’ (M, 368). Yet, the trauma of loss and survival, seen mainly in Snowman, appears not to 
impact greatly on these citizens of the future. Any looking back is limited to the odd grumble, 
while the overall mood is one of new collaborations and getting on with world-making. This 
constitutes a critique that appears to endorse both routes of death-facing. Other narrative 
episodes support this sense of getting to the ground of things. For example, Toby decides to 
revise the myths fed by Snowman to the Crakers about Crake, which had painted him as a 
mysterious but omnipresent God. Her account is not accusatory but, rather, tells it as it is. 
Crake ‘decided to make the Great Emptiness’, she tells them, because he wanted to clear 
humans away while there was ‘still an earth’ rather than leaving it until ‘all must die when 
there are none of these things left’ (M, 291). When the Crakers, characteristically, question 
this, asking whether humans might have been given a second chance, Toby tells them that 
humans had ‘already had lots of chances’ (M, 291). In this new posthuman world, dealing 
with matters from the ground up is repeatedly demonstrated as an effective means to 
collaborate, and in the trilogy’s closing pages this posthuman future looks set to continue.
Nonetheless, along with this grounding of a death-facing ethic, the trilogy’s ongoing 
question about language also remains active, right up to the closing pages of this final novel— 
at which point it takes prominence. Language has been variously considered in the trilogy, as 
distinguishing us or not from the nonhuman, as performative, and as concealing, through 
grammatical functions, the real possibility of death. This difficulty with a gap between the 
discursive and the real appears in all the novels I examine in this dissertation. In subsequent 
chapters I explore this from differing perspectives, establishing links between the notion of 
death-facing at a time of environmental crisis and that of language or writing as variously 
interrupting this turn toward death’s materiality. In Maddaddam, this difficulty materialises 
where Toby teaches Blackbeard to write, and, in keeping with the trilogy’s themes, it raises 
issues to do with ethics and the nonhuman. I devote the remainder of this section to exploring 
aspects of this development.
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The difficulty of a gap between the discursive and the real first arises in relation to the 
question of language and imagination in the human and the nonhuman, a question that is 
sustained across the three books of the trilogy. The two kinds of reinstatement of the animal 
in the human, seen first in the Crakers and then in Snowman, leave us with a sense of the 
imagination as being not so much a thing as a function, a facilitation of the performance of 
living. It is indicated that the imagination was never just a human thing in the first place. 
Removing it in the Crakers, Crake does not render the human animal, because, as Morton 
suggests, there is no ‘animal’, there are only ‘strange strangers’ (see note 34 above). 
Similarly, Snowman is human and / or animal in relation to his human and / or animal 
context. Becoming animal does not obfuscate his humanness, but is simply an aspect of it. In 
Maddaddam, however, the concept ‘animal’ is finally limited to descriptions of humans by 
other humans: those in the anarchic realm of the Pleeblands who see their enemies as ‘rats in a 
dump bin’ or ‘scrappy little bantams’ (M, 131), or the Maddaddams who struggle to see the 
painballers as ‘people' (M, 367; emphasis in original). ‘Animal’ and ‘person’ thus become 
statements of intention, rather than signifiers of being, returning us to the question of the 
imagination and specifically its role in language.
This question occupies a subtext layer throughout the final novel. It manifests when 
Toby first writes Blackbeard’s name on a notepad, suggesting that he shows it to Ren to see 
whether she will say his name out loud. The young Craker, who is astounded when this 
works, tells the rest of the Crakers that writing makes words appear in your head just as the 
Pigoons can do, except that they can do it ‘without writing’ (M, 376). This indication that the 
Crakers and other nonhumans communicate telepathically might be read in various ways, but 
also illustrates the contemporary movement, in theory, towards delineating realities at work 
beyond our grasp, signalling a world external to the human sphere. This world of animal, 
confronting us as it does both theoretically and discursively, functions to rewrite the human 
subject as we are interpellated by it, depicting our arrival within a new sense of being.
Nonetheless, the narrative also depicts a sense of precariousness as the young 
Blackbeard takes over the roles of storytelling and journal-keeping from Toby (and previously 
Snowman). This poses a question about the functions of text and discourse in relation to this 
novel’s depiction of a posthuman, ecotopian future. It is Toby who alerts the reader to the 
possible issues with the advent of writing as a cultural practice.
Now what have I done? she thinks. What can of worms have I opened? They’re so
quick, these children: they’ll pick this up and transmit it to all the others.
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What comes next? Rules, dogmas, laws? The Testament of Crake? How soon 
before there are ancient texts they feel they have to obey but have forgotten how to 
interpret? Have I ruined them? (M, 204)
This again mirrors Snowman’s anxiety about teaching the Crakers about guns and rape. 
However, from this point forward the underlying subtext about the dangers of writing begins 
to be incorporated into the narrative in a particular way. Rather than manifesting the 
difficulties Toby envisages, which remain only possibilities that lie beyond the trilogy’s 
closing pages, it is in the transmission of a legacy from Toby to Blackbeard that this subtext 
unfolds. While Blackbeard picks up writing as a practice, he enacts the possibility for ongoing 
iterability and the accumulation of an archive. Toby, on the other hand, is in a process of 
relinquishing such endeavours. Despite her misgivings about teaching Blackbeard to write, 
she feels that she ought to record the events that are occurring for the sake of posterity. 
However, life in this new posthuman world appears to reduce her desire to do so. She makes 
excuses, such as having no paper, or finding it hard to ‘concentrate on the idea of a future’ 
and its possible readers. Even if reading does persist, she asks herself, ‘will anyone in the 
future be interested in the doings of an obscure and then outlawed and then disbanded green 
religious cult?’ (M, 135). But it is not just Toby who experiences this:
She’s noticed others slacking off as well. Standing still for no reason, listening though 
nobody’s talking. [...] It’s tempting to drift, as the Crakers seem to. They have no 
festivals, no calendars, no deadlines. No long term goals. (M, 136)
One effect of this slippage or blurring between Crakers and humans is to further the sense of a 
hybridisation within a developing posthumanism. Ontological boundaries are diminished, and 
this is depicted as a question, rather than a statement, about who we are at a time of 
environmental crisis. This blurring is anticipated by Bartosch in his reading of the first two 
novels, when he describes them as envisaging a ‘postnatural world’ in which dualist thinking 
is ‘dissolved’.72 This postnatural world is now manifesting, and as Bartosch also anticipates, it 
becomes another kind of ‘hyperreality’ in which differences ‘do not matter’.73 Bartosch 
reminds us of Dana Phillips’ view that, in postnatural environments, ‘focus on personal 
consciousness is misplaced’. Phillips states: ‘Postmodern ‘experience’ is not a psychological
^  Bartosch, p. 221.
73 Ibid., p. 231.
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category but a collective one, though hardly in the utopian sense’.74 The effect on Toby of her 
arrival in a posthuman world brings forward both a utopian celebration of the collective and a 
fading of the psychological self. The narrative, however, intercedes in this, since, as Toby 
fades, increasingly, the Crakers function in the reverse by appearing. The Crakers effectively 
reverse the blurring process by bringing, not just a different form of logic and engagement 
with the world, but the possibility of a reinstatement of the human psychology of the self.
The question left hanging, at the end of this last book, is one about death-facing and 
the function of writing. Near the end of the novel, Toby dies, meaning that Blackbeard must 
witness her death and the loss it incurs. If human psychology hangs in a dichotomy between 
death-denial and death-facing, the potential for its reinstatement appears when Blackbeard 
takes over the narration of the novel’s ending. It may be a posthuman world, but its doors are 
open to whatever defines the writing process. Blackbeard’s name points to the possible piracy 
of the linguistic process within a posthuman world. That he sets out to inscribe the Book of 
Toby may suggest that Toby’s initial fears are validated. However, his actions are also guided 
by Toby, implicating her in the process. Whilst Toby and Blackbeard each embody a version 
of a death-facing ontology, the performative practice of writing returns as a problematic 
device that paradoxically functions, as Crake points out, to conceal death-facing. Therefore, 
death-facing as an ontological mode relies on stories that both perpetuate and obfuscate it. 
Any reading of Atwood’s depiction of a posthuman ecotopia therefore must account for her 
trilogy as both a story about the value of death-facing and a story about the way death-facing 
is always undermined.
* * *
The Maddaddam trilogy quite overtly depicts, and also interrogates, possible interpretations 
of a contemporary paradigm of death-facing. In doing so, it considers its implications for the 
ontological human subject in terms of its place and functions within the more-than-human 
world. As with all the novels I examine, a question arises to do with a distinction between the 
real and the hyperreal and the role played by language in this distinction. I have focussed in 
this chapter mainly on the trilogy’s drawing on a question of animal as a means to foreground 
this distinction, and its use of ethics as a means to attempt reparations to this distinction, or at 
least to demonstrate the relatedness of its parts.
74 Dana Phillips, ’Is Nature Necessary?’ The Ecocrlticism Reader, ed. by Sheryl Glotfeliy and Haruld Fromm (Athens, GA:
University o f  Georgia Press, 1996), p. 210, cited in Bartosch, p. 231.
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The three novels of the trilogy can clearly be seen to experiment with a range of 
theoretical modes in relation to this ontological subject. One question posed of 
poststructuralism and its decentred subject is that of how responsibility might therefore be 
established. Butler’s performative-ethic goes some way to dealing with this problem. Butler 
emphasises the ‘you’ or ‘other’ by whom the subject is interpellated into ‘becoming human’, 
acquiring ‘responsibility’ in the process.75 However, at a time of environmental crisis, the 
very idea of becoming human is also placed under interrogation, since environmental crisis is 
an anthropogenic affair. Becoming human thus turns out to produce layers of paradox, which 
a recourse to death-facing attempts to resolve. In the Maddaddam trilogy, the realms of the 
nonhuman and the posthuman take over as interpellating force at a time of environmental 
crisis, enlisting the appearance of Morton’s ‘ecological thought’. This depicts the way an idea 
of the real enters the performative subject mode at a time of environmental crisis. By the time 
we reach the third novel, Maddaddam, the two modes of death-facing represented in Crake 
and Toby combine in a posthuman subject. This sustains responsibility as itself performative, 
where the subject is interpellated by an ecological survival mode and a new mixing with the 
nonhuman.
These developments illustrate some of the features of a poststructuralist 
reconsideration of the subject, whilst also anticipating themes that will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters. The posthumanism that Atwood calls upon, as she envisages 
possibilities for a future, reappears in Winterson’s The Stone Gods. Atwood, as does 
Winterson, appears to name death-facing as a posthuman component—a phenomenon that I 
discuss in full in Chapter Four. There is also the anticipation of an idea considered in Chapter 
Five—that of Martin Hàgglund’s radical atheism. Hâgglund proposes that death is always a 
part of life, not as an event that is awaited, but as unfolding in life’s continual becoming.76 
Thus, where Toby, in the Year o f the Flood, is receptive to an engagement with ideology (that 
of the Gardeners) whilst remaining able to negotiate it as just one kind of truth, she begins to 
point toward Hâgglund’s claim that all belief-systems, ideologies or factions are characterised 
primarily by a desire for survival.77 For Hâgglund, such a realisation is the starting point for 
an egalitarian conception of life.
The final novel in Atwood’s trilogy depicts the possibility of a posthuman future, 
which materialises beyond the fall of the social order. Atwood uses an apocalyptic mode to
75 Butler, pp. 83-136.
76 Martin Hâgglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique o f Meillassoux’, in The Speculative Turn ed. by Levi Bryant 
and others (Melbourne: rc.prcss, 2011). See also discussions in Chapter Five, pp. 169-171.
77 Ibid., pp. 126-129.
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strategically dismantle a runaway corporate capitalism, making room for the emergence of an 
ecological posthumanism. This new collaborative mode combines utilitarian and liberal forms 
of death-facing, making death-facing inherent to life and its living. Yet, while the trilogy 
makes these steps towards a materialist death-facing ideal, the reappearance of the question of 
language unsettles the novel’s ending. Blackbeard’s learning to write seems to mark the return 
of the ‘impossibility’ of death-facing in life, at least in any complete sense. In Chapter Three, 
I next consider this question of death’s impossibility, viewed in relation to Derrida’s death as 
aporia as applied to Cormac McCarthy’s The Road.
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Chapter 3: Death-Facing as Aporia in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road
Cormac McCarthy’s 2006 novel, The Road, although published only three years after the first 
novel of Atwood’s trilogy, Oryx and Crake, could hardly be more different.1 The Road and 
Atwood’s trilogy each deals with a rebounding of death upon humanity and a corresponding 
death-facing imperative; yet, whilst Atwood sugar-coats notions of death-facing with humour 
and elements of the fantastic, McCarthy’s reader is faced, simply, with death. McCarthy’s 
prose is as sparse as his storyline. He provides no relief for the reader from the grim reality of 
death’s envisaged arrival. As a result, The Road is so intensely bleak as to be almost 
unreadable at times. In the novel, the natural world, although we are not told how, has been 
obliterated and it is now a dead world, no longer regenerative, incurring the prospect of 
inevitable starvation for humanity’s remnants. With the exception of a few morels, all 
nonhuman life is already ended. The novel describes the journey south of unnamed ‘father’ 
and ‘son’ as they make their way across the ice-cold landscape of this dead world, hoping to 
come upon some warmth and sustenance. But on reaching the coast, all they find is more of 
the same: the death of the world. Even the ocean is ‘not blue’ (230). Near the end of the 
novel, the father dies and the son is taken on by strangers. Based on this ending, and the son’s 
living on, a number of critics see The Road as offering some kind of redemption for 
humanity; yet such a view seems undermined by the depiction of a complete loss of 
ecosphere, rendering all physical persistence futile. As the novel itself states, this is a world 
‘not to be made right again’ (307). In these ways, the novel places death before the reader far 
more fully than the Atwood trilogy, constructing the ultimate full stop—given over only to 
the ghosts of possibility.
This powerful narrative imposition of death in The Road also impacts on the mind of 
the reader in quite different ways to the Atwood trilogy. The trilogy deploys death-facing as a 
discursive idea, declaring it quite overtly. The Road, however, does no such thing. Rather, it 
brings death as experience into close proximity, effectively presencing it in various ways. 
This demonstrates rather than describes death’s inevitability along with the necessity of facing 
it, thereby articulating death’s actuality more powerfully than the other novels examined. The 
Road explores, too, the meaning of human goodness and the possibility of an ethics through 
its heart-rending dialogues between father and son. However, given death’s intimacy in the 
novel, this seems more an indication of the novel’s strategic questioning of the reader than the
1 Cormac McCarthy, The Road  (London: Picador, 2007).
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rendering of redemption that some critics propose. Hence, instead of putting forward another 
moralistic reading, which would elide the novel’s structural effects, I focus in this chapter on 
the sense of death as imminent, drawn through the novel’s spatio-temporal depiction of the 
post-apocalyptic moment. This positions the human subject, not as redeemable (or not), but as 
conceptually located within the site of its own existential and, correspondingly, constructed 
dilemmas.
The Road has three main characters, each of whom responds differently to the novel’s 
death-facing imperative, providing a multidimensional exposition of the problem of death and 
our relations to it. More obvious of these are the father and son, who together enact the main 
storyline. A third, less obvious but also significant character—at least in my reading—is the 
boy’s mother, wife of the unnamed man. The mother’s presence is purely spectral, since she 
commits suicide before the start of the storyline—death being, in her mind, already the only 
remaining prospect. But, despite its non-physicality, her presence pervades the narrative, 
providing a crucial contrast both to the father’s determination to go on—based on his desire to 
protect his son—and to the son’s own living on. Together, these three differing, if equally 
tortuous, responses to rebounding death make The Road seem less a pronouncement on the 
question of death’s relation to environmental crisis than a statement of its intractability as a 
problem for our time. This has the effect of rescinding all discourse with which the novel 
engages, including the death-facing paradigm itself—even as it simultaneously declares it.
The patterns of death and survival in The Road are nonetheless in many ways 
reminiscent of those in Atwood’s trilogy. The unnamed cataclysmic event in The Road, which 
wipes out all but a few human survivors, functions similarly to Crake’s destruction of 
humanity, except that it destroys not so much humanity as its world. Both The Road's mother 
and the trilogy’s Crake also elect to die, thereby each performing death-facing in its more 
literal sense. There are minor parallels, too, in the distinctions made between father and son 
and between Snowman and Toby. In The Road, the father’s care is limited to the wellbeing of 
his son, whereas the son constantly reaches to express a wider community-based ethic. 
Correspondingly, the trilogy’s self-enclosed figure of Snowman only gradually addresses the 
performative ethic that God’s Gardener Toby more rapidly enlists. However, the dynamics 
surrounding this patterning also differ. The act of suicide by the mother in The Road 
acknowledges a death that has already arrived, more distinctly so than Crake’s death-facing. 
In a world devoid of organic regrowth, empty of birdsong and disturbed only by freezing 
storms and the threat of attack by feral humans, father and son’s continuing existence 
becomes a tortuous journey to nowhere. Despite the boy’s living on, any hope for his ongoing 
survival is thinly drawn. Such an ending differs significantly to the flourishing of an
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ecotopian vision with which the Atwood’s trilogy concludes, although raising similar 
questions overall about the ontological human subject—its viability, or its capacity to 
respond. The Road seems, in the end, to accentuate—more so than Atwood’s trilogy—the 
limit of the temporal frame of the reader’s present, whilst also intensifying the notion of 
death-facing and its challenges, which are explored mainly in the dialogues between father 
and son.
Because of the very intense depiction of death in this novel, I conduct my analysis 
using Jacques Derrida’s ‘death as aporia’, as provisionally outlined in Chapter One. I add to 
this a consideration of Derrida’s discussions on a totalising death, whereby he addresses the 
question of nuclear destruction. By combining these Derridean notions of individual and 
collective death, I consider death-facing in The Road as portraying a dilemma for the human 
subject, and as therefore offering no easy answers to the questions of our time. I thereby also 
place Derrida’s work into proximity with the paradigm of death-facing, and thus with the link 
it posits between death-denial and environmental crisis. This begins to demonstrate how 
poststructuralism might in some sense gesture toward more ecological modes of thought. 
Linked to the emergence of poststructuralism, Derrida’s work has been commonly associated 
with the perceived solipsism also discussed in Chapter One, and with a corresponding 
anthropocentrism in theory generally—particularly among environmental literary critics. An 
additional aim of this chapter, therefore, is to explore poststructuralism’s ecological potential 
by applying Derridean thought to The Road's depictions of the loss of a world.
The main purpose of my use of Derrida in this chapter, however, is to provide a means 
to explore the strongly metaphysical nature of McCarthy’s The Road. The novel’s extreme 
evocation of death in relation to both subject and world, and thus of total death, emphasises 
the problematic aspect of death-facing as a turn toward the real. This illustrates a key aspect 
of the difficulties faced by all the novels I examine, as they seek to explore death-facing at a 
time of environmental crisis. The use of Derrida at this point supplements my overall 
approach of a more general concern with the reconsidered subject in the environmental crisis 
moment—a concern also sustained in this chapter. I read The Road in the Foucauldian sense 
as a survey of the novel’s subject positioning by focusing on the novel’s three main 
characters—mother, father and son. This enables an examination of death-facing as both 
‘possibility’ and ‘impossibility’ in the Heideggerian / Derridean sense. I begin the chapter 
with reflection on the way death filters as a theme through McCarthy’s work generally. I next 
review Derrida’s discussions on death, specifically death as aporia and death as the totalising 
death of humanity, relating these to a paradigm of death-facing. I then introduce a 
consideration of the very metaphysical conception of death in McCarthy’s writing through a
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brief discussion of his short stage play, The Sunset Limited, published just prior to The Road. 
Finally, I give brief consideration to some critical responses to The Road before moving on to 
this chapter’s textual analysis. The analysis is structured into three parts, based on the novel’s 
three key characters, mother, father and son, and their differing responses to death-facing.
The Road is described in an early review as a ‘meditation on death’ in which death ‘comes 
close’ and ‘feels very real’.2 Its powerful presencing of death has led to it attracting 
considerable attention. Awarded the James Tait Black Memorial Prize for Fiction and the 
Believer Book Award in 2006, The Road then took the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction in 2007. In 
2010 it was ranked number one on the New York Times’ list of the 100 best American books 
of the past ten years; and in 2009 it was adapted for film.3 Its popularity reflects not only 
recognition of the book itself, but also its reception by a readership engaged on some level 
with the problem of death as a question of our time.
This question of death and its relation to life, as explored The Road, is also signatory 
to McCarthy’s oeuvre more generally, although it takes on a new force in this novel. 
McCarthy himself, who died in December 2011, was in 2009 awarded the PEN/Saul Bellow 
Award, receiving praise from Bellow for his ‘his life-giving and death-dealing sentences’.4 J. 
M. Crammer refers to McCarthy as ‘a writer whose authorship is based ‘upon an intense 
awareness of impermanence’, where ‘life is possible only in a continual and more or less 
cordial dialogue with death’.5 When interviewed in 1992 by The New York Times, McCarthy 
himself ‘famously said’ that he only cares for writers who ‘deal with issues of life and death’.6 
These indicate the way McCarthy pursues the problem of death—regardless of its relation to 
the question of environmental crisis—as being inexorably enmeshed in life and its meanings.
McCarthy also penned his own obituary, a poignant postscript to his lifetime’s work 
that impacts on his oeuvre in certain ways. In it he describes, amongst other things, a 
childhood memory: that of witnessing a dog ‘beaten to death with a tire-iron by a local rustic’. 
He writes: ‘and as the child who would become the old man watched the animal’s eyeball
2 Adam Mars-Jones, ‘Life After Armageddon’ The Observer (Sunday 26 November, 2006) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2006/nov/26/fiction.features> [accessed 21 April 2012].
3 George Brosi, ‘Cormac McCarthy: A Rare Literary Life’, Appalachian Heritage 39.1 (2011), 11-14, p. 14.
4 Alison Flood, ‘Cormac McCarthy Wins Lifetime Achievement Award’, guardian.co.uk (Thursday 7 May 2 0 0 9 ,11.53am) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/may/07/cormac-mccarthy-lifetime-achievement-pen> [accessed 11 November 
2012].
5 J. M Grammer, ‘A Thing Against Which Time Will Not Prevail: Pastoral and History in Cormac McCarthy’s South’ in 
Perspectives on Cormac McCarthy, ed. by Edwin C. Arnold and Dianne C. Luce (Jackson: University Press o f  Mississippi, 
1999)p .33.
6 Edwin Turner, ‘Cormac McCarthy’s Issues o f  Life and Death, Hans Fallada’s Complex Resistance, and Jonathan Lethem’s 
Bloodless Prose’, Biblioklepi (November 28, 2009,2:28 pm) <http://oiblioklept.org/2OO9/11/28/cormac-mccarthys-issues-of- 
life-and-death-hans-falladas-complex-resistance-and-jonathan-lethems-bloodless-prose> [accessed 11 November 2012].
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stalk and all drip like egg yolk down the cracked skull he thought, One day that will be me, 
and in the grand design of things he was not far o ff.7 This posthumous statement of the 
author as child-witness to death provides a curious closure that functions, in the Derridean 
sense, to open McCarthy’s works, not by explaining them as such, but rather by positioning 
the author and his work in alignment with the aporia of death that his fiction exposes. In 
acknowledging his own future death, McCarthy makes reference to ‘the unknowable’, to that 
which—as Derrida asserts—cannot be understood except via the ‘death of the other in me’.8 
Hence, while McCarthy writes about his own (impossible) death, it is we as reader who read 
of it, meaning that death appears for us through our witnessing of it as the death of another. 
Simultaneously, through his obituary, McCarthy acknowledges the death that he also 
fictionally draws, since his oeuvre—most particularly The Road—speaks repeatedly to the 
imminent ‘possibility’ of ‘impossible’ death. Such a uniting of the author’s acknowledgement 
of death and the death he (textually) envisages provides a kind of fictional ends of thinking 
where idea and referent (discursively) meet, giving rise to the appearance of the death that is 
textually anticipated.
Whereas Martin Heidegger views such a coming together of beginnings and ends as 
signalling a move toward the proper human self, for Derrida it has the deconstructive effect of 
opening to the unknowable. As Joshua Schuster explains, ‘Derrida is doubtful of any “proper” 
foundation of humanity, and instead affirms a radically non-foundational notion of play as the 
de-focusing and deconstructing of stable essences’.9 From this view, the appending of 
McCarthy’s obituary to his oeuvre, which functions to close and therefore open up to death as 
unknowable, also renders life as unknowable too. Death as aporia thus deconstructs, to 
indefinite effect, the meanings of life and of living. While it is tempting to read The Road as 
seeking to somehow resolve contemporary questions about death, life and the world we live 
in, this would require a more Heideggerian approach to the novel’s engagement with death- 
facing. In a Derridean reading, the divergent placing of the novel’s three key characters in 
relation to death, together with its complicating of any resolutions alluded to, can be 
considered as modes of death-facing that, in rescinding discourse, thereby draw attention to its 
function.
7 Cormac McCarthy, ‘Cormac McCarthy’s Prewritten Obituary’, Correlated Concepts (9 December 2011) 
<http://correlatedcontents.com/?p=l 161> [accessed 11 November 2012].
8 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 76.
9 Joshua Schuster, ‘Death Reckoning in the Thinking o f Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault’ Other Voices: the (e) Journal o f  
Cultural Criticism 1.1 (1979), n.p.
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Derrida considers individual death in his book-length essay Aporias, in which he insists on 
the aporia of death, on death’s ‘impossibility’ (as possessing any determinable essence or 
meaning), even though its ever present ‘possibility’ means that we cannot but seek to 
determine it.10 In The Road, death, and therefore death’s impossible possibility, is brought 
forward, effectively tipping the reader into death’s aporia. This locating of an aporia locates it 
as a non-place. It is the imposition upon the self of the need to define itself by that which it 
can never properly fathom, even though—since death remains possible—its ontic response is 
demanded. According to Derrida, while this desire to conceive death existentially is 
inevitable, it is also never attainable, not even—he claims—by Heidegger.11 Derrida ‘sets out 
to collapse Heidegger’s distinction between varying conceptions of death and the 
“nonregional”, or universal, “death” that [he] takes such conceptions to rely upon’, arguing 
that, ‘despite Heidegger’s “distancing himself’ from “so-called religions of The Book”, he 
nonetheless “repeats all the essential motifs of such onto-theology’”, thus ‘fails to untangle 
his analysis from the Christian experience’.12 For Derrida, we can never fully avoid bringing 
to the idea of death our pre-existing thoughts and discursive influences. He states:
While the richest or most necessary anthropo-thanatology cannot found itself in any
way other than on presuppositions that do not belong to its knowledge or its
competence ... this fundamental questioning cannot protect itself from a hidden bio- 
anthropo-thanato-theological contamination.13
Therefore, Derrida argues, while we cannot help but seek to explain death, we can never 
explain death as such.14 Derrida correspondingly refers to our accounts of death—ideas of 
‘heaven’, or of rebirth, for example—as forms of ‘trespass’ whereby we move discursively 
beyond our unknowing into places of mythical knowing that lie beyond death’s assumed 
border.15 The sense, in The Road, that the self is grimly poised at this moment of explaining, 
being unable to explain, yet having to live with death all the same, poses for its characters a
set of questions to do with our responses—religious or secular—to death, and thus to life.
Such questions, I propose, are not answered in The Road, or at least any answers are 
themselves posed as questions. This confronts the reader with the need, elicited in today’s
10 Derrida sees death as ‘the possibility o f the impossible as such’ (original emphasis), Aporias, p.78.
11 Derrida, Aporias, pp. 78-79.
12 Louise Squire, ‘Death and the Anthropocene: Cormac McCarthy’s World o f Unliving’, The Oxford Literary Review  34.2 
(2012), 211-228, p. 214, citing Derrida, Aporias, p. 80.
13 Derrida, Aporias, p. 79.
14 Derrida refers to Heidegger’s Dasein as the ‘as such’ o f  death. See Aporias, pp. 77-78.
15 Derrida, Aporias, p. 24.
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postmodern world, to reconsider death whilst demonstrating the impossibility inscribed in all 
forms of its elucidation. The reader is held, within the narrative of The Road, at the moment 
where all forms of ‘trespass’ fall away, thus being forced to face imminent—and 
impossible—death (see note 15 above). It is this moment out of which the mother, father and 
son’s differing responses to existential death-facing arise.
In depicting this moment of death’s ‘impossibility’—an envisaging of death-facing— 
the novel also demonstrates a kind of existential disturbance linked to environmental crisis, 
out of which is thought the possibility of the demise of the human species. This is usefully 
considered via Derrida’s work on collective death, and in particular his work on the notion of 
nuclear destruction, of totalising death—the death of everything, especially that of humanity 
and its archive. The concept of a rebounding death through environmental crisis is not 
dissimilar to that of nuclear warfare in its totalising effect, the difference being that it results 
from the loss of nonhuman other and the corresponding breakdown of ecological structures. 
In The Road, we are not told the cause of the nonhuman world’s demise, effectively honing 
the message that humanity has no existence without it. In Derrida’s work, whereas individual 
death—although it is ‘the end of the world each time’—is assimilated by cultural memory and 
the mourning process, total death or the end of the world leaves no remainder and thus no 
apparatus (no literature) by which the negotiation of the space of humanity occurs.16 Derrida 
refers to this as ‘the loss of the archive’; that is: as the ends of our means of thinking as a 
result of remainderless destruction.17
Such an event frames the message of humanity’s non-existence in a particular way, as 
can be seen in Derrida’s short work, ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, wherein he likens nuclear 
war to literature in that both refer to unreal events. Joseph K. Kronick, citing from and 
clarifying Derrida, explains:
Nuclear war, like literature, does not have a real referent. This does not mean it does 
away with reference nor that it can be reduced to the status of a mere fable. “One has 
to distinguish between the ‘reality’ of the nuclear age and the fiction of war ... 
‘Reality,’ let’s say the encompassing institution of the nuclear age, is constructed by
16 Ibid., p. 75; Jacques Derrida, Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven 
Missiles, Seven Missives)’, Diacritics 14: 2 Nuclear Criticism (Summer, 1984), 20-31, p. 11.
17 In ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, Derrida describes ‘the archive’ as ‘the material basis o f memory’ that enables the ‘symbolic 
work o f mourning’ to occur (p. 23). He also describes nuclear war as an event ‘equivalent to the total destruction o f  the 
archive’ (p. 28). In my article ‘Death and the Anthropocene: Cormac McCarthy’s World o f  Unliving’ I consider 
environmental crisis as event that functions in a similar way. See Louise Squire, ‘Death and the Anthropocene: Cormac 
McCarthy’s World o f  Unliving’, Oxford Literary Review  34.2 (2012), pp. 211-228.
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the fable, on the basis of an event that has never happened (except in fantasy, and that 
is not nothing at all)”.18
In the same way, the demise of the human species due to environmental changes and loss of 
the nonhuman other, so far, has not occurred (‘except in fantasy, and that is not nothing at 
all’). The ‘archive’—our inherited and collective thinking, and ‘literature’ as Derrida also 
refers to it—which gives rise to our comprehending of the very possibility of such demise, 
remains operational, unfolding to construct those institutions by which such thought (the 
thought, say, of total destruction) moves into the world. Literature, Kronick explains, as both 
(structurally) suspended and itself suspending meaning, ‘gives us to think the total destruction 
of the archive’, of ‘first times and last times, of invention and destruction’; for Derrida, this 
destruction is not the end (of deconstruction) but the totalising that enables the thought of 
other, of the future as the event ‘for which we are unprepared’.19 In this sense, The Road, in 
offering a narration of our fears of an ending, speaks, too, of that which lies beyond or is 
external to ‘the archive’. Hence, that by which we come to know ourselves (and our world) 
opens up to meet that which can only be conceived as the unimaginable. The novel in this 
way diminishes discourse as it simultaneously enlists it. In consigning the reader to the 
(assumed) borders of death itself, it forces us to confront both life and the discursive nature of 
our lives out of which notions of the world emerge—both informing and forming our ontic 
modes of being.
If The Road can be understood as a ‘meditation’ on death and its relation to life (to religion, to 
love, to violence and so on), this immersion into death’s (im)possibilities occurs too in 
another of McCarthy’s works published the same year, The Sunset Limited?0 This short work, 
which is constructed and presented in the format of a stage play, is a meditation on meaning 
(if it exists) in life where death is its counterpart. This provides a useful starting point for this 
chapter’s analysis of The Road, since it begins to illustrate Derrida’s ‘death as aporia’.
The two sole characters in The Sunset Limited—a ‘God fearing’ black man with a 
criminal past, referred to simply as Black, and a cynical white man, a professor who has lost
18 Joseph K. Kronick, ‘Writing in the Nuclear Age’, Derrida and the Future o f  Literature (NY, State University o f  New York 
Press, 1999), 101-41, p. 129; Kronick cites Derrida from ‘No Apocalypse, Not N ow ’, p. 23.
19 Kronick, pp. 112,116,103.
20 Cormac McCarthy, The Sunset Limited: A Novel in Dramatic Form (London: Picador, 2012, 1st publ. Vintage Books, 
2006). As The Sunset Limited and The Road  were published in the same year, it is hard to say whether one came first. That 
The Sunset Limited was performed in May and June o f  2006 at the Steppenwolf Garage Theatre, Chicago, suggests it may 
have had a slight lead. However, it has also been speculated that they were written within the same period. See Dianne C. 
Luce, ‘Beyond the Border: Cormac McCarthy in the New Millennium’, The Cormac McCarthy Journal 6 (2008), 6-12.
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faith in his vocation, referred to as White—are in dialogue, Black having, that morning, 
prevented White from jumping in front of a train (the Sunset Express). Their dialogue, 
sustained throughout the whole play, takes place in Black’s flat, and consists of Black trying 
to persuade White that he might have some reason to live, while White defends the position 
that he does not. Having expressed a sense of loss that is conceptually modernist and 
consistent with what Foucault calls the ‘analytic of frnitude’, ‘the end of a certain way of 
knowing [...] which is not its fully realized completion or totalizing closure but its undoing 
and dissolution’, White says to Black: ‘The things I believed in don’t exist any more. It’s 
foolish to pretend they do. Western civilization finally went up in smoke in the chimneys at 
Dachau but I was too infatuated to see it. I see it now’ (SL, 27).21
From this position, White then moves to a dissatisfaction with all constructed 
meaning, applying this just as readily to Black’s attempts to persuade him with a Christian 
narrative:
Black Suppose I was to tell you that if you could bring yourself to unlatch your hands 
from around your brother’s throat you could have life everlasting?
White There’s no such thing. Everybody dies.
Black That aint what he said. He said you could have life everlastin. Life. Have it 
today. Hold it in your hand. That you could see it. {SL, 78)
Here, Black seems to fully accept White’s position: that everybody dies, and there is no life 
after death. His response is to describe ‘life everlasting’ as being extant within the present. If 
faith (in God) is an act of the living, and immortality is (simply) a phenomenon of the 
moment that describes it, the meaning of the phrase ‘life everlasting’ is contained entirely 
within its assumed impact on the present living moment. In Aporias, Derrida expressly resists 
a claim made by Heidegger: that the privileging of the now is a ‘vulgar’ concept of time, 
asking whether it might not be, rather, the only concept of time. He goes on:
What if [...] opposing another concept to the “vulgar” concept were itself 
impracticable, nonviable, and impossible? What if it was the same for death, for a 
vulgar concept of death? What if the exoteric aporia, therefore remained in a certain 
way irreducible, calling for an endurance, or shall we rather say an experience other
Michel Foucault, in Dreyfus, nuoert arm ram ivauinow. micnei ruucuuii: neyona oiruciuransm ana nermeneuncs 
(Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1982), p. 29; Schuster, n.p.
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than that consisting in opposing, from both sides of an indivisible line, an other 
concept, a nonvulgar concept, to the so called vulgar concept? What would such an 
experience be?22
What Black offers to White seems to touch on the experience that Derrida considers. Yet, the 
Christian narrative, as is well known, founds itself explicitly on the belief in life after death. 
But then, as Derrida remarks, ‘Every culture is characterised by its way of apprehending, 
dealing with, and, one could say, “living” death as trespass’, or the discursive crossing of a 
border from life into death, when to explain death at all is to enter the realms of the 
impossible.23 No religion can prepare one for death per se; it can only prepare one, through a 
trespassing of death’s border, for life. Such a point is seen to be made by White, just before he 
leaves Black’s flat in the closing pages, when he will head for the train station to resume his 
earlier intention, rejecting Black’s attempts to persuade him that life may still be worth living:
Show me a religion that prepares one for death. For nothingness. There’s a church I 
might enter. Yours prepares one only for life. For dreams and illusions and lies. If you 
could banish fear of death from men’s hearts they wouldn’t live a day. Who would 
want this nightmare if not for fear of the next? The shadow of the axe hangs over 
every joy. Every road ends in death. Or words, Every friendship. Every love. Torment, 
betrayal, loss, suffering, pain, age, indignity, and hideous lingering illness. All with a 
single conclusion. For you and every one and every thing that you have chosen to care 
for. (SL, 138)
This nihilistic finale, which runs close to the Derridean death as deconstruction, is made even 
bleaker as the reader witnesses Black’s despair, having failed to save White. Black falls to his 
knees to plead with a God he himself seems deeply uncertain of. What is held up to our 
attention therefore, while religion is at stake here, seems to be the function of death’s 
‘trespass’ in life and the effect on the self of the ontic mode it correspondingly engenders, 
together with the fragility of such belief (see note 15 above). This raises questions, in terms 
of death-facing as a paradigm, to do with the function of belief in relation to death-fear, and 
the differences between religious and secular forms of knowing where death is concerned. 
White’s ‘execution’ of postmodern death, calling to mind in particular ‘the Death of God’,
22 DerriHa. Aporias, p. 14.
23 Ibid., p. 24.
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makes unavoidable his own death, whereas Black seems to be suggesting a differing 
conception of God and belief and its relation to death in the first place.24
The Sunset Limited is not an exposition of a paradigm of ecological death-facing as 
such, for its explorations of death remain internal to the life-world of the mind. The novel 
makes no substantive reference to the physical world—nor to any anthropogenic effects of 
human dwelling. It therefore excludes any active rendering of the lived-in world. The Road, 
on the other hand, explicitly extends its meditation on death to the interrelation of self and its 
world, drawing this relation as constitutive by virtue of the tensions it construes where the 
world itself breaks down. The dead (or virtually so) landscape of The Road depicts the 
consequences of human actions upon the planet as they might amount to, from which there 
could be no turning back. By demonstrating a call for death-facing through a presencing of 
death in its rebound—thereby illustrating a failure to deal effectively with the self as mortal— 
The Road seems to subsume the external with the internal, placing the self within its own 
elegy and giving rise to the metaphysical feel of the novel. The question of death as aporia, as 
illustrated by The Sunset Limited, is thus raised again in The Road, but also differs in the way 
the inescapable need to apprehend death, whether by secular or religious systems of thought, 
is made referential to the world at large. This effectively relates fear of death to environmental 
crisis.
The basic story-line of The Road, forming almost its entire plot, is that of the journey south of 
unnamed father and son across the annihilated landscape, together with their experiences and 
dialogues. This is augmented with an ongoing sequence of intensely disturbing events, which 
serve to sustain death’s unremitting imminence. In order to survive, father and son are forced 
to scavenge amid the ruins of human civilization, looting forgotten stores. The roads and 
byways are strewn with drying corpses, while, in the forests, already dead trees thud to the 
ground. Father and son must battle, not only against constant starvation, but against the 
danger of predation by roaming bands of now cannibalistic humans. Repeatedly they come 
across horrific scenes; for example, they stumble on the remains of a charred human infant, 
impaled on a spit over a dying fire. As they make their way onwards, father and son mostly 
shun other humans, their sole aim being to reach the south coast, based on the hope that it 
might offer relief from cold and hunger.
24 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Madman’, The Gay Science 125, ed. by Bernard Williams, trans. by Josefine Nauckhoff 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), or Thus Spake Zaraikusira: A Book fo r  A ll and None, trans. by Thomas 
Common, Project Gutenberg ebook (November 5,2012 ) < http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1998/1998-h/1998-h.htm>.
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The intensity of the novel is drawn in the deathliness of the landscape it describes, in 
the heart-rending dialogues between father and son, and in the father’s apprehension of their 
situation: his dreams, his memories, his dilemmas with regard to his son and the dangers they 
face. The father is acutely aware that he is living with a decision he made, the decision to live, 
to carry on and to ‘carry the fire’ (87), along with his son and because of his son, while the 
son’s mother, his wife, took the decision to end her life. ‘They are going to rape us and kill us 
and eat us and you wont face it’ he recalls her saying. ‘You’d rather wait for it to happen. But 
I cant. I cant’ (58). Along with this burden, this electing to live, all the while knowing that 
imminent death accompanies their every step, the father must take care, not only of his son, 
but of his promise to him that they will die together, that he will not send him ‘into the 
darkness alone’ (265). For this, he must be prepared to kill his own son. Watching the boy 
sleeping one afternoon, he asks himself: ‘Can you do it? When the time comes? Can 
you?’(28). The father constantly battles with this heart-wrenching plan, and, of course—when 
the time does come, finds himself unable to go through with it. However, his promise to his 
son not to send him into the darkness alone is not compromised at the point of his death, since 
the boy is delivered unexpectedly into the hands of strangers. Nonetheless, the boy’s future 
remains unknown and, indeed, unknowable.
The sense of bleakness, amid this depiction of love in the face of bare life, is deepened 
by the novel’s stark stylistic minimalism, in itself setting a mood of profound austerity, 
enhancing the humanity it gives way to. As Lindsey Banco notes, ‘[paragraphs are short’, 
‘chapter breaks and quotation marks around dialogue are absent’ and ‘punctuation is rare’.25 
Banco also notes a specific variation in the application of apostrophes to contractions, these 
being absent where the contraction is negative, but present where it posits or asserts 
something. Furthermore, these apostrophes highlight ‘the “I”, the “you”, or the “we”’ in the 
sentences that contain them.26 For Banco, these affirmative contractions point towards the 
‘moral, empathetic, or creative possibilities of human beings’ in contrast to the negative, 
denuded contractions, which refer to McCarthy’s ‘indifferent’ and ‘blighted’ world. This 
somewhat psychological approach leads Banco to suggest that the novel, while portraying the 
‘utter despair of the modem, existential abyss’, also evokes ‘some of the most important 
things in McCarthy’s world—human agency and assertion—which, if lost, would result in the 
postapocalyptic landscape he imagines’.27 While this seems to obfuscate the uncertain and 
often harmful effects of human agency and assertion, it does perhaps describe some of the
25 Lindsey Banco, ‘Contractions in Cormac McCarthy's The R oad’, The Explicator 68:4 (2010), p. 276.
26 Ibid., p. 278.
27 Ibid., pp. 278.
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novel’s intensity. To apply this to the present reading, I propose that the effect Banco notes 
might be considered instead by viewing this accentuated T  as referent to ‘life’ (and the 
‘death’ it confronts), specifically 'my life’ in relation to ‘my death’. Such a containing of the 
existential T , is held—in the novel—in tension with the ‘life’ and the ‘death’ of other, 
especially that of the world. In Aporias, Derrida discusses the ‘mineness’ of death in 
Heidegger’s thought as a function of the aporia, asking: ‘Is my death possible?’28
For, if death is indeed the possibility of the impossibility and therefore the possibility 
of appearing as such of the impossibility of appearing as such either, then man, or man 
as Dasein, never has a relation to death as such, but only to perishing, to demising, and 
to the death of the other, who is not the other. The death of the other thus becomes 
again “first,” always first.... The death of the other, this death of the other in “me,” is 
fundamentally the only death that is named in the syntagm “my death”.29
In The Road, while human agency and assertion remain inevitably at stake, their mode is 
addressed by the ontic T  being placed primarily at odds with its own ‘life’ and ‘death’ where 
these are held in the mode of ‘mineness’; that is, for each character, the ‘possibility’ of ‘my 
(impossible) death’ is drawn to imminence in a moment-to-moment awareness, while the 
world is already in the state of death. This intensifies the effect of the apostrophised 
contractions, and also points to wider structures at work in the novel, notably the way the 
father is shaped but also broken by his steadfast endurance in sustaining the T , out of which 
his profound love for his son is upheld.
As the novel progresses, it is the boy who seems to want to contest the ‘mineness’ that 
his father attempts, out of legitimate fears for their survival, to sustain. Bom after the death of 
the world (a matter to which I return later), the boy inherits only his father’s memories of 
what the world once was. His—in some ways naïve—desire to encounter other, his extending 
of an ethic, has been remarked on by some scholars, particularly Christopher Pizzino who 
reads the novel as offering ‘the possibility of moral and social order outside the father-son 
relationship’.30 Derrida’s turn towards an otherness of death, in which, as Schuster puts it, T 
cannot die alone. I can only know of the other's death such that I die as other’, takes on, as 
Derrida acknowledges, some of the subject conceptualizing of Emmanuel Levinas.31 The
28 Derrida, Aporias, p. 21.
29 Ibid., p. 76.
30 Christopher Pizzino, ‘Utopia At Last: Cormac McCarthy’s The Road  as Science Fiction’, Extrapolation 51:3 (2010), 3 58 -
/ V ,  p .
31 Schuster, n.p
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relevance to The Road of Levinas’ pre-ontological ethic, as discussed in previous chapters, 
has been noted, for example, by Phillip A. Snyder and Matthew Mullins.32 However, 
considered in relation to a paradigm of death-facing, the father’s withholding from ‘other’ is a 
withholding, not just from the living or worldly ‘other’, but also, simultaneously, from the 
‘other’ that is the death he fears. Hence, one way that death-fear is problematised in the novel 
is in this highlighting of the father’s fear of ‘the death of the other in me’.33 Where death is 
eschewed it rebounds, filling the landscape as both the reflection of, and more literally the 
consequence of, the subject’s ontic modes, rendering an appearance of the ecological 
outcomes of the selfs relations with death. The father, the son and the reader, each become 
‘witness’ to that which lies beyond the end of the world—witness, as Rambo puts it, to ‘the 
impossibility of things ‘being made right again” .34 This rebounding of death reveals its 
ultimate face: that of finality, as the reader is confronted with the bleak notion that the refusal 
to die is both a legitimate effect of living and, at the same time, untenable—having the effect 
of compelling the death of the world of other, upon which the self relies.
Criticism of The Road, as already noted, is characterised by competing claims as to whether it 
offers some form of redemptive hope for humanity, or is an elegiac portrayal of the world 
encountered beyond the point of no return. Such divergence is largely a result of the novel’s 
being read in relation to the ending, whereby—following the father’s death—the son is taken 
on by strangers who claim to ‘carry the fire’ (303). The son, with his seemingly instinctive 
tendency toward goodness, in living on, opens the closing pages to an unknowable future 
which—according to some—offers relief from the novel’s relentless grim deathliness.
Positive or affirmative readings discover hope and / or redemption in a variety of 
ways. More subtle are those of linguistic derivation, such as Banco’s, which, as we have seen, 
views the text’s selective punctuation as signalling the importance of ‘the act of positing 
something in the face of encroaching nihilism’.35 Ashley Kunsa sees The Road, more broadly, 
as ‘a linguistic journey toward redemption’, arguing that its withdrawal of place-names 
presents it as a new Eden. The reader is thereby invited to rename its parts, so that the ‘old’
32 Phillip A. Snyder ‘Hospitality in Cormac McCarthy’s The Road’. McCarthy Conference (27 April 2007, Brigham Young 
University) <http://www.lib.utk.edu/newfoundpress/pubs/mccarthy/phillipsnyderarticle.pdf> [accessed 10 April 2012]; 
Matthew Mullins, ‘Hunger and the Apocalypse o f  Modernity in Cormac McCarthy’s The RoacT Symplokë 19, 1.2 (2011), pp. 
75-93.
33 Derrida, Aporias, p. 76.
34 Shelly L. Rambo, ‘Beyond Redemption?: Reading Cormac McCarthy’s The Road After The End O f The World’, Studies in 
iht: Literary Imagination 41.2 (2008), 99-120, p. 114.
35 Banco, p. 278.
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‘might become new again, once more meaningful and pure’.36 More often, though, a positive 
reading is derived through a straightforward consolidation of the moral tensions within the 
narrative into a coded, and often biblically derived, notion of hope or redemption. For 
example, Erik J. Wielenberg reads the novel as a ‘meditation on morality’ that proposes the 
attainment of ‘earthly salvation’ through ‘meaningful connections with other human beings’, 
and Rune Graulund reads it as expressing ‘a passionate hope that hope fo rm atte rs’, whether 
one ‘puts one’s stake’ in humanity or God.37 Certainly, human morality and goodness play a 
significant role in the novel. As one of his biographers notes, McCarthy himself describes the 
novel as being ‘about human goodness’.38 However, such ‘aboutness’, I would argue, need 
not be definitively conceived. While goodness is clearly important, this importance seems 
deeply precarious, placed as it is in a world that is—or is very nearly—no longer there.
Some scholars take a less optimistic view of The Road’s rendering of humanity. Stefan 
Skrimshire, for example, describes its indications of redemption as being couched in terms of 
a ‘radical undecideability’.39 He points to the ‘challenge of affirming what sort of life one can 
affirm at all’ when all that is met is not ‘the desired end’ but ‘a deepening of its mystery’.40 
Similar reservations with regard to the novel’s portrayal of humanity are seen in the readings 
of Shelly Rambo and Adeline Johns-Putra. Rambo rejects tendencies to read the novel 
through ‘a redemptive framework’, suggesting instead that it confronts us with the question of 
‘the aftermath’, and asks: ‘what does it mean to witness to what remains?’.41 This attention to 
the novel’s temporal structures overcomes the slippage that seems to occur where readings 
focus purely on such matters as its ethics. Johns-Putra, likewise, very clearly establishes the 
depicted landscape as the site of analysis, focusing on ‘the relationship of this post­
apocalyptic terrain of absence to the novel’s imagined past landscapes of plenty’.42 Rambo 
uses Derrida’s notion of ‘witness’ in her reading, and Johns-Putra utilises Derrida’s notion of 
‘trace’, pointing out that a world existing only as trace ‘may as well never have existed’.43 
Johns-Putra suggests, correspondingly, that where the significance of past events is not
36 Ashley Kunsa, ‘“Maps o f the World in Its Becoming”: Post-Apocalyptic Naming in Cormac McCarthy’s The RoacT, 
Journal o f  Modern Literature 33.1 (2009), 57-74, pp. 62, 64.
37 Erik J. Wielenberg, ‘God, Morality, and Meaning in Cormac McCarthy’s The R oad’, Cormac McCarthy Journal 8.1 (Fall 
2010), 1-16, pp. 1,14; Rune Graulund, ‘Fulcrums and Borderlands: A Desert Reading o f  Cormac McCarthy’s The Road' 
Orbis Litterarum 65.1 (2010), 57-78, p. 76 (emphasis in original).
38 Brosi, p. 14.
39Stefan Skrimshire, “‘There is no God and we are his prophets”: Deconstructing Redemption in Cormac McCarthy’s The 
RoacT, Journal For Cultural Research 15.1 (2011), 1-14.
40, Ibid., p. 12.
41 Rambo, p. 101.
42 Adeline Johns-Putra, ‘The Power o f the Apocalyptic: Space, Place and Time in Cormac McCarthy’s The RoacT\ Nordic 
Network for Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies Research Symposium VII: Environmentalism, Spatiality and the Public 
Sphere (University o f  Oslo, 27 September 2012).
43 Johns-Putra, ‘The Power o f  the Apocalyptic’.
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recoverable, then not only do such events no longer matter, but they ‘have not mattered, at 
all’.44 The strength of these readings is in the way they refuse to pin down the novel’s abstract 
ethical dimensions, meaning that these ethics remain undetermined whilst the temporal and 
spatial dimensions of the novel thereby are able to retain their significance. These views posit 
an elegiac portrayal of a humanity that did not meet its obligations to the world, rather than 
the promise of humanity’s redemption. After all, such redemption would require a far more 
comprehensive set of interventions than the ethical reclamation of human goodness, which (as 
with human agency generally) cannot be relied on not to cause harm as well as gain.
My reading, as indicated already, takes its lead from those who read the novel as elegiac, but 
perhaps is closest to Skrimshire’s. By bringing death’s real possibility into such close 
proximity with the reader, the novel appears to enact a funeral of life itself. This is of course 
not complete death, since—as all the novels I examine demonstrate—such an end is 
unrepresentable in textual and especially narrative form. Yet, death’s visibility is vastly 
accentuated where discursive life is reduced, enhancing too the reader’s sense of death as both 
imagined and real. At the same time, since death is aporetic, this retraction of discourse also 
emphasises the discursivity of death in terms of life. Accordingly, the novel’s three main 
characters respond to the arrival of imminent death by facing death in differing ways: by 
dying (mother), by surviving temporarily (father), and by living on (son). Whereas the 
alternate modes of death-facing in Atwood’s trilogy appear to seek to tame death, death in 
The Road retains a certain ‘wildness’, despite and importantly because of its increased 
visibility.45 This suggests, not so much a failure to tame death, but its untamability. The Road, 
viewed this way, becomes an elegy for a humanity that has failed to understand that which 
cannot be fully understood.
A brief return to Derrida begins to indicate what this might imply. In his work, which is 
characterised by an increasing attention to the problem of death, Derrida endeavours to 
complicate the life / death opposition in his notion of ‘survival’, being ‘not simply that which 
remains but the most intense life possible’.46 In his last interview, published as Learning to 
Live Finally, Derrida remarks:
44 Ibid.
45 See discussions in Chapter One (p. 9) on modem death as ‘wild’; see also Philippe Aries, Western Attitudes Towards 
Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. by Patricia M. Ranum (London: The John Hopkins University Press,
1974).
46 Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview. An Interview with Jean Bimbaum, trans. by Pascaie-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 52. See also: Jacques, Derrida, ‘Living On: Border
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Learning to live should mean learning to die, learning to take into account, so as to 
accept, absolute mortality (that is, without salvation, resurrection, or redemption -  
neither for oneself nor for the other)... to philosophize is to learn to die.47
But he goes on to say:
I believe in this truth without being able to resign myself to it. And less and less so. I 
have never learned to accept it, to accept death that is. We are all survivors who have 
been granted a temporary reprieve [en sursis] (and from the geopolitical perspective of 
the Spectres of Marx, this is especially true, in a world that is more inegalitarian than 
ever, for the millions and millions of living beings -  human or not — who are denied 
not only their basic “human rights,” which date back two centuries and are constantly 
being refined, but first of all the right to a life worthy of being lived).48
In the first of these, Derrida refers to a stripped down conception of death; in the second, he 
distinguishes between the belief that an acceptance of absolute mortality can properly ground 
life and the plain fact that, in living, we nonetheless must die, making us always survivors. He 
reminds us that our concern should be with life and the living, whether human or non-human. 
We are granted, along with all other living beings, a ‘temporary reprieve’ and, within that, a 
life ‘worthy of being lived’ is at stake for all. Derrida’s reading here of death as aporetic, or 
irresolvable, does not imply his full disagreement with the claim of death-historian Philippe 
Aries, as discussed in Chapter One, that the advent of the modem sees an alienation from 
death. Indeed, Derrida applies this idea himself, in Aporias, to Heidegger’s existential 
analysis, suggesting that, in having, itself, at its root, ‘a judgement on the loss of authenticity 
in the relation to death,’ the analysis reveals:
a certain incapacity to look death in the face, to assume in a resolute fashion being- 
toward-death, a certain everyday levelling that is not always foreign to what is being 
exacerbated by a certain modernity of the modem industrial city.49
Lines’, trans. by James Hulbert, Harold Bloom, Paul DeMan; Jacques Derrida and others in Deconstruction and Criticism 
(New York, Continuum, 1979), pp. 175-176.
47 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, pp. 24-5.
48 Ibid., pp. 24-25. NB. At this point, Derrida was very ill with cancer, although, despite the book’s title and subject matter he 
deflected any attempts by the interviewer to refer to his illness or his future death.
49 Derrida, Aporias, p. 58.
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Derrida concludes that ‘the dominant feeling for everyone’ is that death ‘is no longer what it 
used to be’, adding: ‘who will deny it?’50 At the same time he derides historians such as Aries 
for their easy assumption that by knowing death better one might somehow resolve i t 51 Death 
remains, for Derrida, ‘impossible’ no matter how far we might recognise its ‘possibility’. 
Derrida’s notion of ‘survival’, by which he complicates the life / death opposition, points, 
instead, to the need for an ‘intensity’—as he puts it—of life, based on death’s ever-present 
aporia (see note 48 above). I consider Derrida’s notion of survival more fully in Chapter Five, 
in relation to the work of Martin Hâgglund, who emphasises death’s ongoing presence in 
temporal life. Meanwhile, this notion of an intensity of life, where one acknowledges without 
resolving death’s possibility, arises, in Derrida’s thought, in relation to his concerns for a 
world ‘more inegalitarian than ever’ and the corresponding need for a life ‘worthy of being 
lived’ for all (see note 50 above). It is here, therefore, that facing death, in Derrida’s work, 
discloses its ethical function. On a Derridean reading, the death-haunted world of The Road is 
deeply symptomatic of a contemporary acknowledgement of death and even total death as 
both ‘possible’ and ‘real’. Yet it demonstrates how this increased intimacy with death, rather 
than resolving death, intensifies our realisation of its aporetic state. While The Road therefore 
appears to acknowledge a contemporary paradigm of death-facing, the only resolution it 
insists on is the forced recognition of death’s impossible possibility, giving way to an 
‘intense’ underlying recognition of the need for survival by all. Hence, despite the novel’s 
insistence on irresolution, this irresolution itself seems to gesture toward the possibility of a 
Derridean ecological ethic.
Correspondingly, as I discuss more fully later on, a shift appears structured into the 
narrative of The Road that moves from a focus on ‘I’ to a focus on ‘we’. This ‘we’ necessarily 
includes all survivors granted a ‘temporary reprieve’ (see note 50 above), and thus all life: 
human and nonhuman alike. Such a shift seems almost the outcome of the thinking of death 
as aporia, in The Road. Where imminent death, rather than enabling the self to resolve its own 
(possible) demise, presents itself as irresolvable, one is forced to acknowledge that this is the 
case for all, drawing a sense of other into the act of self-conceptualising, producing an ethic 
reminiscent of that of Levinas.52 Consequently, the rescinding of all discourse, rather than 
negating the necessity of explaining death, might equally suggest the reverse, but with the
50 Ibid., p. 58.
51 This objection is made against Louis-Vincent Thomas and the comparative nature o f his Anthropologie de la Mort (Payot,
1975), in which Thomas describes Africa as offering an example o f ‘how the problems o f  death are resolved’ in non- 
mdusuiahsed populations (p. 531). See Derrida, Aporias, p. 58.
52 See discussions in Chapters One and Two, pp. 41, 53, 70-72.
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crucial caveat that all such explanations refuse the violence (upon other) of their own 
completion.
The three characters of mother, father and son each depict some form of recognition of the 
loss of the physical and discursive world; while their various responses to this loss— 
understood as differing approaches to death-facing—can be said to represent distinct facets of 
death’s aporia. The mother, in departing life altogether, demonstrates most fully the 
recognition of possible death and the tragedy of not having recognised it sooner. The father 
mourns the loss of the world but demonstrates death’s impossibility; his living on in the face 
of such loss thus produces a narrative of excruciating trauma for the reader. The son also lives 
on but his persistence differs to that of the father: a child of the aftermath, he witnesses the 
loss of that which he has never known. His life depicts an intensity that acknowledges both 
possible and impossible death; nonetheless he remains a shadow, since he represents 
humanity as already devoid of its archive and its world.
Mother
To date, not a great deal of in-depth consideration has been given by critics to the character of 
the mother, or, more particularly, to her function in the text of The Road. As her influence is 
felt only through analeptic recollections, in the father’s memories of her, this is perhaps 
understandable. We do not meet her; hence she has no direct presence in the narrative, which 
centres entirely on the story of father and son and their journey south across an annihilated 
landscape. Even so, her act of committing suicide, albeit before the story begins, exerts a 
considerable influence on both our reception of the characters, father and son, and on the plot 
itself—sparse as it is. As Snyder remarks, McCarthy ‘haunts’ the novel’s ‘mood and setting 
with her absence’.53 She is the wife of the man who feels he must go on, must continue to 
invest some faith in life and in living, all the time wrestling with his fear that his beloved wife 
may have been right to turn away from a life that is already a living death. She is at the same 
time the mother of a son bom after the unnamed cataclysmic event; it is thus she who 
acknowledges and enacts the end of all things, giving way to the other that lies beyond it.
Those readings that do consider the mother tend to do so in the negative. Where she is 
turned to briefly, or mentioned in passing, her act of suicide is generally—although not 
always—perceived as a weakness of some kind, a relinquishing of responsibility, an act of
53 Snyder, n.p.
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nihilism. Lydia Cooper, for example, condemns the mother for having abandoned her son, 
reading her as ‘an embodiment of the egocentrism and faithlessness that are swiftly killing the 
planet’.54 In Cooper’s view, the novel—as a twist on the mythical grail narrative (wherein it is 
the son who abandons the mother)—brings forward the son as the grail, poised as ‘counter to 
the mother’s nihilistic belief in the pointlessness of human survival’.55 To identify the mother 
in opposition to the son is to read The Road as insisting on the value of humanity’s survival, 
underlining humanity’s worth and capacity for transformation. This idea that the novel sees 
humanity as implicitly valuable inheres in a number of readings of The Road, usually based 
on the son’s innocence, his goodness, his kindness and so on. While one may do well, at a 
time of environmental crisis, to hold on to a belief in human goodness, the problem with 
imposing upon texts this desire to make us ‘better persons’ is that it risks underestimating that 
text’s—and life’s—complexities. Morton explains this using Hegel’s notion of the beautiful 
soul—one who, in ‘washing his or her hands of the corrupt world’, does not admit how, ‘in 
this very abstemiousness and distaste he or she participates in’ its creation.56 Rather than take 
an overly moralising approach, the only ethical option, Morton suggests, is ‘to ‘muck in’; that 
is, to enter into a close reading in such a way as to make room for its intricacies and 
inconsistencies.57 Although the son’s goodness is unquestionable in itself, none of The Road's 
characters represents a pure vision of humanity, since humanity in the novel has already 
destroyed its world. The mother’s acknowledgement of total destruction therefore indicates a 
purity of recognition that neither son nor father is able to match by living on. Readings that 
locate her as negative by placing her in contrast with the uprightness of father and son can 
therefore be undermined, since none of the novel’s three key characters are, in the end, so 
clearly drawn.
Snyder’s reading of the mother does go some way to illustrating the mucking in that 
Morton describes, although in the end he also portrays her negatively. He focuses on a 
Derridean ‘hospitality’ motif, which he sees as pervading the text of The Road. He argues that 
the novel’s ethical call, with which father and son constantly grapple, is broken down in the 
mother because she is overwhelmed by the worldly situation. She knows that the survival of 
her husband and son cannot be safeguarded, so can no longer bear the responsibility of her 
role. This, Snyder suggests, is not a simple turning away from responsibility:
54 Lydia Cooper ‘Cormac McCarthy’s The Road  As Apocalyptic Grail Narrative’, Studies in the Novel 43.2 (2011), 218-236, 
p. 233.
55 Cooper, p. 223.
55 Timothy Morton, Ecology Without Nature (London: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 7
57 Ibid., p. 13.
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Her suicide demonstrates, according to Levinasian and Derridean notions of 
subjectivity, that when one loses the sense of responsibility to the Other, one also loses 
one’s self. The mother commits suicide, not because she rejects her responsibility 
toward her husband and son, but because of the way its impossibility necessarily 
overwhelms her.58
The mother nonetheless, he argues, clearly ‘understands the profound necessity of the Other 
for the survival of the self, for (as he observes) she tells her husband, at a point in the man’s 
recollections when they are arguing over her decision to end things, that if he survives it will 
not be for himself but for, and because of, his love for their son.59 In some ways this is an 
astute reading. Snyder gives a degree of credence to the mother’s acknowledgement that the 
end is the end, viewing her suicide as a demonstration that the self cannot be sustained 
without its hospitality to other.60 However, he also cites her as being ‘wrong’ in deciding to 
die. He subsequently uses the father and son to illustrate hospitality as ‘structuring human 
existence’.61 He bases this on their constant grappling with the ethical dilemma of how to 
respond to hungry strangers—the boy’s constant wish to feed everyone, despite having almost 
no food himself, and the father’s prioritising of food for his son over food for himself. The 
effect of this reading, however, is to turn the mother’s act of suicide into a form of self­
enclosure. In Snyder’s reading, the mother illustrates little more than a failure to care at all, 
the only—somewhat insensitively drawn—point in her favour being that she removes herself 
as burden to father and son.62
What Snyder’s reading omits, it seems, is the consideration of any standpoint from 
which the mother might be right to acknowledge the other as lost, or that death is already all 
that remains. It is at such a point that a more ecological reading may emerge; for the other 
with whom father and son negotiate their hospitality are a distinctly human other, while the 
physical world of The Road—that which embeds the intra-reliance of the self / other duality 
within a human / nonhuman realm—is already beyond hospitality’s reach: it has ended. This, 
correspondingly, forces the narrative into shapes that cannot legitimately be explained by a 
promise of redemption or hope for humanity, underscoring in turn the aptness of readings that 
pay attention to the novel’s temporal structuring. Hence, Rambo reads The Road as giving
58 Snyder, n.p.
59 Snyder, n.p.
60 Ibid., n.p.
61 Ibid., n.p.
62 Ibid., n.p.
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‘witness’ to the end, to that which ‘cannot be made right again’, while Johns-Putra observes 
The Road as envisioning that which appears not to matter, as not /zavmg mattered—‘at all’.63
How, then, might a Derridean approach bring out the nuances of the mother’s 
contribution in relation to discussions on rebounding death and death-facing? The idea that 
she simply gives in seems to underestimate the implications implied. Even giving in—if to 
face death is indeed to give in—need not, itself, be construed as an act of nihilistic weakness; 
to face death’s actuality may require significant strength. Importantly, the mother plays a role 
in contributing to the way an ecological death-facing idea is structured in the novel. The 
potency characterising The Road's presencing of total death, as an outcome of human action, 
is in part generated by her death. If we are, as Derrida puts it, ‘survivors granted a temporary 
reprieve’, then the ‘temporary’ measure of this reprieve is brought, in The Road, intimately to 
hand, intensifying our engagement with the experience of life and living that remains.64 This 
is first brought to us through the mother’s act of suicide, her opting for death over its 
omnipresence in life, a release she wants for her husband and son too. In an analeptic glimpse 
of conversation between mother and father, prior to her death, we are told that:
She watched him across the small flame. We used to talk about death, she said. We
don’t any more. Why is that?
I don’t know.
It’s because it’s here. There’s nothing left to talk about. (58)
If we view this fragment of dialogue as articulating an arrival at death’s (rhetorical) border, 
we begin to see the potency it carries. The mother’s words, ‘because it’s here’, function to 
presence death, transporting the reader to the point of unknowing (of ‘impossibility’) out of 
which death emits discourse, and, as the mother observes, in the world of The Road there is 
‘nothing left to talk about’. The effect of this statement is to retract or nullify all ‘trespass’ in 
relation to death (see note 15 above). In this world where the landscape is ‘barren, silent, 
godless’ (2), death has come too close to wrap it up in stories. These, in any case, have fallen 
away, along with the endings of all that was known. What is known is death itself, its 
possibility now construed as its arrival.
The mother, in a few words that haunt the whole text, makes potent for the reader the 
traumatic context of death’s aporia within which father and son continue on, before retreating 
into the abject oblivion of the death she acknowledges. Her act of death functions as an
63 Rambo, p. 101; Johns-Putra, ‘The Power o f  the Apocalyptic’.
64 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, pp. 24-5.
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acknowledgement of death as real ‘possibility’ not just for herself, but for all. She 
acknowledges death’s material inevitability as its arrival. Nonetheless, she withdraws only 
from the immediate transit of the narrative; between the lines of the text her presence is 
sustained, evoked by the narrator who slides in and out of focalisation on the father, speaking 
through his memories, while locating him in a landscape in which his dead wife seems to 
linger: Where the nights are ‘now only slightly less black’, by day ‘the banished sun circles 
the earth like a grieving mother with a lamp’ (32). The sun’s banishment displaces it from 
view, but in orbit it continues, unhindered. As a simile this presences the mother, or more 
particularly her death, evoking it as ‘trace’ like the ‘past landscapes of plenty’ noted in Johns- 
Putra’s reading; as a ‘grieving mother’ watching on, the sun, in turn, foregrounds the death 
with which it is overlaid, a death which enters the spaces between the present and its 
haunting, the death which, denied, can only return in its fullness, engulfing both landscape 
and life in its rebound.65
The effect of the mother’s act of death-facing and subsequent haunting of the text, 
viewed this way, seems to reinforce Rambo’s view, that The Road confronts the reader, not 
with tragedy but with trauma.66 This trauma occurs, Rambo suggests, in the way the reader is 
forced to ‘witness’ what remains.67 By locating the mother’s death-facing in relation to death 
as aporia, she enacts the ‘possibility’ of that which is also ‘impossible’. She acknowledges 
death’s necessity, but, for the reader—whose position as reader is necessarily a living one— 
this remains an acknowledgement of the possibility of impossibility. Her haunting of the text 
becomes a sign of the aporia of death, since—says Derrida—death can never be understood as 
such. The mother therefore functions to inflict death’s aporia upon the reader. Such an 
experience is then intensified in the father’s refusal of death, despite his being haunted 
constantly by its real possibility, both through the figure of the mother, his wife, and in the 
world of his living on.
It is not sufficient, then, to say that the mother represents a failure or giving up, a 
relinquishing of responsibility. Her act of death-facing expresses a profound love for father 
and son, whose lives are made untenable by a death that has already arrived. That she acts out 
of love, and not selfishness, is made clear in the text, for, foreseeing the end, her ‘heart’ is 
‘ripped out’ of her (59) when her son is bom; while her last ‘cold’ ‘gift’ (60) is so because she 
sees no other way to breach the situation. Accepting death, she demonstrates death’s 
inevitability for father and son. There is therefore, as Michael Chabon notes, a certain
65 Johns-Putra, ‘The Power o f  the Apocalyptic’.
‘intelligibility’ in the figure of the mother and her decision to die.68 She demonstrates with her 
life the only solution she can see, and by doing so depicts the loss of the world, not as her own 
death, but as the end of the road for humanity. At the same time, her choice is not simply ‘the 
only sane one’, as Chabon thinks it is.69 While her death accords with the death of the world, 
it is clearly also complicated by the father and the son’s living on. The mother’s death places 
death-facing before the reader; however, the narrative journey is one of continuation in the 
figure of the father and the boy: a journey, therefore, within death’s aporia.
Father
Far more has been written about father and son than it has about the mother. It is, after all, the 
father with, and for, his son who pursues—to the extent that he personifies—life and hope, 
while they no longer exist in the world that surrounds them. It is the father who infuses the 
son with the notion that they are ‘carrying the fire’ (87), a phrase that has been variously 
interpreted, but most often, and most accurately it seems, as indicating the way the two of 
them uphold and represent human goodness. Father and son are ‘the good guys’ (136), who, 
despite the ghastliness of the situation they are in, refuse to resort to violence or eating babies, 
steadfastly maintaining both civility and a profound mutual care in their hellish day-to-day 
lives. The father also depicts death’s ‘impossibility’. In an aporia of death, even as the 
possibility for total death is envisaged, one remains alive in such envisaging; hence the father 
is paired with the mother as the other component of death’s aporia.
Important to the figure of the father is his insistence that he and the son are carrying 
the fire—a notion that is of some interest to our discussions. The father’s demonstration of 
death’s ‘impossibility’ for the self nonetheless retains death’s ‘possibility’ as a conditioning 
aspect of his life. This conditioning aspect hovers in the figure of the mother, constantly 
reminding the reader that (impossible) death remains possible. If ‘fire’ indicates human 
goodness, it necessarily indicates, too, the possibility of goodness being lost, and even of 
goodness itself as causing harm. As Chabon also notes, fire is also a key element of 
destruction in the novel, as seen in the ash-grey of the landscape of a dead world.70 Thus, any 
reading of ‘the fire’ and its ‘carrying’ may need to allow for its possible double meanings.
68 Michael Chabon, Maps and Legends: Reading and Writing Along the Borderlands (San Francisco: Me Sweeney’s Books), 
o n .112-113
69. Ibid., p. 113.
70 Chabon, pp. 112,115.
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A problematic reading of ‘the fire’—at least in relation to death as aporia—might be 
seen in Mullins’ account. Mullins reads The Road, not as post-apocalyptic landscape but as 
depicting a crisis of modernity through the novel’s figurai use of hunger. His reading usefully 
points to a space in which a re-evaluation of the ethical occurs—one that, rather than 
reinstating prior humanisms, opens up between postmodernism and post-postmodemism. This 
idea counters one-dimensional readings of The Road that view it as a Biblical redemption 
narrative. However, his key assertion—that father and son represent a transcendental ethic 
presented by the novel as foundational to defining the human—assumes a narrative coherence 
that seems difficult to verify. He bases this in part on his reading of ‘the fire’ as something 
‘passed on from generation to generation, something essential to being human, something that 
transcends the individual and cannot be extinguished’.71 In describing this fire as ‘essential’ to 
the human, Mullins assumes the novel to define humanity in such a way that also excludes 
those who are not ‘carrying the fire’, meaning that they are not human— at least as we might 
commonly understand the word. The violent cults and baby-eaters, for Mullins, represent the 
‘instrumentality’ of modernity as defined by Charles Taylor; that is, they take an instrumental 
approach to their need for sustenance in contrast to father and son who, in opting to starve 
rather than eat babies, portray a transcendental humanism that is sought—Mullins argues— 
where postmodernism has failed to address modernity’s ills.72
I would argue, however, that The Road's depiction of an encounter with death’s 
aporetic state complicates the novel’s otherwise more straightforward moralistic rationale. 
Father and son clearly do pursue life and goodness, even as possible starvation haunts their 
every moment. They refuse to resort to cannibalism, continuing to treat each other with 
profound care and tenderness, despite being under constant extremes of trauma. However, as 
the novel’s portrayal of the more abject aspect of humanity reveals, it is not certain that we 
will be human—where to be human is to be good (kind, caring and so on). It is therefore also 
unclear that such characteristics, even if attained through transcendental means, are viable 
signifiers of being human; for, if they are, what is to be done with our abject, and seemingly 
nonhuman, selves? Are our weaknesses not also a part of us? It is necessary, therefore, to 
examine the doubt, hesitation, and even horror, at work in the life-world of the father if the 
novel is to be fully examined, thus returning us to a postmodern arena.
Central to my reading of the father, in The Road, is the nature of his response to 
death’s imminence in relation to continuing life. In deciding to go on, to ‘carry the fire’, and,
71 Mullins, p. 89.
72 Charles Taylor, Sources ofîhe Self: The Making o f  the Modem Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1989); Mullins, pp. 91-92.
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thus, in attempting to link past and future, the father’s choice differs to that of the mother. 
Yet, as Skrimshire points out, McCarthy displays ‘no triumphalism in allowing his 
protagonist to refuse giving up’.73 While the father’s determination to uphold life—both his 
own and his son’s—suggests a pristine valuing of humanist ideals, he also provides, through 
his living on—as Rambo observes, a witnessing of the aftermath, a witnessing of that ‘Not to 
be made right again’ (307).74 The father moves toward no destination; his life is little more 
than a living death that will permit no sustained resistance. His only focus is the life of his 
son: the boy’s wellbeing, which he cannot enable, and the boy’s future, which he cannot even 
imagine. The sheer lack of a world in which to drive his care forward, a lack which intensifies 
the agonal portrayal of his care of his son, is established early on in the novel. At a point 
when he is lying in the dark, awaiting sleep following a conversation about death with his son, 
the text continues:
He lay listening to the water drip in the woods. Bedrock, this. The cold and the 
silence. The ashes of the late world carried on the bleak and temporal winds to and fro 
in the void. Carried forth and scattered and carried forth again. Everything uncoupled 
from its shoring. Unsupported in the ashen air. Sustained by a breath, trembling and 
brief. If only my heart were stone. (10)
Within this narrative description in heavy, clipped sentences of the deathliness of the world in 
the night time, two insertions are more directly the father’s: ‘Bedrock, this’ and ‘If only my 
heart were stone’. In the same way that the mother’s assertion that death is already here 
conjures death’s aporetic state for the reader, the statement, ‘bedrock this’, serves to 
emphasise that the father’s world is, in effect, worldless: there is nothing there. Any chance of 
the father being ‘hailed’—like Snowman in Oryx and Crake—‘by the void’, disintegrates 
before it can occur; whereas Atwood’s post-apocalyptic world is regenerative, McCarthy’s is 
not.75 Bedrock equals utter baseline. Whatever may have been built upon bedrock, in this 
novel, is gone for good, at least in any knowable life-world experience. The father might only 
even begin to identify with his situation if, as he puts it, his ‘heart were stone’. But it is more 
than an identification of self with world that is at stake here. The poststructuralist conception 
of the subject as arriving in an already given world, effectively, positions the father in a non-
73 Skrimshire, p. 12.
74 Rambo, p. 101.
75 See Chapter Two, where I consider the post-apocalyptic void in which Snowman finds himself in relation to Judith Butler’s 
remark, ‘that one is always addressed in one way or another, even if  one is abandoned or abused, since the void and the injury 
hail one in specific ways’. Judith Butler, Giving an Account o f  Oneself (USA: Fordham University Press, 2005), p. 51.
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place, meaning that everything he knows and sees has already collapsed in on him. From the 
point of bedrock, whatever he creates—his ongoing, day-to-day, lived experience—can only 
occur through his concerted effort to build something, which he must do out of nothing but 
his shattered memories of, say, the meaning of goodness, together with his profound love for 
his son. Hence, for the reader, the love the father shares with his son is the only real thing 
remaining.
The father’s tenacious effort to establish meaning in life, his ‘carrying the fire’, 
functions alongside the mother’s belief that no meaning remains, death being all there is. His 
opting to go on cannot therefore be fully justified by the desire to safeguard his son, since 
safeguarding the boy is the mother’s primary desire too—this is why her heart is ‘ripped out’ 
(59) of her when he is bom. The man’s justification to go on appears, instead, in the meanings 
he continually constructs; in his encounters with the ‘traces’ of the past as emphasised in 
Johns-Putra’s reading.76 These often crumple to dust almost as he grasps them. On one 
occasion he finds a Spanish coin and rushes to show it to his son, driven (we can assume) by 
traces of its past meanings as artefact. But then he hesitates and instead drops it. In a world 
where the present step is hunger and the next death, a coin has no meaning at all. For the 
father, immersed as he is in the ephemerality of constructed meaning, his continuing to 
‘carrying the fire’ therefore might be his most significant construction. To ‘carry the fire’, 
after all, implies a future towards which it is carried—a task that the father persists in, even 
though the novel neither fully anticipates nor assures such a future. In terms of death’s aporia, 
the fire becomes the ultimate device by which the father continues to uphold death’s 
‘impossibility’.
Facing life, in The Road, is nonetheless placed alongside facing death at the point 
where death’s inevitability becomes apparent. In carrying the fire, father and son traverse a 
landscape that is ‘no place’, that gives nothing, that cannot make father and son as life-world 
creatures, promising only their deaths. Within this, the novel’s portrayal of ‘trauma’ (to recall 
Rambo) is presented in the character of the father in his constant self-interrogation of his own 
decision to go on.77 His assurances to his son that he will not leave him, in life nor in death, 
involves the possibility—should the situation demand it—that he may need to end the boy’s 
life himself. His repeated consideration of this prospect, his preparing for it, his fear that he 
will be unable to carry it through, is a continuation of his dialogue with his now long dead 
wife, whom he once taught how to self-kill using an obsidian blade. Her insistence that death
76 Johns-Putra, ‘The Power o f  the Apocalyptic’.
77 Rambo, p. 108.
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has become the only option, her act of suicide and her reprimanding of him for attempting to 
go on, for opening himself and the boy to dangers that may be worse than death while still 
resulting in it, haunts his every waking hour.
Yet, for the man, life remains embodied—in all its unfathomability—in the person of 
his small, frail, ever generous-hearted son. Such recognition reveals the complex aporetic 
equivalence between the mother’s and the father’s intentions. When the time does come, the 
father is, of course, wholly unable to carry through with his plan to end the boy’s life. As his 
own death is imminent, despite the boy’s begging him, ‘Just take me with you. Please’, his 
reply to his son is, simply, ‘I cant’ (298). This T cant’ forms the crux of my reading of the 
father in relation to Derrida’s death as aporia, forming a parallel to the mother’s T can’t’ in 
relation to going forward. As Skrimshire observes, the difference between the father’s choice 
and his wife’s ‘is one equally weighted, equally uncertain’.78 The father, on one hand, 
expresses that he knows she is right. On the other, that he cannot face killing his own son is of 
course, unquestionably, right too. To assert that these two are equally weighted is not, exactly, 
to equate the two conflicting desires (toward the son’s life or his death), for that is to 
misunderstand the mother. It is not that she wishes to end the life of her son, but that she 
acknowledges the appearance of death as inevitable: the ‘possibility’ of ‘impossibility’ made 
imminent. The father, conversely, presents the ‘impossibility’ of ‘possible’ death in his living 
on. He illustrates Derrida’s claim that one can never experience death except through the 
death of the other ‘in me’, sustaining both the reader’s engagement with death-facing, and his 
own depiction of death’s unavoidable presence in life.79
Death’s unfathomability is perhaps the most useful of Derrida’s points in relation to 
the character of the father. Derrida insists that our questioning of death cannot protect itself 
‘from a hidden bio-anthropo-thanato-theological contamination’.80 This means that our death- 
facing always contains figments of our beliefs and understandings about life. But it means too 
that, in addressing death, we always participate in discourse, generating stories, enacting a 
‘trespass’ that reaches beyond death’s border, where, for Derrida, there is no actual border.81 
The mother demonstrates this process at work when she says: there is ‘nothing left to talk 
about’ (58). In a dead world, as we conceive it, even stories possess no meaning. The father 
‘carries the fire’ and thus lives on in a landscape where all constructed meaning has fallen. Its
78 Skrimshire, p. 12.
79 Derrida, Aporias, p. 76.
80 Ibid., p. 79.
81 Ibid., p. 24.
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meanings can have no ultimate foundation, since there is no essence to humanity that—in this 
novel—can be assumed to persist.
Nonetheless, stories are powerful and our survival, in the end, is in many ways down 
to us. The novel projects images of our failure to survive, wherein all discourse falls away. At 
the same time, if trespasses have meaning for life in life, then, in addressing his son, the father 
dwells in life and not death. Death’s ‘possibility’ remains, for him, an ‘impossibility’ as long 
as he carries the fire. When death finally takes him at the end of the novel, the son is left to 
face death’s ‘impossibility’, with only the fire he is carrying to prevent all meanings falling 
away.
Son
Of the three characters, the boy provides the reader with the most intense and the frailest form 
of living in the face of death’s imminence, even as only he lives on. Acutely vulnerable, the 
boy is painfully undernourished and constantly afraid. His hopes for long term survival are 
uncertain, while his prospects of experiencing ‘a life worth living’ are contained within his 
person, having no substance in a world returned to him only as death.82 Yet he also depicts a 
distinct sense of newness and purity—a condition that stands out as other to the world as we 
have come to understand it. Very easily, then, the boy might be read as a vision of hope for 
humanity’s redemption, seen as ‘The One’, or as the embodiment of the Holy Grail.83 On such 
a view, he appears to fimction as a test case between the father and mother’s differing 
responses to the death of the world. For many critics, the fact that he lives on, being passed 
into the hands of seemingly benevolent strangers, justifies the father’s upholding of life 
against death’s ‘impossibility’ as an act of faith in the future. As such, it is unsurprising that 
redemptive readings of the novel arise.
Yet, this redemptive approach may be too simplistic; the father repeatedly indicates 
that he has no faith in the future, recognising that there is none. He is aware that his promises 
to his son may be meaningless after all. For example, as sleep is evading him in the cold of 
the night, we find that:
82 n £
83 Kunsa, p. 66; Cooper, pp. 230-231.
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He said that everything depended on reaching the coast, yet waking in the night he 
knew that all of this was empty and no substance to it. There was a good chance they 
would die in the mountains and that would be that. (29)
A discrepancy is at work here. The father on one hand ‘knows’ that his assertion that they will 
reach the coast is ‘empty’. However, that there was ‘a good chance’ they would die in the 
mountains evokes the parallel possibility that they may reach the coast, which of course they 
do. While the second of these may appear to counter the first, it might alternatively be said 
that the novel, rather, succeeds in sustaining both suppositions, and continues to do so to the 
final page and beyond. When the father dies and the son lives on, the aporetic dichotomy 
engendered by the mother and father’s two responses to death is now ended, but reappears in 
their son as a single representative of death’s aporia. The son thus embodies the perspectives 
of both mother and father, carrying forward the novel’s complex engagement with death.
A further aspect of the son’s character now becomes significant, seen from the 
perspective of Derrida’s work on collective death and the loss of the archive. As several 
scholars note, the son is bom after the unnamed cataclysmic event, and so has no experience 
of the world as it was before it. This means that he has only the father’s descriptions—his 
stories and memories—by which to envisage what might have been. Whereas the father 
persists in the non-place of The Road's deathly landscape, the son is born into it. His life- 
world is an exposition of the unknowable, from the very moment of his birth. His living on, 
therefore, takes the reader beyond all capacity to imagine. The boy might correspondingly be 
said to signal the Toss of the archive’ (of literature) and thus the appearance of the absolute 
referent. According to Kronick, the ‘affinity’ Derrida uncovers between ‘the rhetoric of 
nuclear war’ and ‘literature’ lies ‘not in scenarios of mass destruction but in the anticipation 
of the wholly other’.84 This ‘other’, for Derrida, ‘is the only possible invention’, that is 
‘without precedent’, this being the ‘absolute referent’ as ‘monstrosity’.85 The implied end of 
the world in The Road is also that which the son steps toward at the end of the novel. He 
moves forward into the space beyond precedent, beyond the intimacy of his father’s love, 
beyond the end to a place where death, via the mother, and life, via the father, both are ended. 
While this gives way to a space of other, opening to the possibility of a future, in signalling 
the Toss of the archive’ it also forecloses all means by which we might conceive it. In moving 
beyond our conception, it signals, for that matter, our own demise, while making of itself both
Kiuiiivk, p. 105
85 Ibid., p. 105.
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everything and nothing. Although the boy moves ahead and beyond us, accompanied by 
benevolent strangers, we can make no valid claims about his future. Whatever he carries or 
contains or accompanies him, the landscape into which he steps is that of an already dead 
world.
The son does, however, perform the novel’s shift from the question of T  to that of 
‘we’—a shift that is also problematised by its encounter with the loss of the world. This shift 
is envisaged as unachievable by the mother and negated, if also relied upon, by the father. As 
Pizzino notes, while the man is generally considered to be ‘the novel’s primary evocation of 
goodness’, insisting on life over death for the boy and teaching him the meaning of goodness, 
a further ethic extends beyond that of the father and son relationship 86 This is seen, Pizzino 
explains, in the way the son seeks to include everyone they meet in his ethic of care, in 
contrast to the father who extends it only to the son.87 Nonetheless, whilst this is an important 
observation, rather than pointing—as Pizzino suggests—to a utopian reading, it may be 
understood as adding to, thus amplifying, the novel’s aporetic state. The boy’s desire to feed 
everyone they meet, and the father’s concern that they can barely feed themselves—or, more 
particularly, that he can barely feed his son—are placed in helpless conflict with each other. 
The boy’s generosity, while often justifiably celebrated, is in an important sense also naive. 
He has no means to grasp the ethical dilemmas embedded at the heart of contemporary death- 
thinking, and which, at the collapse of the archive are undone.
This problem is emphasised, in the novel, in relation to an encounter between father 
and son and a starving man. The father refuses to help the man, and, as they continue on their 
way, the boy pleads with his father:
He was just hungry, Papa. He's going to die.
He's going to die anyway.
He's so scared, Papa.
The man squatted and looked at him. I'm scared, he 
said. Do you understand? I'm scared.
The boy didn't answer. He just sat there with his head 
bowed, sobbing.
You're not the one who has to worry about everything.
The boy said something but he couldn't understand
him. What? He said.
He looked up, his wet and grimy face. Yes I am, he said.
I am the one. (277)
Here, the boy is not ‘The One’ of a Christian redemptive narrative, but ‘the one’ who is other 
to all that is known, to all that can be relied on or prepared for—in contrast to his father, who 
worries because of all he has known. The son has to worry because his father speaks to him 
using words from a world that has ended; because he embodies a future that exceeds his 
father; because, in marking the appearance of the absolute referent, his very existence marks 
the end of the world. Hence, while he signals pure goodness, he depicts, too, the unfounding 
of the ethical as no longer possible, based on a failure in death-facing by all who have gone 
before him. This does not make an ethic transcendent, as in Mullins’ account; rather, it makes 
an ethic unattainable where we consign it to the unimaginable world beyond us. The novel 
makes no demand for a flight from the realities of a finite world; rather, it places the finitude 
of the world squarely before us, so that survival depends on an account of the ‘we’ in its 
immediacy.
If the ethical, in The Road, is problematised, this goes too for the various forms it may 
take, including that of religion. The ephemeral nature of religious practice seems to haunt the 
novel to striking effect. Made up of promises of a life beyond death in return for adherence to 
their ethical formulations, religions dissolve to nothing when death arrives in its actuality. As 
the father seeks to ‘evoke the forms’ (77-8), he interrogates his own faith in God repeatedly, 
raging at its loss while enlisting the boy to stand in for it. The boy, on the other hand, seems 
more able to depict this loss of religion in its passing. An example of this occurs when he is 
watching the snow fall one day on the stricken landscape: ‘it’s snowing, the boy said. He 
looked at the sky. A single grey flake sifting down. He caught it in his hand and watched it 
expire there like the last host of Christendom’ (15). Not only has Christendom expired, but its 
expiry is embodied in the melting of a single grey snowflake. More than the mourning of its 
loss, this is an illustration of the transience of discourse and of all ideology. The grey of the 
snowflake reminds us that it carries a certain contamination and, as noted earlier, in Derrida’s 
view, contamination occurs in all ‘trespass’, in all crossing of borders in relation to death (see 
note 15 above). The grey of the snowflake’s contamination is also tied—necessarily—to the 
demise of the physical world, it being the dust of its death and decay. The snowflake seems to 
carry an expression of the existential problem at hand, whereby our failure to face death 
squarely is bound up with the end of the world. The snowflake, as it melts, performs a
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deconstmctive dissolution of our very sense of being, yet also leaves us, as the boy is left, 
standing on as ‘witness’ (recalling Rambo) to its demise.88
This function also extends from and beyond the novel’s portrayal of faith or ‘trespass’. 
The novel effectively undermines all metanarrative constructions of life that rely upon that 
which lies beyond it: death itself. The question of ‘trespass’ (see note 15 above), which works 
closely with Derrida’s notion of death as aporia (death can neither be explained by, nor 
explain, life) is in turn located alongside the novel’s more totalizing image of the fear of the 
death of all things. As religion and meaning fade, the world and humanity are ended too, and 
it is, again, the boy who is positioned in the novel to observe this process at work. An 
observing of the ending of all things is evoked in relation to the boy directly following a 
narrative portrayal of ephemeral religion. We are told of refugees who, in the early days, not 
long after the cataclysmic event, peopled the landscape: ‘Their eyes bright in their skulls. 
Creedless shells of men tottering down the causeways like migrants in a feverland. The frailty 
of everything revealed at last. Old and troubling issues resolved into nothingness and night’ 
(28). The text continues: ‘The last instance of a thing takes the class with it. Turns out the 
light and is gone. Ever is a long time. But the boy knew what he knew. That ever is no time at 
all’ (ibid). This contracting of all time into nothingness—‘ever is no time at all’—is 
recognised by the boy in his function as absolute referent. He recognises, seemingly 
effortlessly, the death that must be faced, lying at the heart of all discourse. This can be 
reflected on further, however, in relation to Derrida’s reading of death as aporia. In 
recognising death’s function as discourse, the boy might effectively be said to recognise his 
own mother in the form of death’s real possibility. Despite the father’s insistence of their 
‘living on’, he also keeps her memory close to him.89 On several occasions he remarks to his 
father that he would have liked to go with her. His ‘living on’ is thus constantly placed in 
tension with his desire to meet death face on, along with his mother; hence he embodies death 
as both ‘impossible’ and ‘possible’.
In his reading of death as aporia, Derrida resists all existential analysis of death; yet, 
he admits that we cannot help but seek to explain death. When we cease to do so, the world 
ends for us. In this sense, rather than problematising humanity as a destructive force, the 
novel is about the way we already think of humanity as a destructive force, and the effects of 
our conceptualising upon our perceptions and subsequent constructions of life. The boy in this
88 Rambo’s use o f ‘witness’ is that o f Christian redemptive narrative; however she discusses this alongside Derrida’s notion 
o f survival, or survivre, in his early essay, ‘Living On: Borderlines’, also reappearing in his later works. Rambo, pp. 106-107.
89 Here ‘living on’ can be considered in relation to Derrida’s notion o f ‘survival’, as being ‘not simply that which remains but 
the most intense life possible’. Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, p. 52.
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sense demonstrates a care that we envisage as being lost to us, and which we experience as 
impossible to locate within the world. The Road, rather than being structured as redemptive, 
instead turns us back on ourselves, confronting us with an underlying problem with a death 
we must inevitably face, yet which we cannot grasp and which can offer no meaning in life— 
other than that which we create out of living.
Embodying death’s aporia, which he inherits from father and mother, the boy allows 
us to envisage, too, the possibility of an impossible utopia, which, in the end, is not part of our 
experience, even as it exists in our thinking of it. The boy’s life-world emerges out of—and 
not into—death’s rhetorical border, so that he functions as a witness to the possibility of the 
unimaginable, the other beyond totalising destruction. If, in some sense of the word, he 
‘continues’ to live on, such a ‘continuance’ nonetheless moves him into that for which he can 
only be unprepared; it is the no-place of our minds made absolute. In uniting the ends of the 
world with the beginnings of the ethical, he refuses the relevance of both, instead drawing 
attention to Derrida’s key point: if a ‘life worth living’ is ‘at stake’ all—both human and 
nonhuman—then the meanings and possibilities of this ‘life worth living’ only exist in ‘life’, 
in the most intense sense of the word.90
* * *
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, as stated at the start of this chapter, might be said to 
demonstrate the death-facing paradigm in conceptual terms. That is, it enlists the reader in an 
experiential, and thus, potentially, phenomenological journey of its contours, rather than 
justifying or expounding upon them. The Road posits no discursive reasoning about what we 
have done to cause death’s rebound upon us, nor what it means to face it, but simply brings 
death upon us as a rebounding force. Whatever form of totalising death we fear may descend 
upon us, it is now here to be faced.
This produces a close up examination of death and our relations to it, and of the failure 
of our responses in the advent of its appearance. Where death’s rebound is a result of our 
failure to face death, the mother, in The Road, steps forward to face it. Therefore, although her 
suicide is, in one sense, an abandonment of life and those living, it is, in another, not just the 
‘only sane’ option as Chabon sees it (see note 69 above), but, an active acknowledgement of 
the situation as it appears. The mother may well fear death, but she fears more that humanity 
has already destroyed its world. This acknowledgement is also an acknowledging of life;
90 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, pp. 24-5, 52.
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hence, the boy can be described as ‘living on’, as much because his mother’s death fulfils 
death’s aporia as because his father perpetuates it.
If the mother’s act is one of congruence, then it is also ecological according to a 
paradigm of death-facing. The mother clearly enacts the death-facing described as imperative 
in Atwood’s trilogy. The trilogy repeatedly insists on death as a good, since, out of it, life and 
its ecologies arise. The Road, however—like the trilogy but more intensely—complicates this 
ecological imperative whilst also insisting on it. Its disclosure of an aporia disturbs easy 
notions of death-facing—a problematising that can be discerned in the novels I examine. The 
way this aporia transitions, in The Road, from father and mother to the son, also shifts 
ecological death-facing to a space beyond thought and the world. Hence, although it takes its 
fullest form in the boy, it does so at a point where its value is already lost. Death-facing 
cannot function as pure abstraction. The locating of aporia within the boy therefore 
demonstrates the futility of our thinking of the ends, whereby we conflate it with our thinking 
of a future as possibility. He may exemplify an ethic of the kind of scope that enables an 
assimilation of ecological thinking in the world of the self; yet the novel’s ecological moment 
exists out of reach—assigned to the past, or to a location beyond the ends of the human 
archive. The novel’s placing of ecological wellbeing into the non-place of our envisioning 
seems above all to evoke our failure to re-envision humanity in an ecologically viable way in 
the present. It illustrates the effect of death’s aporia on ecological thinking, pointing to the 
complexities of discursive thinking, thus exposing the reader to the aspects of ecological 
thinking that make it difficult to do.
Important to this is a stripping back of discourse to the point of paradox. On one hand, 
if all death-facing is discursive—all analyses of death being contaminated by the mind—then 
no one form of death-facing is sustainable in itself. On the other hand, when all discourse is 
stripped back to a point where—as the mother puts it—‘there is nothing left to talk about’ 
(58), then we are faced, nonetheless, with a kind of death: the loss of all means by which to 
know life. The novel asks whether it is possible to live at all without the functioning of our 
discursive worlds, without story. At the same time, it holds up a demand for an engagement 
between the discursive and the real, which the mother’s death demonstrates but father and son 
can only witness.
Even as it complicates it, McCarthy’s novel depicts a contemporary turn toward the 
real more intensely than the other novels I examine. In particular it points to its loss, whereby 
its destruction has become irreversible. It places the reader in a visceral encounter with the 
loss of all things as real, whilst allowing the reader, as consumer of the novclistic form, with 
the boy, to live on as witness. The novel thus produces a double effect, whereby not only must
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we acknowledge death’s part in life, but we must do so at the point when such death-facing is 
too late, since there is no possibility for life remaining. At the same time, this makes clear the 
way death emits discourse. Since the boy lives on, there is fire to be carried, and a story to be 
told. This provides one means to consider the preoccupation with a reappearance of language, 
as seen in Atwood’s trilogy, and which recurs in Winterson’s The Stone Gods and also in 
Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide. Winterson’s The Stone Gods, which I consider next, 
carries this poststructuralist concern with language into the contemporary figure of the 
posthuman. In The Stone Gods, language emerges as an imperative means by which the 
human faces death, but also which renders death elusive.
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Chapter 4: Language and the Posthuman in Jeanette Winterson’s The 
Stone Gods
Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods (2007) tackles the contemporary paradigm of death- 
facing through the figure of the posthuman, which it also entangles at times in a question 
about language.1 The posthuman broadly represents a prominent contemporary route to 
theorising beyond the human, taking form as a means to redefine the human in relation to a 
range of issues, including the emergence of biotechnologies and various problematics of 
Enlightenment thought, its dualisms and anthropocentrisms. While posthumanism interrelates 
and conflicts with certain other -isms that arise as means to theorise possible new futures for 
the human subject, notably transhumanism, it also discloses links and tensions with 
poststructuralism. Hence, while clear distinctions can be made between posthumanist and 
antihumanist strands of thought, crossovers also frequently occur, not least in fictional 
representations.
The juxtaposition, in The Stone Gods, of a death-facing imperative with a problem of 
language replicates the question of representation discussed in the previous two chapters, 
distinctly transposing it into the figure of the posthuman. Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy, 
discussed in Chapter Two, concludes by conjuring up the vision of a posthuman future, yet 
ends by placing this in question as Blackboard learns to read. Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, 
discussed in Chapter Three, depicts death-facing as anthropological, rendering it a discursive 
paradox—or an aporia, as Jacques Derrida explains it.2 On one hand, death-facing points 
towards death as actuality, where death is a material fimction of all life—human and 
nonhuman. On the other hand, the ways we think about, theorise about, tell stories about 
death, although they may not be limited to us, take place first and foremost for us. We make 
sense of death through language, its structures and our related mental processes. Therefore, to 
the extent that life has meaning in relation to death, life is negotiated through linguistic and 
discursive means. This poses a problem at a time of environmental crisis, when we realise 
anew the extent to which viewing the world from within our own self-contained bubble limits 
our view. This moment—as I discuss in this chapter—can be understood as the moment of the
1 Jeanette Winterson, m e  Stone uods (London: penguin, 200/).
2 Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).
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posthuman.3 As such, environmental crisis challenges not just poststructuralism but 
philosophy itself, most recently taking philosophy into the domain of post-philosophy, while 
taking theory into the domain of the material and the speculative.
The Stone Gods explores the posthuman and its entanglement in this set of issues, 
depicting in fictional form a key challenge posed by the posthuman: that of how to think 
beyond the human. The novel also appears very specifically to tie this ‘thinking beyond’ to 
death-facing, revealing the death-facing paradigm’s links to contemporary theoretical and 
post-theoretical conundrums. The novel, through a complex structure of overlapping stories, 
depicts humanity’s failure to respond to its mistakes, its flawed mechanistic conceptions of 
the world, its failure to resolve issues of power and politics, and consequently its repeated 
destruction of pristine worlds. The novel consists of three (or potentially four) main sections, 
each of which is a story in its own right, but which is also woven into, so overlapping, the 
others. It opens, in the first section, with a depiction of death’s rebound upon humanity as 
anticipated yet deferred. Humanity’s survival in an environmentally depleted world has 
become untenable, but plans to relocate to another planet look set to safeguard the future—at 
least for now. This strategy differs to that of Atwood’s trilogy and McCarthy’s The Road, 
each of which opens with death’s arrival. Such a deferral, in The Stone Gods, of death’s 
rebound, in turn enables a consideration, early in the novel, of our relations with death and the 
ways death-denial is understood to give rise to rebounding death in the first place. This 
appears in the novel as a transhumanist embellishment of a body politic reflective of Michel 
Foucault’s notion of ‘making live’ rather than ‘letting live’, wherein death is placed on a 
plane of avoidance.4 This socio-cultural alienation from death forms a backdrop for the 
novel’s subsequent call for a re-engagement with death, which it depicts specifically in an 
emergent posthumanism—thereby assuming links between the posthuman and a 
poststructuralist finitude. This general shift and the ideas and problems that surround it are 
presented largely through the actions, ideas and interactions of the novel’s two main 
characters, Billie (appearing as Billy in part two) and Spike (Spikkers), who I take to 
represent, loosely, the subject categories o f ‘human’ and ‘posthuman’.
The novel’s engagement with the possibilities of a posthuman future is thus placed in 
ongoing comparison with related subject categories, including humanism and transhumanism. 
Transhumanism refers to a condition of transition toward the posthuman (broadly defined),
3 This point applies whether one refers to the ecological posthuman or the critical posthuman. By the first o f these I mean the 
posthuman that is decentred from such traits as anthropocentrism, and by the critical posthuman I mean the posthuman as 
subject o f poststructuralist thought.
4 Stuart J. Murray, 1 Thànatopuli tics : Reading in Agambcn a Rejoinder to Biopolitical Life", Communication and  
Critical/Cultural Studies 5.2 (2008), 203-207, p. 204; see also discussions in Chapter One, pp. 20-21.
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and to a certain kind of future that it aims towards. I base my understanding of 
transhumanism, in this chapter, on Cary Wolfe’s conception of transhumanism as ‘an 
intensification of humanism’, and on Hava Tirosh-Samuelson’s statement that, according to 
the transhumanist vision, humans (via genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and so on) will 
‘transform themselves into “persons of unprecedented physical, intellectual and psychological 
capacity, self-programming, potentially immortal, unlimited individuals’” .5 Transhumanism’s 
emphasis on radical life-extension can be considered as a form of death-denial. The 
posthuman, conversely, rather than relying on ‘death symbolism’ and a ‘life / death duality’, 
is more often understood, as Francesca Ferrando notes, as ‘post-dualistic process-ontological’, 
although it can also employ an antihumanist subject-decentring.6 While it intersects with 
transhumanism in some definitions, the posthuman is also often distinct from it. While 
transhumanists envisage the attainment of their ideals in the posthuman, for posthumanists we 
always already were posthuman. Wolfe describes posthumanism as coming before humanism 
in the sense that ‘it names the embodiment and embeddedness of the human being in not just 
its biological but also its technical world’, yet as coming after humanism in that it ‘names a 
historical moment in which the decentring of the human by its imbrications in technical [and 
other] networks is increasingly impossible to ignore’.7 This sense of a historical moment, at 
which the decentred human self-identifies with its imbrications in various networks, is the 
posthumanism to which I refer in this chapter, being the definition that appears most strongly 
transmitted in the novel—mainly through the character, Spike.
Spike is a Robo sapiens (advanced artificial life form) who functions as a kind of 
oracle throughout the novel. Representing and propounding a range of posthumanist ideals, 
she also contests human exceptionalism in its various forms. Spike is in many ways 
reminiscent of Donna Haraway’s Cyborg, and depicts a performative and quantum posthuman 
ontology that has echoes of the work of Karen Barad.8 Spike also demonstrates certain 
problematics of a posthuman ideal, mainly to do with language and the human. Discovering 
poetry, she becomes drawn into the intricacies of human emotion, and from thereon becomes 
increasingly human. This development coincides with her selection of ‘love’ as the signifier
5 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (London: University o f Minnesota Press, 2012), p. xv (emphasis in original); Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson, ‘Engaging Transhumanism’ in H+/~ Transhumanism and its Critics, ed. by Gregory R. Hansell and 
William Grassie, p. 24.
6 Francesca Ferrando, ‘Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms 
Differences and Relations’, Existenz: An International Journal in Philosophy, Religion, Politics and The Arts 8.2 (2013), 26- 
32, pp. 31-32.
7 Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? p. xv.
8 See Donna Haraway, ‘Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s’, The Haraway 
Reader (London: Routledge, 2004); see also Kareii Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement o f  Matter and Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).
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of her posthuman solution. Here, we can see that Spike, in her quest to assign death-facing to 
the human subject, hones in on language and story as a feature of the ontological human. As 
the novel goes on, however, love proves an unstable means for the transformations she 
envisages. This destabilising takes place in the figure of Billie, to whom Spike directs her 
Tove’ solution.
Narrator Billie, the second main character, is the (human) undercover rebel who falls 
in love with Spike. Although Billie constantly reflects on, and takes on, much of Spike’s 
posthuman philosophising, we find, as the novel goes on, that she becomes increasingly 
unable to assume the decentred posthumanism that the novel, through Spike, recommends. 
This is most strongly depicted in the closing pages of part three, as she withdraws from all 
networks and steps into her own narcissistic death. This death is contrasted with Spike’s own 
death—a posthuman death that concludes each of the first two sections. Hence, while the 
novel seems (mainly through Spike) to recommend a posthuman solution, it seems 
inexplicably to retract or abandon this solution in the end. Billie dies, yet her death appears 
not to fulfil Spike’s posthuman conception of death-facing. This difficulty seems tied to an 
ongoing entanglement in the interior human subject and its language processes—a difficulty 
that the novel, despite its many innovations to the contrary, nonetheless falls back on.
In approaching this problem of an emergent yet unstable posthumanism, I pursue two 
key matters. The first is the way the novel appears to append the problem of human death- 
denial to ‘trans’ and ‘post’ humanisms, depicting the transhuman as alienated from death and 
the posthuman as able to face it. The second is the way the novel appears to then complicate 
this pattern by leaning back into humanism where it underlies ‘trans’ and ‘post’ humanist 
modes. This raises a question as to what it is about humanism that sustains its re-emergence in 
the posthuman. As N. Katherine Hayles notes, the posthuman. Tike the human’, is a 
‘historically specific and contingent term rather than a stable ontology’.9 Foucault, too, sees 
the categories by which we conceive ourselves as arising out of terms we borrow from ‘our 
society, from our civilisation, from our culture’.10 Thus, in its portrayals of the posthuman, 
The Stone Gods can be said to reconceptualise the human subject at a time of environmental 
crisis. Correspondingly, tensions within these subject categories point to anxieties over our 
capacities to respond going forward at such a time. The intersection between these tensions 
and the novel’s depiction of the death-fear paradigm suggests, furthermore, that questions are 
posed at an existential level. The novel’s positioning of death-facing as a function of the
9 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘Unfinished Work: From Cyborg to Cognisphere’, Theory Culture Society 23, 7.8 (2006), 159-166, p. 
160.
10 Fons Elders, Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns o f  Mankind (London: Souvenir Press, 1974) pp. 153-154.
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posthuman therefore provides a means to explore its entanglement with the paradoxes at the 
heart of contemporary thought. I begin the chapter with an overview of Winterson’s oeuvre 
and responses to The Stone Gods so far. I then provide an outline of my theoretical approach, 
which, in this chapter, focuses on the death-facing paradigm’s participation in a late and 
turning theoretical moment in poststructuralist thought. This draws discussions closer toward 
the arenas of post-philosophy and a speculative and material turn. I apply the ideas of Barad, 
whose ‘performative posthumanism’ engages with a quantum ontology, and those of Wolfe, 
who describes second order systems theory as a form of posthumanism that is gestured to by 
Derridean deconstruction. A short synopsis of The Stone Gods then leads into my textual 
analysis. The two main characters of Spike and Billie, whom I consider in stages across their 
differing incarnations, form the central focus of my analysis.
The tensions between differing categories of being human, in The Stone Gods, might also be 
seen as symptomatic of concerns in Winterson’s work more generally. As her first 
environmental crisis novel, The Stone Gods represents a shift from an establish pattern of 
focus on the interior human subject, towards a focus on the exterior (environment) of that 
subject’s field. Such a shift may contribute to the tensions that appear between humanist, 
transhumanist and posthumanist ideals, whereby an exteriorising factor in the posthuman 
subject appears as being in some sense difficult to sustain. A related question about 
representation has also been raised about Winterson’s work over a longer period. Following 
the initial rapid acclaim for her debut novel, Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit (1985), 
Winterson experienced a period of poor reception. As Sonya Andermahr explains, this was 
related to an eliding of ‘the difference between her life and art,’ due in part to the semi- 
autobiographical nature of her works.11 Winterson resists the view that her fiction is 
autobiographical, instead emphasising the role of story: ‘What matters’, she says, ‘is what 
writers do with the experience, whatever the experience is’.12 This emphasis on an overriding 
function of story is also discernible in The Stone Gods, becoming similarly entangled in the 
tensions at work. Today, Winterson has very much recovered as an author, and scholarship on 
her work has accumulated. Her novels are read as textual ‘flying carpet’ adventures that 
revolve around such themes as love, sexuality, art, storytelling, time and anti-reality, while 
approaches taken to her work include feminism, queer theory, postmodernism and
11 Sonya Andermahr, Jeanette Winterson (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009), p. 153.
12 Jcaiicilc Winterson, Jeanette Winterson', The Art o f  Fiction, 150, The Paris Review, interview by Audrey Biiger 
<http://www.theparisreview.org/interviews/1188/the-art-of-fiction-no-150-jeanette-winterson> [accessed 15 June 2014].
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poststructuralism, narratology, Bakhtinian theory, and psychoanalysis.13 These various 
characteristics of Winterson’s work can all be discerned in The Stone Gods, shaping its 
depictions of a posthuman moment. Stylistically postmodern, Winterson’s fiction nonetheless 
also sustains a glimpse of the modem, demonstrating the influence—as is often noted—of 
such authors as Ezra Pound, Virginia Woolf and T.S. Eliot. While this adds to the richness of 
potential for analysis, it also indicates possible aspects of the resistance, within the narrative 
of The Stone Gods, to the posthuman paradigm it depicts. As the novel addresses a 
contemporary concern with human responses to its world, prior conceptions of human 
subjecthood appear constantly to vie with emergent possibilities.
Critical responses to Winterson’s work tend to be slow to emerge; hence The Stone 
Gods has not yet found its way far into the body of volumes that focus on her oeuvre, whilst 
articles remain comparatively few, although growing in number. There is, however, a plethora 
of media reviews, which tend to offer the novel much praise, referring to it as ‘emotionally 
lucid’, and as ‘a keen lament for our irremediably incautious species’.14 The two main 
concerns raised are: first, whether The Stone Gods is a work of science fiction or literary 
novel that borrows from it (the latter being the more accurate view); and, second, whether 
Spike’s ‘love intervention’ offers a sufficiently credible solution to humanity’s problems. If 
The Stone Gods, as Julie Ellam remarks, ‘sets out to examine the inevitability of a dystopian 
future’, then ‘it is at least a surprise that love continues to be the panacea’.15 However, while 
love is a common theme in Winterson’s work, in The Stone Gods it appears to undergo the 
same transition in emphasis to a reaching for the real beyond the human, contributing to the 
broader quantum feel of the novel. If the novel lacks ‘vigorous speculations’, as Paul Di 
Filippo remarks, this may not all be down to a problem with ‘love’ as an intervention, but 
reflective too of the novel’s difficulties with establishing the posthuman subject.16
Scholars are often concerned with whether The Stone Gods takes a positive or negative 
view of humanity’s capacity to turn things around. Approaches vary considerably, with some 
focusing more on the novel’s typically Wintersonian aspects (love, sexuality, queering,
13 Jeanette Winterson often refers to her fiction as a ‘flying carpet’; for example see: Rosie Blau, ‘Lunch with FT: Jeanette 
Winterson’ (September 21,2007) <http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/48087864-6657-l ldc-9fbb
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2uKr2hSMM> [accessed 25 February 2014]; for a synopsis o f  critical approaches to Winterson’s 
work, see Sonya Andermahr in Jeanette Winterson: A Contemporary Critical Guide (London and NY: Continuum, 2007), p. 
4.
14 Donna Seaman, ‘The Stone Gods’, Booklist 29 (March 15,2008) <www.booklistonline.com> [accessed 16 November 
2012]; Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Head Cases’, The Guardian.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2007/sep/22/sciencefictionfantasyandhorror.fiction> [accessed 16 November 2012].
15 Julie Ellam, ‘Finding Love in a Dystopian Future’, The California Literature Review (June 14th, 2008) 
<http://calitreview.com/740> [accessed 7 July, 2012].
16 Paul Di Filippo, ‘The Stone Gods’ The Barnes and Noble Review (April 2™ 2008) 
<http://bnreview.bamesandnoble.com/t5/Reviews-Essays/The-Stone-Gods/ba-p/297> [accessed 7 July 2012].
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gender and difference), and others on its engagement with wider concerns (historical, social, 
political, and environmental). Positive readings tend to focus on the way the novel open up 
‘new narratives’, these being largely cognisant with the posthumanist solution of my reading, 
although differing in the final outcome.17 Hope Jennings, for example, although criticising the 
novel’s rejection of the present in favour of a ‘temporally distant (i.e. non-existent) and 
holistically natural world’, and its ‘representation of nature as inherently feminine’, reads The 
Stone Gods as offering, in the end, a ‘genuine passage toward beginning again differently’.18 
Similarly, Abigail Rine notes the novel’s pessimism with regard to the chances of our 
choosing to intervene in our own destructive cycles, but nonetheless sees the queered space 
opened up in the novel’s poetics as transformative, saying, ‘love makes poetry, and poetry can 
change the world’.19 Susan Onega’s reading is also positive, and shares some elements with 
mine. Onega focuses on the ‘neo-baroque’ poetics of The Stone Gods, associating its 
overflowing margins and its rejection of spatio-temporal limits with a Levinasian turn to 
other—an acknowledgement, she states, of ‘the traumatic character of our contemporary 
age’.20 Onega relates the space this opens up to Peter D. Ouspensky’s ‘doctrine of 
possibilities’, or the potential to choose a new course of action, via which old forms of 
repetition literally ‘disappear’.21 This might be thought in relation to Barad’s posthuman 
performativity, which sees the ‘intra-actions’ of self and other in quantum terms of 
‘becoming’, as I go on to discuss.22 However, Onega sees the novel as sustaining this sense of 
‘possibility’ through to its end; thus she describes Billie’s death in the closing pages as 
offering the ‘dream of a new start from the Edenic garden’.23 It is here that my reading differs 
from optimistic readings such as Onega’s. Instead, I see Billie’s death as retracting from, 
rather than verifying, the novel’s ‘new narratives’, which I read as narratives of death-facing, 
appearing rather as a failure to escape the interiority of the self.
Other less optimistic readings of The Stone Gods are also based upon the problem of 
Billie’s death. Scholars for whom the novel’s pessimism overtakes its utopian promise
17 Hope Jennings, ‘“A repeating world”: Redeeming the Past and Future In the Utopian Dystopia o f  Jeanette Winterson's The 
Stone Gods', Interdisciplinary Humanities, Utopia / Dystopia 27.2 (Fall 2010), 132-146 p. 133.
18 Jennings, p. 143.
19 Abigail Rine, ‘Jeanette Winterson’s Love Intervention’ Ben Davis and Jana Funke (eds), Sex, Gender and Time in Fiction 
and Culture (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011), pp. 84, 83.
20 Susana Onega, ‘The Trauma Paradigm and the Ethics o f Affect in Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods', DQR Studies in 
Literature 48.1 (2011), 265-298, p. 273. Here, Onega is making reference to her citations from: Jean-Michel Ganteau, ‘Rise 
from the Ground like Feathered Mercury: Baroque Citations in the Fiction o f Peter Ackroyd and Jeanette Winterson’, 
Symbolism: An International Journal o f  Critical Aesthetics, V  (Spring 2005), p. 134.
21 This doctrine is Ouspensky’s response to Nietzsche’s doctrine o f eternal return. Onega explains: ‘According to Nietzsche, 
the fixity o f recurrence negates any possibility o f  real change or evolution, as every individual is destined to relive his or her 
life over and over again’; but ‘...according to archaic thought, recurrence does not condemn human beings to the endless 
repetition o f the same mistakes. On the contrary, it grants them the possibility o f making a new start’. Onega, p. 279.
22 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfvvay.
23 Onega, p. 297.
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include Hwa Yi Xing and Adeline Johns-Putra. Hwa, following a reverse logic to that of 
Onega, remarks on Billie’s inability to ‘detach from the loss of her mother’, suggesting that 
Billie ‘remains bound to a singular narrative of origins that renders her unable to invest in any 
‘queer moment’.24 Johns-Putra, exploring love in the novel as intergenerational, observes that 
the ‘maternal’ love of Billie’s story fails to match that of the Cyborg (Spike). Therefore, she 
argues, while the novel may suggest the potential for ‘a way of knowing and caring about the 
world’, this is subsumed within ‘a model of inter-generational care’. Love becomes a 
‘nostalgic alternative’, ultimately ‘redundant’ against ‘the legacy of repeated human 
behaviours’.25 These readings acknowledge the world-making possibilities envisaged in the 
novel, yet depict them as unrealised—or perhaps even as unrealisable.
My reading has affinity with and supports those of both Johns-Putra and Hwa; 
however, I focus specifically on the novel’s depictions of death-facing, this in turn providing 
a view on its problematic ending. My starting point, as noted above, is based on the novel’s 
apparent appending of death-facing to the figure of the posthuman, primarily through the 
character of Robo sapiens. Spike. This is first contrasted, in the novel, with a death-avoiding 
transhumanism. It is then further complicated by a (re)emergent humanism, culminating in 
Billie’s death-facing moment (her narcissistic death in the final pages), seemingly rendering a 
posthuman death-facing problematic for the human subject.
Exploring death-facing as a paradigm within the domain of the posthuman brings it into a 
contemporary materialist and speculative arena wherein various aspects of the posthuman are 
theorised, although not necessarily under any claim to such a rubric. This focuses attention on 
an intersection between poststructuralism(s) and subsequent debates over the real and the 
abstract and corresponding questions of the human and nonhuman. I explore this intersection 
by applying the performative posthumanism described in Barad’s Meeting the Universe 
Halfway alongside Wolfe’s more recent What is Posthumanism?. Wolfe grounds his 
posthumanism in a conservation of Derrida’s logic of the gramme, which he applies to a 
reading of second order systems theory (and vice versa). This has some affinity, it can be 
argued, with the speculative materialism of Barad, despite Barad’s replacement of a reliance
24 Hwa Yi Xing ‘Holding on to a Lifeline: Desiring Queer Futurities in Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods', Alexa 
Athelstan and Rosemary Deller (eds) Theorising Futures, Graduate Journal o f  Social Science 9. 2 (July 2012): 131-154, p. 
148.
25 Adeline Johns-Putra, ‘Borrowing the World from our Children: Gender, Posterity and Well-being in the Climate Change 
Novel’ Plenary lecture. Literature, Ecology and Health Conference, AHRC-funded International Health Humanities Network. 
University o f Nottingham (30 March 2012).
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on language with an emphasis on ‘matter’ that ‘matters’.26 Both scholars in their own ways 
reach toward what Raoni Padui—referring to the aims of Quentin Meillassoux—describes as 
a desire to ‘reconnect philosophy to the “ great outside” of the inhuman and ultimately 
contingent world’.27 The struggle to achieve this, in philosophy today, creates what remains 
something of a force-field collision between poststructuralism’s conceptions of (human) 
language, and the un’think’able thingness of the world beyond the human. This conundrum 
feeds into various workings of the posthuman, and the corresponding question of what 
remains of the human in the posthuman.28
In What is Posthumanism? Wolfe outlines a correspondence between Derrida’s 
notions of ‘trace’ and ‘iterability’ and Niklas Luhmann’s reading of second order systems 
theory.29 Wolfe considers systems theory as a textual form whereby meaning is conferred in 
ways distinctly exterior to the human mental process, even where the human subject is 
positioned as such a system. This subject also has a relation with death. Central to the book, 
Wolfe states, is the key Derridean argument, ‘that iterability “introduces into self-presence 
from the beginning all the impurity putatively excluded from it,” a “corrupting” and 
“contaminating” force that “marks the essential and ideal limit of all pure idealization’” .30 The 
decentring function of deconstruction, described here, is next approached, in Wolfe’s reading, 
from the other side (as it were). Wolfe turns his focus to the reconstructive nature of systems 
theory, which he sees as being gestured toward—although not described—in Derrida’s 
deconstruction. This reconstructive nature of systems theory, Wolfe goes on to emphasise, 
helps us to see that the ‘disclosure of paradox does not in itself threaten the autopoiesis of 
social systems’.31 Rather, if we view the iterable events of the ‘trace’ in terms of systems 
theory, thus enfolding the radical heterogeneity of possibilities, such events function to open 
up the field of decidability. Or, put more simply, a system responds to the complexity of its 
environment by creating complexes for selection. And, because Wolfe specifies meaning as
26 Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding o f  How Matter Comes to Matter’, Signs 28. 3, 
Gender and Science: New Issues (Spring 2003), 801-831, p. 803.
27 Raoni Padui, ‘Realism, Anti-Realism, and Materialism’, Angelaki: Journal o f  the Theoretical Humanities, 16.2 (2011), 89- 
101, pp. 90-91.
28 For example see: Neil Badminton, Theorizing Posthumanism’, Cultural Critique 53 (Winter 2003), 10-27; or N. Katherine 
Hayles, ‘The Human in the Posthuman’, Cultural Critique 53, Posthumanism (Winter, 2003), pp. 134-137.
29 Hannes Bergthaller usefully glosses ‘second order’ with a view to establishing its implications: ‘It was first and foremost 
Heinz von Foerster who drew the radical conclusions which ensued once one accepted not only that such systems did indeed 
provide the basis for cognitive processes, but that furthermore researchers were only able to observe and describe them 
because they themselves were constituted in a like manner. For von Foerster, this realization entailed a shift from a 
“cybernetics o f observed systems” to a “cybernetics o f observing systems”, or, as he eventually came to refer to it, second- 
order cybernetics’. Hannes Bergthaller, ‘On Human Involution: Posthumanist Anthropology and the Question o f  Ecology in 
the Work o f Hans Blumenberg and Niklas Luhmann‘, New German Critique, ,The Challenge o f  Ecology to the Humanities: 
Posthumanism or New Humanism?1 ed. by Bernhard Malkmus and Heather Sullivan (forthcoming), p. 14.
30 Cary Wolfe, ‘Response to Christopher Peterson, “The Posthumanism to Come”,’ Angelaki: Journal o f  the Theoretical 
Humanities, 16:2 (2011), 189-193, p. 191.
31 Wolfe, What is Posthumanisml, p. 27.
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existing in ‘the event % meaning is therefore stated to occur within the ‘continuing 
actualization of potentialities’.32 A compatibility with Barad’s work appears at this point. 
Wolfe further points to Luhmann’s claim that ‘humans don’t communicate’33. 
Communication is not some psychic facility of the human mind, Wolfe explains, nor is it 
reliant on language; rather, it is ‘communication’ (the event) ‘that communicates’.34 Such an 
idea works from but also extends beyond Derrida’s approach, allowing meaning to appear to 
us, rather than always occurring in us. This further makes it possible to ‘link the complexities 
of meaning [...] to their biological, social and historical conditions of emergence and 
transformation’.35
Barad’s work has some correspondences with Wolfe’s but arises out of a quite 
different framework. Her work is extraordinary in scope, theorising—it seems—the whole 
universe. This also makes it a fruitful source of ideas for readers, writers and critics of books 
such as The Stone Gods, which similarly takes the (idea of the) whole of reality as its starting 
point. Barad is trained in theoretical particle physics and in Meeting the Universe Halfway she 
makes her starting point the work of Niels Bohr, whose quantum model of the atom won him 
the Nobel Prize.36 Barad produces from this an ambitious reworking of the ways we 
understand ourselves and the world. She formulates an ‘agential realist’ ontology, which 
results in her posthumanist performative account of discursive practices. For Barad, matter 
matters, and all discursive practices—by which she means ‘specific material (re)configurings 
of the world through which the determination of boundaries, properties and meanings is 
differentially enacted’—are forms of matter in its becoming.37 Barad uses the term ‘intra­
action’ (as differentiated from ‘interaction’) to explain agency as ‘an enactment’ rather than 
‘something that someone or something has’; hence ‘distinct agencies do not precede but rather 
emerge through their intra-action’.38 She stresses that agencies 'are only distinct in relation to 
their mutual entanglement; they don 7 exist as individual elements \ 39 Crucial to this is her 
notion of the ‘agential cut’, which is what ‘enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the 
inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy’.40 Put more simply, it is through specific
32 Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Paradox o f Observing Systems’ in Theories o f  Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions o f  
Modernity, ed. by William Rasch (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 65, quoted in Wolfe, What is 
Posthumanisml, p. 18.
33 Niklas Inhuman, ‘How Can The Mind Participate in Communication’ in Theories o f  Distinction, ed. by Rasch, p. 169, 
quoted in Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, p. 19.
34 Wolfe (explaining Luhmann; see notes 33 and 32 above), What is Posthumanism?, p. 19.
35 Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, p. 8.
36 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 138.
37 Ibid., p. 148.
38 Ibid., p. 178.
39 Ibid., p. 33 (emphasis m original).
40 Ibid., p. 140.
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intra-actions that relata-within-phenomena emerge. Relata, for Barad, do not pre-exist 
relations.41
Although the distinctions between Wolfe’s work and Barad’s are plain, certain 
correspondences also arise. Barad’s highly sophisticated account of ‘performative becoming’ 
seems gestured toward, although not developed, in Wolfe’s work. In particular, Barad’s 
‘resolution within the indeterminacy’—the ‘agential cut’ that is central to Barad’s approach— 
is comparable to, if more spatially derived than, Wolfe’s description of the ‘event’, which he 
perceives as external and out of which meaning arises. Wolfe also maintains a textual logic 
that Barad simply releases into a notion of ‘discursive material practices’, saying that, 
language ‘has been granted too much power’.42 This problem of how much power is—or 
ought to be—granted to language remains a major question for environmentalist (and other) 
theorists today, including Barad and Wolfe, who seek to theorise beyond it. In Wolfe’s case, 
his theorising beyond nonetheless sustains a textual form. He focuses on a compatibility 
between Derridean conceptions of literature and the nonhuman complexes of second order 
systems theory, in effect assigning to language a role that is not wholly human—this being in 
any case, arguably, Derrida’s intention too. Hence, while Barad insists that we need to get 
away from the habit of seeing the universe as grammatically structured, Wolfe’s approach 
seems to repeat such a habit. Nonetheless, this distinction between Barad and Wolfe begins to 
blur where one takes Barad as rejecting either naive forms of representationalism or the more 
extreme interpretations of Derrida’s conception of the text, and where one simultaneously 
notes the strict exteriority of Wolfe’s thesis. As Dietrich Schwanitz observes, both systems 
theory and the logic of the gram (or deconstruction) each ‘regard their fundamental operation 
(i.e., writing or communication, respectively) as an independent process that constitutes the 
subject rather than lets itself be constituted by it’.43 Hence what Wolfe shows is how the logic 
of the gram might pattern ‘the event’ through which Barad’s ‘discursive material practices’ 
move. In the end, Wolfe’s project and that of Barad share some important similarities, 
gesturing toward each other in sometimes surprisingly intimate ways, despite working from 
quite different frameworks. Their differing conceptions of language and text are illustrative of 
the continuing slipperiness of the language problem within a material turn of post-theory 
generally. Out of this arises the further point that to theorise beyond language is not always to
41 Ibid., p. 140.
42 Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity’, p. 801.
43 Dietrich Schwanitz, ‘Systems Theory According to Niklas Luhmann— its Environment and Conceptual Strategies’, 
Cultural Critique 30 (Spring 1995), p. 146, cited by Wolfe in What is Posthumanism?, p. 13.
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raise a polemic against high theory, since this theorising occurs within, as well as outside of, 
poststructuralist thought.
The ideas that link Wolfe’s and Barad’s work, along with the theoretical tensions that 
emerge between them, are also illustrative of aspects of the often undecided figure of the 
posthuman. These tensions revolve around such questions as what role language plays for the 
decentred subject, what implications the reconfiguring of the subject and object has for 
agency and identity, and what happens at the horizons of our knowing. Such questions sit in a 
borderland between material and abstract domains—a borderland within which both Wolfe 
and Barad’s work operate. Wolfe sustains but dehumanises a textual form of communication; 
Barad, differently, denies such distinctions, saying that her ‘framework for understanding’ the 
role of ‘the human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and natural and cultural factors in 
scientific and other social-material practices’ moves considerations ‘beyond the well-worn 
debates that pit constructivism against realism, agency against structure, and idealism against 
materialism’.44 The resultant de-focalising from such polemics is thus achieved in Barad’s 
work without falling into such traps as what she calls ‘mere intersubjectivity’.45
This leads us to consider a concern emphasised by Timothy Morton: that of the danger 
of a horizontalising, or erasure of differences, that threatens to appear in the posthuman. 
Morton sees the posthuman as ‘all too readily dematerialising the nonhuman’, thus as 
‘disastrously’ collapsing ‘the profound alterity of the strange stranger’.46 In Morton’s view, 
we can begin to know (or think we know) the unknowable, posing a risk for the posthuman 
whereby its decentring—which ought to generate an ethical levelling—instead newly 
endangers the nonhuman.47 New kinships switch from ‘failure to recognise’ to ‘false 
recognition’. Barad sees her ‘agential separability’ as ‘the ontological condition for 
objectivity’; thus, objectivity ‘is not sacrificed with the downfall of metaphysical 
individualism’.48 Rather, ontology is strengthened so that erasure of difference is avoided. 
Here, the image of the (human) posthuman might legitimately sustain a human ontology, 
while its decentring from human exceptionalism is at the same time sustained. This condition 
for the emergence of the object is also seen in the autopoietic systems Wolfe’s theory relies 
on, for these systems—as Hannes Bergthaller describes them—‘shut out the overwhelming 
complexity of the environment so as [to] elaborate ... islands of negentropy’.49 The question
44 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 26.
45 Ibid, p. 174.
46 Timothy Morton, ‘Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals’, Substance, 117,37. 3 (2008), 73-96, pp. 77-79.
47 Morton, ‘Ecologocentrism: Unworking Animals’, pp. 74-66.
48 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 174.
49 Bergthaller, ‘On Human Involution’, p. 17 [NB: Negentropy is the reverse o f  entropy].
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of how much of this object remains within the decentred posthuman is one of the most 
pressing questions for posthumanisms. It appears too, therefore, as a predicament that 
characterises its representations. Certainly, it is a question that seems inexorably to infringe 
upon the possibility of a posthuman solution in The Stone Gods.
The posthuman, while reflecting a disavowal of humanism’s arrogances and 
anthropocentrisms, also poses some dangers, even to the point of undermining the very 
possibilities for philosophising. As humans whose conceptions of the world exist in language, 
how might we, or, for that matter, might we self-conceptualise where these two identificatory 
categories, ‘human’ and ‘language’, are placed under erasure? In current scholarship, the 
need, not just to answer, but to also move beyond this question underlies the speculative turn 
in continental philosophy. Some scholars nonetheless insist on the human as starting point. 
For example, Morton remarks, with Slavoj Zizek, that, ideally ‘the deconstructive encounter 
between the human and the nonhuman or inhuman is the human’, while Claire Colebrook 
looks toward a ‘highly human inhumanity’, whereby we realise ‘both that there is no 
guarantee that we will be human and that it is human to forget oneself.50 Crucially, to make 
the human the starting point is not necessarily to place the human at the centre (of life, the 
world and so on). Bergthaller explains this well, saying that any autopoietic system ‘can only 
refer to its environment by simultaneously referring to itself; in other words, the self is 
understood as always implicated, but this need not amount to its elevation.51 The tension 
between two critical urges—to think the beyond of the human and to think the human in its 
beyond—is thus one means to understand the human / posthuman tension that increasingly 
impacts on the narrative of The Stone Gods.
If the death-facing paradigm sits at the point of conceptual rift between 
poststructuralism’s abstractions and subsequent efforts to conceptualise the real, Barad’s 
notion of material-discursive practices indicates how death-facing might enable the 
posthuman to recover the material while sustaining its discursivity. Wolfe, however, refines 
our understanding of this by designating two deaths in the posthuman, one of which is 
discursive but no longer human. Discussing what he calls Derrida’s ‘logic of double finitude’, 
he suggests that, in addition to the material death (or mortality) that we share with the 
nonhuman, the second form of finitude is a ‘not being able’, or a ‘radical passivity’.52 This
50 Slavoj Zizek, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, ed. by Eric Santner and Kenneth Reinhard (Chicago 
and London: University o f Chicago Press, 2005), 134-90, pp. 159-60, cited by Morton, ‘Ecologocentrism: Unworking 
Animals’, p. 81; Claire Colebrook ‘Framing the End o f the Species: Images Without Bodies’ Symploke, 21. 1-2 (2013), 51- 
63, p. 53.
51 Bergthaller, ‘On Human Involution’, p. 15.
52 Wolfe, What is Posthumanisml, p. xxviii.
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finitude derives, he says, from ‘the fundamental exteriority and materiality of meaning and 
communication itself, which includes ‘any form of semiotic marking and iterability to which 
both humans and nonhuman animals are subject in a trace structure’.53 Such a structure, 
‘exceeds and encompasses the human/animal difference’ as well as “‘the life/death relation” 
itself, meaning that this ‘radical passivity’ cannot be erased by any ‘analytic of finitude’ or 
‘existential being-toward-death’.54 Thus, it is not just material death or mortality that is shared 
by human and nonhuman alike, but a finitude that in effect renders all talk of death discursive, 
while at the same time devolving communication and meaning (discourse) from the interior 
self. If death-facing in Winterson’s posthuman is viewed both as an acceptance of mortality 
and as a ‘radical passivity’, then the posthuman solution must contain an acknowledgement 
that it has no solution as such (all solutions being anthropological and thus discursive). That 
being the case, this posthuman might declare that it embodies such an acknowledgement as 
the solution. Or—and this is precisely the tendency we see in Winterson’s and other fictional 
representations of the posthuman—it may instead retract into its centre, reclaiming the 
security of humanist discourses. By conceptualising the death-facing paradigm this way, I 
hope to provide a means to explore the posthuman figure of Spike, who largely escapes 
dualisms, but nonetheless illustrates the complexities involved in defining the ontological 
human in its relation to its world as a task of our time. In this sense, Spike also begins to 
illustrate a non-dualistic death-facing, reminding us perhaps of Derrida’s view of death as an 
aporia, whereby its borders are just habits of our thinking processes.55
The main storyline of The Stone Gods is carried across the novel’s three main parts through 
the characters of Billie and Spike and their differing incarnations. The overarching story is 
one of humanity’s repeated destruction of pristine worlds, while the question of the causes of 
such failures and the means to resolution is explored as an ongoing dialogue between Spike, 
Billie and the reader. The novel’s ingenuity lies in the way it presents reality as quantum. 
Since (as Spike tells Billie) ‘Everything is imprinted forever with what it once was’ (105), all 
that is needed for everything to change is some form of intervention. The two questions at the 
heart of the novel, therefore, are: What form might this intervention take (Spike calls it 
‘love’), and why, given that we—humanity—could so easily do so, do we not choose to 
intervene in our own repeating behaviours?
53 Ibid., p. xxviii
54 Ibid., p. xxviii.
55 Derrida, Aporias.
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Each of the novel’s three main parts depicts a repetition of this story of humanity’s 
hubris, each also ending with a death—that of Spike and Spikkers in parts one and two, and 
that of Billie in part three. Part one, Planet Blue, focuses on the late stages of human life on 
Orbus, a technology-driven world presided over by three dominant powers, of which the 
Central Power (the dominant political West) monopolises control over the planned relocation 
to Planet Blue, funded by the all-powerful corporation, MORE. Spike is the (beautiful) female 
Robo sapiens who entices female and human Enhancement Officer and eco-rebel, Billie, with 
her philosophising and amorous advances. Both find themselves aboard the Central Power’s 
space mission to prepare Planet Blue for inhabitation. Part two, Easter Island, then provides a 
retelling of the historical Easter Island event, depicting an act of ecocide: the felling of the last 
tree on Easter Island by its indigenous population. Spike is recast as the male Spikkers, who 
intimately befriends Billy when he is marooned on the island. Parts three and four, Post-3 
War and Wreck City, finally return us to an alternative future on Orbus, where, following a 
nuclear attack, political collapse and corporate takeover by MORE have led to acute social 
division and violent confrontation. Spike resumes Robo sapiens form, and is again placed in 
intimate connection with a female Billie, who is employed by the corporation MORE to teach 
Spike what it means to be human. In this last dual section, however, the ongoing dialogue 
between Spike and Billie, in the last instance, takes over, culminating in the story of Billie’s 
death. Billie’s longing for the mother who gave her up for adoption (Winterson herself was 
adopted) entwines the events of her birth and death into a homecoming that leaves all worldly 
issues behind.
Planet Blue
The novel’s initial portrayal of death-evasion occurs in part one, appearing in the narrative 
space created by the deferral of humanity’s otherwise inevitable demise. Portrayed in this 
space is a critique of late-capitalism on Planet Orbus. The Central Power intends to relocate 
its citizens to Planet Blue, since all possibilities for human survival will expire in fifty years 
due to planetary exploitation. This assumption, however, that humanity can simply start again 
on another planet demonstrates death as being placed on a perpetual plane of avoidance. The 
corresponding transhumanist desire for perfection and immortality, meanwhile, is depicted as 
being driven by a dumbing-down of the population in the interests of monopolising 
corporations. On Orbus, the Central Power regulates the wellbeing of its citizens and the
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bio-enhancements ensure the perfect body, while genetic fixing keeps everyone young. Even
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happiness is structured into the system, with Enhancement and if necessary Enforcement 
Officers in place to attend to those for whom happiness does not flourish. Yet, as Billie 
explains, ‘making everyone young and beautiful also made us all bored to death with sex’ 
(31). Disillusionment has become rife, while the encroaching end of planetary capacities is 
pressurising the system. Despite having ‘made itself rich’ by ‘polluting the rest of the world’ 
(37), the Central Power also blames the Eastern Caliphate and SinoMoscow Pact for ongoing 
planetary degradation, while relying on surveillance to manage its citizens. Depicted here is a 
dystopian transhumanism, which renders its own desire for perfection and immortality 
unsustainable, both in relation to internal and external affairs and to the planetary home. This 
is of no concern, of course, to the Central Power, who, through its associations with MORE 
has the financial and technological resources to abandon the planet and colonise a new one, 
thereby enabling life (so it is believed, only for those who can afford the trip) to continue. In 
this section I explore the way Spike’s emergent posthumanism is brought alongside the 
dystopian transhumanism of part one. I illustrate, too, the way questions already begin to 
appear to do with an unfinished humanism and its role in relation to the posthuman figure. In 
the course of the novel, this lingering human subject eventually comes to undermine, without 
necessarily opposing, Spike’s posthuman solution.
Important to this first section—and indeed to the novel as a whole—is its manipulation of an 
indeterminacy of meanings, where such meanings relate to the ways we conceptualise 
ourselves as subjects. This is particularly relevant to the distinctions and crossovers, in this 
section, between transhumanism, posthumanism, and humanism. An example of this might be 
drawn in relation to the problem of freedom, as discussed in the introduction to this 
dissertation.56 Freedom of course has associations with humanist discourses and the liberal 
stance. This makes it a key component of transhumanism, where transhumanism is 
understood—in Wolfe’s words—as an intensification of humanism (see note 5 above). The 
transhumanist vision depicted in The Stone Gods includes the supposition that humans can 
overcome ‘the constraints of the natural world’.57 Citizens of the Central Power strive to 
achieve this through various bodily manipulations, even seeking to overcome the ultimate 
constraint of death, both through genetic fixing of age and through the planned relocation to 
another world. The novel, however, not only depicts but also undermines this freedom. The 
citizens—or some at least—become bored with the perfection of youth; meanwhile, the all-
56 See discussions in Introduction on conflicts in nineteenth-century notions o f freedom, pp. /-9.
57 Cranston, p. 6 (citing Lord Acton, 1907).
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important relocation to Planet Blue fails, since the mission to prepare the way accidentally 
renders the planet inhospitable for centuries to come. The freedom of immortality is thus 
shown to be a dream that fills the pockets of corporations, rather than fulfilling the lives of 
citizens. This is contrasted in the novel with a reverse form of freedom, which begins to form 
a subtext layer of alternative subject positions. Here (recalling Cranston), humanity needs to 
be freed, not from the constraints of ‘nature’, but from ‘the constraints of [...] civilisation’.58 
The presence of this second freedom alongside the first seems indicative of a strand of 
thinking in contemporary humanism / posthumanism debates, reminding us of Lewis 
Hinchman’s views on humanism, which is that it ‘does not need to denigrate nature and treat 
it as a sphere of heteronomy in order to validate freedom’; rather a capacity for freedom is 
what might ‘liberate us’ through both ‘self-reflection and political deliberation’ ‘from 
reification and blind, fate-like processes’.59 If freedom can mean either the capacity to release 
ourselves from entrenchment in destructive behaviours or the freedom to indulge in them, 
then ‘freedom’ as an idea is easily misconstrued. While this draws attention to the way the 
novel blurs the -isms of humanism and transhumanism—before contrasting them with a 
posthumanist perspective—it also replicates the ways meanings are blurred throughout the 
novel as a whole.
Part one’s central focus on transhumanism and an emergent posthumanism is thus 
complicated from the outset by a competing humanism and related questions. This issue is 
explored in particular through the character of Pink McMurphy. Near the beginning of part 
one, the shallow and brash Pink is appealing for the right to reverse her age to thirteen 
because her husband is attracted to young girls. However, once removed from her 
embeddedness in the social body (she wins a place on the space mission), she begins to 
display some unexpected strengths of character. While she continues to disclose a problematic 
anthropocentrism, particularly in her insistence on Spike’s nonhumanness, Pink also begins to 
produce the kinds of qualities that Hinchman argues are characteristic of the early 
environmentalist movement, ‘notions of individuality, dignity, autonomy and self- 
government’, which he also describes as humanistic.60 Pink’s attitude toward the pristine, 
nonhuman landscape of Planet Blue, although remaining pragmatic, gradually becomes less 
disdainful the more she familiarises herself with it. This seems in some ways reminiscent of 
Snowman’s gradual identification with the world of his arrival, in Atwood’s trilogy.61 When
58 Cranston, p. 6.
59 Lewis P. Hinchman and Sandra K. Hinchman, ‘Should Environmentalists Reject the Enlightenment? The Review o f  
Politics 63.4 (Autumn, 2001), 663-692, pp. 16,25.
60 Hinchman, ‘Is Environmentalism a Humanism?’ p. 4.
61 See Chapter Two, pp. 63-64; see also discussions in relation to Judith Butler, pp. 53-54.
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the mission accidentally destroys the new planet’s biospheric stability, it is also Pink who 
outdoes Billie in her ability to cope emotionally with the foreknowledge of imminent death. 
This linking of humanist characteristics with death-facing not only aligns it with a particular 
understanding of freedom (the capacity of the self to produce efficacious responses), but also 
raises the point that pragmatic death-facing is a feature of secular humanisms too, marking a 
point of distinction between humanism and its intensification in the figure of the transhuman 
(see note 5 above). This depiction of Pink thus presents a question as to whether it is 
humanism that is the problem or centric behaviour more generally—in this case 
anthropocentrism.
If this episode with Pink raises a question early on in the novel about the human in the 
posthuman, it nonetheless becomes peripheral as the posthuman comes to take centre stage. 
The transhumanist assumptions on which the Central Power builds its hegemonic forces are 
quickly overlaid with Spike’s posthumanist philosophising and the boundary-crossing love 
between Spike and Billie. Built by the Central Power to accompany space missions, at the 
start of the novel Spike is undergoing an information-drain prior to being dismantled. Billie, 
as Enhancement Officer, has the opportunity to interview her about Planet Blue, and the two 
of them quickly form an understanding. Robo sapiens are programmed—Spike tells Billie 
once they have disabled transmission—to evolve. This indicates a performativity strongly 
characteristic of Spike. She then asks Billie to help her escape. The connection formed 
between these two at this point is sustained throughout the novel, not only across boundaries 
of gender and the ontological categories of human and machine, but across Billie and Spike’s 
different incarnations, and thus across boundaries of life and death too.
The continuity produced in this sustained bond reinforces one of the key principles of 
Spike’s posthumanism: that of the universe as imprint. ‘You are part of the imprint’ she tells 
Billie; ‘it imprints you, you imprint it. You cannot separate yourself from the imprint, and you 
can never forget it. It isn’t a “something”, it is you’ (105). Even death, it seems, does not 
interrupt this continuity. Among the ship’s crew’s stories about planets trashed and 
abandoned, one is that of the White Planet, which still exists as ‘a raging death\ a planet that 
has both ‘been killed' and yet 'rages to be dead' (62). This quantum continuity has no linear 
existence. It might be thought, rather, in terms of the iterability Wolfe designates to his 
reconstructive posthumanism, while the inseparability of self and imprint Spike speaks of 
might remind us of the performative becoming described by Barad, whereby agencies emerge 
through their intra-action. Illustrated in these refusals of the life / death binary, in the novel’s 
imagery, is a reference to meaning’s exteriority, demonstrating how the narrative reaches, 
with the speculative materialists, toward the ‘desire to ‘reconnect philosophy to the “ great
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outside”  of the inhuman and ultimately contingent world’.62 Spike both expounds and 
embodies this performative posthumanism, while its emergence alongside the backdrop of a 
dystopian transhumanism invites the reader to acknowledge the moment, described by Wolfe, 
at which ‘humanity’s imbrications in networks become impossible to ignore’.63 Spike 
maintains this discourse of posthuman performativity right through to her death, which she 
faces with complete equanimity—death being, for her, just a form of recycling. Thus her 
death is itself another iteration of performative becoming, her life forming an indelible 
imprint, producing a posthuman death-facing that seems wholly to overlay the death-denial of 
a more transhumanist mode.
Spike proposes that humanity might achieve this posthuman performativity, and thus 
halt further cycles of destructive behaviour, through her intervention of ‘love’. According to 
Spike, this is a ‘quantum universe’, which is ‘neither random nor determined’ (75). Thus, if 
‘love’ were to enact the ‘resolution within the phenomenon’ (Barad’s ‘agential-cut’; see note 
40 above), destruction might be replaced with new and reconstructive ways of being. As 
Spike herself says to Billie, love ‘is an experiment’: ‘What happens next is always surprising’ 
(81). Viewed in relation to the problem of death-evasion, ‘love’ can seem a plausible solution. 
In parts one and two, it is the strength of Spike’s love—her love for Billie, but also her love 
for life and the world in all its complexity—that enables her to accept death’s inevitability. If 
this performative love is what enables a posthuman death-facing, then love must, accordingly, 
overcome the destruction to which death-denial gives rise. Jennings takes such a stance, 
seeing ‘love’ in The Stone Gods as being that which is ‘capable of resisting the totalizing 
claims of a society's internalized death-drive and its repression of difference’.64 Love and 
death are also, of course, inexorably linked in the human psyche; Winterson herself describes 
love as ‘the only force strong enough to pit against death’.65 However, for all that love might 
seem an enticing solution, it is also problematic. Given love’s unreliability—not to mention 
the scale of its task—such a solution can simply appear as naive. In The Stone Gods, Spike’s 
love intervention, in any case, loses traction as the novel goes on; hence, there is clearly an 
issue to investigate.
The novel’s undermining of Spike’s love solution is subtle and incomplete, appearing 
mainly as a questioning of the -isms by which we understand the ontological human. This
62 Raoni Padui, ‘Realism, Anti-Realism, and Materialism’, Angelaki: Journal o f  the Theoretical Humanities 16:2 (2011), 89- 
101, pp. 90-91.
63 Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, p. xv.
64 Jennings, p. 140.
Jeanette Winterson, column ‘July 2004’. Available at the Jeanette Winterson website: 
<http://www.jeanettewinterson.com/column/july-2004/> [accessed 22 June 2013].
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questioning first appears through the character of Pink, who depicts an ability to face death 
that seems to strengthen the ontological self. Such a death-facing pits humanism against 
posthumanism as a feature of both. We might liken it to Barad’s idea that ‘agential 
separability’ is the ‘ontological condition for objectivity’, since Pink’s active and agential 
acceptance of death more successfully sustains the self as distinct object than does Billie’s 
more passive death-facing in the novel’s final pages.66 Pink’s strength, which she seems able 
to draw upon once freed from hegemonic forces and immersed in nature on the pristine Planet 
Blue, thus seems to set up a challenge to Spike’s posthuman solution. It also raises the 
possibility that the human is always in some way present, whether in humanist or 
posthumanist subjecthood.
Pink also challenges Spike’s posthumanism in philosophical terms, although her 
success here is limited. This arises in relation to a dialogue between Billie and Spike about the 
distinctions between humans and machines. Spike has just kissed Billie, and Billie is 
concerned about the implications of a human / android romance. Spike asks her whether she 
thinks human life is ‘biology or consciousness?’ saying, ‘You locate yourself in 
consciousness, and I, too, am a conscious being’ (76). However, when Pink arrives, 
interrupting the moment of intimacy, she challenges this theoretical levelling. Responding to 
Billie’s announcement that they are discussing ‘the differences between Robo sapiens and 
Homo sapiens, Pink retorts: ‘You think too much .., it’s obvious -  cut me and I bleed’ (77). 
She then adds to this biological claim by saying that Spike, as an android, is unable to feel 
(human) emotion. Pink thus sets out a classic Cartesian stance, which Spike takes the 
opportunity to counter. Spike accordingly lays out a classic posthumanist claim, which is that 
practices such as genetic modification and bio-enhancement function to blur previously 
distinct human / nonhuman differentiations. ‘A human being now is not what a human being 
was even a hundred years ago’, Spike tells her; ‘[s]o what is a human being?’ (77). Spike 
backs this up by referring to anthropocentrism. ‘There are many kinds of life’ she remarks; 
‘Humans always assumed that theirs was the only kind that mattered’ (79).
This dialogue functions to weaken Pink’s humanist challenge to Spike. She is left 
depicting the philosophical difficulty faced by a centred (humanist) stance when attempting to 
allocate such properties as consciousness, rationality, and so on, to possible minds and entities 
beyond the self. As a result, she is unable to consider the human and the nonhuman in 
comparable terms. While Pink’s thinking rests on longstanding Platonic ideals, Spike stands 
for the possibility that Pink is wrong, and in doing so locates Pink as representing a hubris
66 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 175.
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that might result in harm to humans or nonhumans, in genocide or ecocide. This foregrounds 
the ethical significance of theoretical posthumanisms that seek an ontological outside to the 
emergence of meaning.
As a result of Pink’s philosophical interrogations, Spike’s own interest in what it is to 
be human, however, increases—an interest that develops, it seems, as the novel goes on. This 
gesture of a movement toward the human raises a complex of issues. While it seems 
reasonable to assume that the diminishing of difference between human and nonhuman works 
both ways (an android might become more human, or vice versa), this also points to a 
horizontalising effect whereby difference is erased. However, Spike’s increasing emphasis on 
the human might alternatively be considered in relation to the point made by Morton and 
Colebrook—that the human is the necessary starting point for the human. To recall 
Bergthaller, ‘any autopoietic system’ in order to refer to its world does so by simultaneously 
referring to itself.67 While the nonhuman Spike seems an inappropriate candidate to 
demonstrate such a point, as an object in the mind of the human reader she nonetheless must 
take on a human subjecthood if she is to depict what Morton, Colebrook and Bergthaller point 
to. In this, Spike seems to demonstrate a difficulty for fictional depictions of the posthuman 
figure, since it both contains and reaches beyond the human.
Following Pink’s challenge, Spike’s entanglement with the question of human 
subjecthood increases. In order to experience emotion, particularly what it is to love, Spike 
learns to interpret poetry. The effect of this is manifold. On one hand it places her into parity 
with Pink by establishing an interiority of self. This brings the human into the posthuman and 
blurs the categories of humanism and posthumanism. It also, rather more problematically, 
defines interiority in terms of (supposedly) human characteristics. On the other hand, Spike’s 
moving closer to the human effectively and paradoxically (again, as an effect of fictional 
representation) increases the clarity and success of her depiction as posthuman. Her discovery 
of emotion, in particular ‘love’, demonstrates her ability to reach beyond herself, to take on 
meanings that are not her own from that which is external to her subjective experience. This 
relies on a profoundly posthuman assumption, which is that, as Wolfe (applying Luhmann) 
puts it, ‘meaning communicates’; that is, the event out of which meaning arises is exterior to 
the human.68 If it were wholly interior, it would not be derivable outside of the human, and 
the Cyborg as a creature of meaning would vanish. In this sense, Spike’s portrayal of the 
performative posthuman is exceptionally drawn, her choice of ‘love’ as intervention aptly
67 Bergthaller, ‘On Human Involution’, p. 15.
68 Wolfe, What is Posthumanism?, pp. 18-19.
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symbolising a posthumanist urge that drives contemporary theory—the urge to encounter 
what Morton describes as ‘the strange stranger’.69 Spike, then, not only expounds but 
successfully embodies a means to theorise beyond the human. Nonetheless, her engagement 
with poetry also signals the appearance of a potential difficulty.
Spike’s engagement with poetry as a means to experience her ‘love’ intervention is, of 
course, no innocent method, since it raises questions about the role and function of literature. 
Not only is there the difficulty of language as a contested means of differentiation between the 
human and the nonhuman; there is also the question of the relationship between text and the 
world. Spike’s actions thus set up an interrogation of poststructuralist assumptions, moving 
her one step towards a site of conflict, whereby formalisms might run aground as categories 
of the real appear. Thus, as she depicts the posthuman, Spike also points to some of the 
tensions and difficulties out of which the idea of the posthuman arises. Her use of poetry in 
establishing her posthuman solution places this now poetic solution at the vortex of debate, 
giving way to divisions in thought with regard to literature’s role. She seems thus to both 
sustain posthuman possibilities and disclose the underlying complexities upon which these 
possibilities rest.
This complicates any examination of the loss of traction that eventually undermines 
Spike’s posthumanism, since, effectively, such a loss cannot fully be determined within Spike 
herself. Her posthuman encounter with (human) language is problematic, if only to the extent 
that one takes a formal approach to language. At the same time, or therefore, an explanation 
becomes apparent (on a poststructuralist reading) in relation to the concept of ‘love’. Love’s 
meaning simply cannot, of course, be fixed. For Spike, ‘love’ is an expression of her care for 
the world and its inhabitants; as Johns-Putra notes, her love is also a Cyborg love.70 However, 
as becomes apparent in parts two and three, Billie’s expression of ‘love’ is quite differently 
oriented. It exists on a far more personal level; consequently love, for Billie, involves loss and 
pain as well as joy. In Barad’s and in Wolfe’s work, undecidability translates as the process of 
an iterative or performative becoming, with language being one more unit in this material- 
discursive process out of which meaning arises. Love takes many forms, in literature as in 
life, and so produces many meanings—a point that sustains the poststructuralist insight while 
reducing its reliance on text. In bringing literature into play, Spike also brings with it the 
endless possibilities of the human subject and its archive, and perhaps necessarily so, since 
her intervention is tied to the question of humanity’s hubris in a not just human world. This
69 Timothy Morton. The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 14 -15 ,1 7 -1 9 ,3 8 -5 8 .
70 Johns-Putra, ‘Borrowing the World from our Children’.
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returns us, nonetheless, to the difficulty of how love might provide a sustained response to 
environmental crisis. It seems that for Spike’s ‘love’ to mean something, it must be viewed 
within the posthuman frame that she provides. The ‘love’ Spike demonstrates relies on a 
performative becoming, not just of the self but of the universe in all its fullness; hence it relies 
on the ability of the self to embrace not just life but death.
Spike comments directly on the problem of human death-fear in part one, tying it— 
like love—to poetry. Correlating humanity’s death-fear with a fear of the void, Spike sees 
literature as playing a key role in countering such fear. Part one ends with Spike’s death, 
whereby she gives her life over to love. This love is her love for Billie, since it enables Billie 
to go on. But it is at the same time a love for the world in its becoming. Spike demonstrates 
this love to Billie, expressing it through her openness to death. Spike equates love with a 
willingness to give up the self. She also sees life as an imprint; for Spike, the universe is 
always becoming and she participates in this becoming, even in her death. Spike sees poetry 
as offering a means by which humans, too, might come to face death, by providing a means to 
overcome fears of the void. Prior to Spike’s death, at the point when the mission to Planet 
Blue fails (the asteroid, aimed at it to rid it of dinosaurs, hits too soon and too hard), the ship’s 
captain, Handsome, in conversation with Spike, laments: ‘Poetry didn’t save us, did it?’ (95). 
However, Spike replies:
‘Not once but many times.’
Handsome smiled. ‘You think so?’
‘It was never death you feared. It was emptiness.’
Handsome nodded. ‘That’s because there’s no such thing 
as empty space. Only humans are empty.’
‘Not all of them.’
‘And not all of them are humans’. (95)
Here, as Spike makes a distinction between ‘emptiness’ and ‘death’, it follows that what she 
is referring to is the human need for meaning, out of which she derives ‘love’ (since it is 
through poetry that she learns to love). Spike therefore sees literature as negating not just 
death but emptiness, by creating meaning. The distinction Spike makes here is that the human 
needs meaning in order to face death. She seems to reiterate Derrida’s inferences that our
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trespassing of death’s border seems unavoidable, even if it is nothing more than ‘trespass’.71 
To acknowledge the ‘possibility’ of ‘impossible’ death dispassionately, one would need to be 
(like Spike) a machine of sorts. Yet, since Spike too derives meaning from literature, learning 
what it is to love, it becomes part of her posthuman solution. Thus, she both becomes human 
and assigns to her posthuman solution the ontological human.
Easter Island
Part two transports the reader, somewhat unexpectedly, out of the future-contemporary 
concerns of part one and into a cautionary retelling of the Easter Island event. Stylistically, the 
mood changes from one of linguistic excess to a staid eighteenth-century prose befitting our 
new narrator, Billy. As the section opens, Captain Cook’s Resolution has landed on Easter 
Island, and, following a clash between the ship’s crew and the island’s peoples, Billy is 
separated from his shipmates and his ship sets sail without him. The island is heavily 
deforested and inhabited by two warring tribes. Billy, who is soon caught up in their 
confrontations, is shocked to find himself witnessing, first, the felling of the last tree on the 
island by the dominant group—wood being a resource tied up with their cosmological 
beliefs—and then the toppling of an enormous stone god as one group seeks to destroy the 
other’s ‘Mana’. This toppling of ‘stone gods’ thus forms the motif for the novel’s 
representation of humankind’s repeating patterns of destruction; while its depiction of the 
Easter Islands event also counters commonplace associations between ecological harmony 
and the ‘noble savage’. Humankind’s repetition of destructive patterns is presented as a 
possibility for any human individual or group, of any era or location. The stone gods also 
represent the focal point of power around which such destruction unfolds. Billie and Spike, 
now recast as Billy and Spikkers, again provide the narrative means by which these issues are 
considered, and also provide an exploration of the means and capacities of the human subject 
to respond. Spikkers, in part two, is now a Friday figure who safeguards Billy and teaches 
him about the island and its inhabitants; meanwhile Billy’s love becomes the encouragement 
Spikkers needs to carry out his cherished plan, by which he intends to return the island to 
ecological wellbeing.
My focus in this section is on two elements of the Billy and Spikkers story. The first is 
the influence Billy’s love has on Spikkers’ actions, and the second is Spikkers’ plan itself,
71 ‘Trespass’ is Derrida’s term for the mental crossing o f  a border that has no acmai existence, see  Introduction, p. 42, and 
Chapter Three, p. 89; see also Derrida, Aporias, p. 24.
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which is to restore the Ariki man, leader of one of the island’s two warring tribes. Revered by 
the islanders, the Ariki Man is able to ‘fly with the Dead, and bring visions to the Living’ 
(130). However, the island is currently controlled by the Bird Man, who rules through 
intimidation and monopolising food sources. This sets up a contrast between death-facing (the 
Ariki Man) and death-denial (The Bird Man) as a socio-political concern. Billy’s love for 
Spikkers thus also plays a role in supporting his quest to reinstate an ecological death-facing. 
However, Billy’s cynicism as to the chances of Spikkers’ success is proved right when 
Spikkers meets his death, and the plan fails.
The Easter Island section has received little critical attention to date, but nonetheless offers 
some useful correlations with our discussions so far. The stories behind the warring tribes 
offer metaphorical illustrations of the death-facing paradigm and support Spikker’s 
corresponding response. Meanwhile, questions about love and death reappear, shifting in a 
direction that will continue to influence the events of the novel’s final section. Where the 
posthuman intervention is destabilised in part one, the undecidability of love’s meanings now 
begins to impact on the narrative, in particular in the ways Billy’s experiences of ‘love’ differ 
to those of Billie Crusoe in part one. While Billie and Billy are each justifiably cynical about 
humankind, Billy’s cynicism in part two is placed in tension with his love for Spikkers, whose 
death he must witness as a result of supporting his plan. Although he is less willing (than 
Billie) to accept the philanthropic nature of Spikkers’ ‘love’, he nonetheless loves Spikkers in 
a way that frees him to tackle his important task. Hence, when unfolding events result in 
Spikkers’ death, Billy’s experience of ‘love’ becomes that of the tragic loss of his lover, 
whom he longs to regain. This raises questions about the links between Spike’s love 
intervention and a corresponding ecological death-facing, which in part two seems 
overshadowed by a justified cynicism.
Certain shifts in the depictions of the two main characters in this section are worth 
noting, at least in passing, at this point. Following (Robo sapiens) Spike’s increasing 
engagement with the human in part one, she is now recast as human and also switches gender 
to become the male Spikkers. Billie retains human form, but is now recast as the male Billy. 
The love these two characters share now becomes more particularly a human love, although 
their continuing homosexuality nonetheless replicates a Cyborgian boundary-crossing. This 
mid-novel humanising and re-gendering of the novel’s two main characters seems in some 
sense to add to the novel’s overall diminishing of its posthuman solution, particularly in 
relation to the ways love is conceived. Nonetheless, Spikkers sustains much of Spike’s 
ecological envisioning, his openness to the bigger picture appearing as recognisably
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posthuman, whilst Billy, for all his cynicism, similarly sustains many of Billie’s sentiments— 
notably in his abhorrence of the destruction he sees on the island; ‘mankind’, he observes, 
‘wherever found [...] cannot keep any purpose for much length of time, except the purpose of 
destroying himself (132). However, we also see, in Billy, something of a step back from the 
possibilities of posthuman performativity. Not unlike Snowman in Atwood’s trilogy and the 
father in The Road, Billy projects a personal mode that is singular and interiorised. Despite 
being acutely aware of the destruction he sees around him, reflecting on it frequently as 
narrator, he also seems largely passive in relation to it. An exception to this is seen in the 
generosity of his love for Spikkers; yet this seems only to lead to failure, death and loss.
To an extent, Spikkers also represents a reduction in performative possibility. He is 
caught up in his dreams of a ‘back time’, when the islanders lived only by ‘the word of [...] 
the Ariki Man’, a time when ‘the god MakeMake had filled the island with forests and springs 
and fishes and birds so that no man could want who could stretch out his hand’ (132). That 
the Ariki Man both ‘flies with the dead’ and facilitates ecological abundance clearly correlates 
death-facing with environmental wellbeing. Yet, his influence notably lies in the past, perhaps 
reminding us of Philippe Aries’ observations of a ‘tame’ death that has now been replaced by 
a death that is ‘wild’.72 The Bird Man of the present—who ironically cannot fly—is bent on 
acquisition and control and destroys the island’s habitat. But every year an annual Egg Race 
competition is held, via which the leadership of the ‘Bird Man cult’ is decided for the year 
ahead. Spikkers’ dream, he tells Billy, is to enter this competition and ‘win back for the old 
gods the rights of the new power’ (134). If he can win on behalf of the Ariki Man, he 
explains, then the civil war will end, the ‘trees will grow and the birds will return’ (135). 
Spikkers’ dream, then, is to overthrow the present hegemonic order in favour of an egalitarian 
and ecologically sound form of governance. Spikkers’ difficulty, which he fails to notice but 
Billy foresees, is that his only route to achieving this is through the mechanisms of a 
competition that turns out to favour those already in power. This of course replicates the self- 
perpetuating nature of late corporate capitalism as we currently experience it, while placing 
Spikkers in a position of naivety. A problem thus arises for Spikkers, as for Aries, which is 
that life represents struggle (since death is always there) in any era or location; one cannot just 
swap the present for the past. Nor is it just a matter of winning the Egg Race, since the 
struggle is with the Egg Race itself. This further complicates death-facing in ways that only 
become clear in Chapter Five, discussed in relation to Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide. 
Nonetheless, Spikkers’ actions do have significance.
72 Aries, pp. 8 ,10.
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Importantly, it is because of Billy’s ‘love’ and encouragement that Spikkers finds the 
courage to accomplish his long-held dream. This provides an instance of verification of love 
as intervention, no matter what the eventual outcome. Complexities of course feed into this 
situation. Although Billy is appalled, like Spikkers, by the plight of the island and its peoples, 
and by humankind’s capacity to ‘destroy the very thing he needs most’ (125), his support of 
Spikkers’ plan is principally an expression of his personal love for Spikkers rather than of his 
care for the world. At the same time, had Billy not arrived in Spikkers’ life, Spikkers may not 
have found conviction he needed to intervene in the wider picture. Billy’s love thus activates 
an already latent possibility, meaning that any form of love retains at least the potential to 
effect a change in relation to social and ecological devastation.
This effectively equates the personal with the political via an intra-active process. 
Barad’s concept of agential intra-action illustrates that, rather than seeing love (that of Billy 
for Spikkers) as just an emotional force, we might view this love as the event that performs 
the ‘agential cut’ (see note 40 above). Viewed this way, the ‘event’ of Billy’s love for 
Spikkers itself performs the ‘resolution within the indeterminacy’ (ibid.), which itself is the 
intervention; whereas the emotional experience—whether of Billy or Spikkers and however it 
materialises—is the conditional and variable state of those participants as they come together 
in the world. The distinction is subtle, but (I think) recaptures the meaning that Spike (in part 
one) seems to intend: that of an action / occurrence (event) that arises from a state of desire 
for the wellbeing of other (as opposed to malevolence, self-interest and so on). The 
significance of this distinction has already been proposed by Johns-Putra in her recent article 
on care ethics, in which she applies a new materialist approach. Johns-Putra defines ‘care’ as 
‘a feeling of concern for the wellbeing and needs of others’ and ‘care ethics’ as ‘an ethical 
position that takes this affective concern as its basis for action’.73 Correspondingly, we might 
say that Spike uses ‘love’ to derive ‘love as intervention in a quantum world’.74 Johns-Putra 
argues that ‘care’ is not static (ontic) but ontological, where ontology is defined in terms of 
Barad’s ‘agential realism’, thereby imparting a ‘radical, dynamic and local quality ... to 
ontology’. Care is therefore, Johns-Putra clarifies, ‘not the means by which agency occurs, but 
is itself agential’.75 On Johns-Putra’s argument, Billy and Spikkers’ ‘love’ thus is understood 
as agential, rather than simply being the means by which agency occurs. So the event of Billy
73 Adeline Johns-Putra, ‘Environmental Care Ethics: Notes toward a New Materialist Critique’ Symploke, p. 125.
74 This is a hypothetical transference o f ideas for the purposes o f  illustration; however while ‘care’ and ‘love’ can be said to 
overlap in certain ways (we may care about those we love, and we may love those we care about), and to be similarly 
contingent upon many contextualising matters, there are o f course differences between them, in particular that ‘love’ is an 
emotion that can have a force o f its own.
75 Johns-Putra, ‘Environmental Care Ethics’ p. 126.
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loving Spikkers changes something; it is a performative intervention that influences—or, 
more specifically, participates in—the world in its becoming.
Importantly, however—as Johns-Putra says of the care response—this ‘love’ is also 
always contingent.76 As an ontological unit within the coming together of material-discursive 
practices, it arises out of, and into, a mesh of possibilities. This way of conceptualising ‘love’ 
impacts on our understandings of Spike’s intervention. Billy’s love for Spikkers (as ‘agential 
cut’) is understood as contingent upon such matters as his personality, his feelings and 
responses, and the many details that make up circumstance and context of this ‘love’. The 
same applies to Spikkers’ response to Billy in return. It so happens, in this case, that Billy’s 
love encourages Spikkers, and he responds in kind. However, our human relations possess 
many nuances, while ‘love’ may absorb or oppress (and so on), at any point within the 
momentary emergences of ‘material-discursive practices’ (see note 42 above), and indeed as 
an ongoing affect. Love is subject, too, to the spectrum of effects that coincide with it. Billy’s 
support of Spikker’s entry in the Egg Race may depict love as an intervention; nonetheless, 
this intervention operates within an endless multiplicity of possible givens and outcomes, 
always contributing but never occupying any singular primacy.
The poststructuralist explanation of ‘love’ as an unstable category therefore appears to 
be followed through and built upon—although its emphasis is partially reduced in the 
process—in new materialist approaches such as Barad’s. A similar follow-through can be 
seen in the work of Wolfe. Where, in a Derridean reading, undecidability gestures toward the 
unknowable, in speculative and new materialist approaches it indicates an engagement with a 
reconstructive autopoiseis and a continuing actualisation of possibilities (Wolfe / Luhmann), 
or comprises elements of the discursive-material world in its becoming (Barad). Spike’s 
posthumanist intervention is therefore simultaneously both undermined and productive in 
terms of the meaning it prescribes. From Billy’s ‘love intervention’ emerges both Spikkers’ 
success in winning the Egg Race, and also his death as an outcome of this success. Spikkers 
N enacts an ecological death-facing, yet Billy is confronted with the tragic loss of his lover (the 
death of other), and correspondingly with his own responses to that loss. The ongoing effects 
of Spikkers’ success, meanwhile, remain undecidable, or at least contingent, since they 
emerge from ‘love’ as just one intra-active unit in the world’s continuum of material- 
discursive becoming.
As part two nears its close, Spikkers’ tragic death is increasingly entwined with Billy’s 
sentiments as narrator, and thus also with a reorienting of love in terms of Billy’s more
76 Ibid., p. 131.
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personal love. On the day of the Egg Race, Billy watches the paraphernalia of the event— 
flags, costumes, and the awaited and celebrated egg—and is at once put into a cynical mood, 
observing: ‘here, as in every place the world can shew, men will gamble and plot and fight 
and fall, all for the winning of a trophy’ (37). He gazes upon Spikkers who is preparing to 
race and, in loving him, already sees his fall. Where Spikkers believes ‘truly’ that, with the 
return of the Ariki man, ‘the trees will grow and the birds will return’, Billy confides that 
Spikkers’ ‘shining face’ ‘causes me to drop my eyes for fear of hurting his happiness’ (35). 
Two pages previously, Billy describes a ‘Delft tile’ wrapped in blue cloth, which he finds in 
the cave he and Spikkers share: on the tile is ‘a picture of a tall house with its door open. A 
man in a hat waits inside the hall’ (135). Before setting out, Spikkers tells Billy of a dream he 
has had, in which, ‘his father came to him’ (137), giving him the Egg in one hand, and with 
the other hand taking him to live in Amsterdam. These premonitory statements not only 
predict Spikkers’ death, but envisage a return via death’s doorway to the parental home, 
indicating a corresponding shift in conceptions of death, which reappears in the final part of 
the novel to inform its ending.
The meanings of both love and death become vexed at this point. While these dreams 
have a spiritual tone (trespassing—to recall Derrida—an assumed border to death by 
envisaging a life beyond it; see note 71 above), they also align the post-mortal (Spikkers’ 
imminent death) with the prenatal (his birth), returning life’s end to its beginning. Thus, 
while the dreams are an indicator of Billy and Spikker’s shared bond, they also remind us 
that, in the void beyond death—as before life—there is no subject extant to suffer death.77 
Death has no ‘is’, which in effect disqualifies death’s meanings. So, although Spikkers is the 
champion on the day, collecting the egg laid by the first tern of the season, Spikkers in effect 
dies because the ‘swaggering oaf (137), who is the Bird Man’s proxy in the race, takes the 
egg off him by force and, in the struggle that ensues, pushes him off the high cliff to fall upon 
the rocks below. In life, as in politics, fair play cannot be assumed, and there may be no 
innocent answer to the grip of a power that stifles the landscape, its habitat and its peoples. 
For Billy, who must live with the loss of Spikkers, his cynical views have been validated, 
while Spikkers’ death appears rendered meaningless at this point. All that remains, it seems, 
is a return to the rule of the Bird Man, and Billy’s longing for a lost love—leaving Billy to 
face living on.
77 Thomas Nagel makes this point, but also argues that death is a misfortune all the same because it halts a life that could 
have continued. Thomas Nagel, 'Death,' in Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979).
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The Easter Island section, nonetheless, offers more than a complication of Spike’s 
love intervention via this bleak excavation of love and death. That Spikkers wins as he 
collects the egg—despite his ensuing death—is an event that nonetheless enters our 
understanding as having occurred, producing meaning out of Billy’s love. To this we might 
add Spike’s insight in part one, which has relevance to the present Billy’s situation. For Spike, 
meaning is what humans derive—from literature or from discourse of whatever kind—as a 
safeguard against the emptiness of death. Survival is not just living with loss but living, and 
this involves stories. So, Spikkers, who in effect leaps into his own story, becomes the Ariki 
man—an event out of which the reader derives meaning. Billy, facing the irretrievable loss of 
his lover, is forced to construct his own meanings, but he too achieves them, not least 
because, in living on, there is no choice but to do so. As Spikkers dies in Billy’s arms, Billy’s 
narration reads:
And he passes through the door. And in the house he must make ready til I have 
finished my business here and come back to him.
A white bird opens its wings (140).
As readers, we retain the story of Spikker’s death-facing through his becoming the Ariki man, 
but we are aware too of Billy’s ‘trespass’ (see note 77 above) into meanings beyond death, 
where ‘impossible’ death appears before him as the loss of his lover. If the first points to the 
material, the second points to the discursive. This illustrates language as both separating from 
and enfolding into meanings in the world’s becoming.
Post 3 War and Wreck City
Technically speaking, Post 3 War and Wreck City are two distinct parts (or chapters)
providing four in the novel altogether. However, since they share a running narrative, I treat
them as a combined third part. The first, Post 3 War, primarily provides a baek-story for this
section’s Billie Crusoe, who, like the first Billie Crusoe, is female and lives on Orbus,
although the time and context have changed. The second, Wreck City, then continues Billie’s
story into its post-Third-World-War scenario. The storyline follows Billie and Spike—who is
a Robo sapiens once more, but, as an incomplete prototype, consists of nothing but a head—
as they trigger a brewing clash between Tech City and Wreck City. In the closing pages,
Billie is subsequently shot; however, her narration then continues into her death as she comes
home to a longed-for maternal love, having been given up as a baby for adoption. Billie’s
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death thus differs to that of Spike and Spikkers in previous sections. Despite meeting, and, in 
the end, embracing death, she seems not to face death in the posthuman sense depicted by 
Spike. Billie is shot in the back; hence her death occurs as she is fleeing, not facing it. In this 
section I explore the narrative events that lead up to this differing portrayal of death in the 
character of Billie. In particular, I consider the way this final iteration of Billie and Spike 
depicts both as variously sliding between human and posthuman perspectives. Spike starts out 
as a Robo sapiens, and moves towards the human and then the posthuman, whereas Billie 
increasingly retracts from the world, towards an interiorised self. These sliding portrayals also 
impact on the differing ways Spike and Billie deal with death, as well as on their differing 
capacities as subjects-in-a-world. This, in turn, appears as a difficulty for the novel’s ending, 
depicting the representation of death-facing as again problematic.
In part three it quickly becomes apparent that this Billie is less self-assured than Billie of part 
one. This seems to be an outcome of her formative experiences. In the first chapter, Post 3 
War, Billie narrates the extraordinary story of her pre-natal relations with her mother, 
demonstrating a biological love that transcends the events of a life that interrupts it. Billie, as 
a result, is immersed in a need to piece together a fragmented self, processed via memories 
foundational to her emergence into the world. She longs for a love that she has never had: 
‘Love without thought. Love without conditions. Love without promises. Love without 
threats. Love without fear. Love without Limits. Love without end’ (146). Yet such a love 
seems rare indeed, illustrating Billie as holding an accentuated idealisation of love as a result 
of her loveless childhood. The love Billie longs for, in reaching beyond death, seems to 
disavow death’s part in the iterability of life in its becoming, negating death’s presence as 
always ‘possible’, and overlooking the way love frames itself primarily within the temporality 
of life. Billie’s longing for an idealised love goes on to inform—throughout this dual third 
section—both her inability to be whole without it, and her desire to reclaim it. These issues 
reach their climax in Billie’s death, which takes the form of ‘trespass’ (see note 71 above), 
whereby her narration over-determines her death experience. This discursive death effectively 
functions as a counter to the material element of the posthuman reclamation of death, as 
envisaged in the death-facing paradigm and as proposed by Spike. It also seemingly 
contributes to the unsatisfactory feel of the novel’s ending.
Although Spike, in part three, retains echoes of the earlier Spike, she differs in accord
with part three’s very different set of narrative ideas. In Wreck City, political negligence has
resulted in an unforeseen nuclear attack by Iraq on the States. Out of the devastation, MORE,
having taken political control of the globe, has designed ‘the world’s first Robo sapiens'
145
(Spike) to ‘take the planet-sized decisions that humans are so bad at’ (159). It is Billie’s role 
to train Spike ‘to understand what it means to be human’ (162); for the reader, this often 
comes to seem the other way around. Spike’s reduction to just a head appears to limit her 
capacity for quantum thinking. This echoes the enclosed post-Third World War mood of Tech 
City, wherein no escape (to other planets) is foreseen. Death, in the form of warfare, has 
already rebounded, and there is no dream of a new start, not even a false one—other than in 
the possibilities represented by Spike. Spike, whose role is to consider humanity’s future, is 
linked to a Mainframe computer. Her ability to access and utilise the sum of global data 
places her in a somewhat formalist position. She relies on Billie to help her process meanings 
and to act as her arms and her legs. Spike thus depicts a detached intelligence, while her 
association with Billie foregrounds the notion of embodied consciousness that cannot be 
limited to the self-contained vessel of the human (or any isolated) subject.
Part three thus poses a distinct set of difficulties. The global situation has deteriorated 
to levels of discord that seem beyond repair; yet our once-activist Billie is now wrapped up 
with a need for love of an idealised kind, seeking an alternative form of escape in a 
transcendent love, while Spike is reduced to a disembodied state. As the section progresses, 
Spike nonetheless gradually recovers elements of her posthumanism, increasingly striving to 
process meanings through her intra-active encounters with others. This depicts a gradual 
reinstatement of a performative becoming. Yet in the last instance, even so, she retracts from 
performative presence when Billie fails to follow through with a performative mode.
In part three, a potential response to the socio-environmental situation appears, as 
depicted in the anarchic zone of Wreck City, but is not fully formulated. Wreck City is where 
Billie and Spike end up, having set out on an educational walk and stepped, not quite 
accidentally, out of Tech City’s delineated zone. This step from the constructed to the 
deconstructed world and into the liminal points to the possible ‘new narratives’ described in 
more positive readings of the novel. However, Billie is soon tom between the lure of Spike’s 
willingness to embrace new experiences, and the need to return the five-million-dollar robot 
safely to MORE. When Spike, following an encounter with new-age lesbians, severs her link 
to the Mainframe, Billie’s concern is with Spike’s loss of ‘objectivity’. She berates Spike:
‘Spike, the future of the planet is uncertain. Human beings aren’t just in a mess, we 
are a mess. We have made every mistake, justified ourselves and made the same 
mistakes again and again. It’s as though we’re doomed to repetition. In all of that, we 
can’t afford our one and only Robo sapiens to go on a personal journey of self- 
discovery’. (216)
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Spike, objecting that Billie seems to ‘want her to remain a robot forever’, responds:
T don’t see how else to begin.’
‘Begin what exactly?’ [Billie asks her] 
‘Begin again’. (216)
From this moment of disconnection from the Mainframe, Spike’s reclamation of a 
performative posthumanism effectively increases, whereas Billie, from this point, increasingly 
retreats from such possibilities, turning instead to the metaphysical individualism of more 
humanist discourse. Billie does briefly, in part three, consider Spike’s performative 
posthuman ideas. For example, she wonders whether love might really be ‘a force of a 
different nature from the forces of death that dictate what will be’ (217). Yet, this only 
functions to illustrate her failure to grasp the way Spike’s love intervention enfolds death in 
its becoming, as demonstrated in Spike’s death in the previous two sections. Billie instead 
brushes aside Spike’s new discoveries, overlooking opportunities that may be posed. Her 
conclusion, aptly enough, is that ‘we who are the intervention’ (that is, humanity) just ‘don’t 
know what we are doing’ (217). She flees further into the liminal as she heads into the 
contaminated nightmare of the Dead Forest where deformed survivors of nuclear war roam. 
Despite the dead state of the zone she runs into, Billie seems more accurately to be running 
from death than towards it, running too from the love intervention offered by Spike. Love, for 
Billie, thus becomes the means not to face but to avoid death.
A key feature of Spike and Billie in this last part of the novel is that they appear to 
part ways in the final pages. This can be usefully explored in relation to Wolfe’s ‘double 
finitude’ (see note 52 above). Wolfe’s posthumanism—as already indicated—possesses two 
kinds of death. The first is the material death that we share with the nonhuman (our 
mortality); the other is what he refers to as a ‘radical passivity’ (ibid.). Wolfe, of course, 
returns us here to Derrida’s ‘death as aporia’. Acknowledgement of the first of these—the 
mortality of the self—is, on the terms of the death-fear paradigm, the recognition that 
avoiding death only leads to death’s rebound. This death-facing is thus a pragmatic 
acknowledgment that the human, with its intellect, is just a unit in the becoming of the 
universe; it cannot transcend it, nor therefore can it transcend death. Such a death-facing is 
seen in Spike of part one and Spikkers of part two, whilst Billie’s death differs because it 
effectively transcends mortality. Spike in part three, however, might be better understood in 
terms of the second death, which is Wolfe’s notion of ‘radical passivity’ or, as he also calls it,
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‘not being able’.78 Where, for Wolfe, meaning and communication, viewed in a trace 
structure, are fundamentally exterior to the human subject, they exceed both the human / 
animal difference and “‘the life/death relation” itself; hence neither an ‘analytic of finitude’ 
nor an existential Being-toward-death (i.e. Heidegger) can erase this passivity.79 More simply 
put, we are only ever participants in the iterability or becoming of the world. It will always 
exceed us, with or without us, no matter our attitude towards death. To apply this idea to the 
third Spike is to recognise the profound passivity that also characterises her posthumanism.
In part three, Spike does not abandon the performative death-facing of Spike / 
Spikkers in parts one and two as such; instead, this aspect of her retreats from emphasis. This 
corresponds with the way the second of Wolfe’s ‘deaths’ always exceeds the death-facing of 
the first. She also increasingly responds to an exteriority of meaning, culminating in her 
rediscovery of her participation in a quantum and performative universe, which occurs when 
she deciphers a signal from Planet Blue in an old satellite receiver, a temporally quantum 
signal set up by the first Spike and transmitted from Planet Blue to Orbus. However, although 
this conjures the sense of a reappearance of the first Spike in part three, the present Spike 
remains largely passive in her interactions, for all her willingness to engage with new 
possibilities. In particular, her love for Billie, throughout part three, seems less engaged than 
that of the first Spike. She is more outgoing than Billie, yet retains a kind of prudence, her 
response to Billie being more onlooker than oracle. Hence, when this last Billie persists in 
pursuing her own longing for a certain kind of love, amid the chaos of erupting conflict, Spike 
simply steps back from Billie’s story.
‘Billie,’ said Spike, ‘leave me here and go on.’
‘I’m not leaving you. Go where?’
‘Find your way home’. (239)
This standing back seems quintessential^ sacrificial, reminding the reader of Spike’s death in 
part one. However, it is more than that. Importantly, what Spike stands back from is Billie’s 
persistent longing for home; hence, Spike effectively relinquishes all that she potentially 
stands for in her relations with Billie. This amounts to a ‘radical passivity’ (see note 52 
above), depicting the human (envisaged as posthuman) as profoundly limited in relation to its 
world. This indicates not only humanity’s mortal state, but also its profound lack of secure 
meaning within the world and its becoming. Yet this is not its weakness. It is at this point,
78 Wolfe, What is Fosthumanisml, p. xxviii.
79 Ibid., p. xxviii.
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rather, that the posthuman solution becomes its own acknowledgement that it has no solution 
as such, for to have a solution is to stake a claim for an ontological certainty that disqualifies 
the posthuman from its intent.
* * *
The complex dynamics at work in The Stone Gods render death-facing a posthuman solution. 
However, the question of the human in the posthuman becomes profoundly vexed. The 
novel’s sense of irresolution, as Billie withdraws from all networks into her narcissistic death, 
demonstrates a failure of the human to grasp the meanings of the posthuman. The radical 
passivity of Spike’s final posthuman portrayal seems to enact a retraction that returns the 
question of humanity’s behaviours to one of choice: while we have opportunities, it seems, to 
develop an ecological death-facing stance, it is up to us as to whether we do. In a quantum 
universe, the means to intervene in our own patterns of destruction remains ever before us. 
Yet the novel also complicates this idea. Since the mission to Planet Blue fails, the possibility 
of starting again is also disrupted—for all that it is supposedly a quantum universe, perhaps it 
is just a dream after all. Furthermore, the human character in the novel, Billie, finds herself 
unable to take a posthuman stance even in death-facing. The Stone Gods thus presents a 
posthuman solution; yet, in the end, it depicts its meanings and ideas as merely transient 
possibilities whilst undermining, or perhaps simply disbelieving, the chances of our enacting 
them.
Spike, therefore, in some ways interrogates a contemporary posthuman ideal, 
representing it whilst also placing it under scrutiny. She illustrates the ways different -isms 
are latent in complex and often conflicting ways in our discursive minds. The interplay 
between Billie and Spike, meanwhile, depicts a contemporary oscillation between humanist 
and posthumanist ideals. The novel, like any of Winterson’s fictional works, is, in the end, 
strongly psychological. Its science-fictional forays into a socio-political arena retain a close 
concern with the possibilities and inconsistencies of the interior self as it encounters its world. 
Thus, Spike also returns us to the problem of Derrida’s death as aporia. On one hand, she 
faces death in full, like the mother in The Road, and on the other, she lives on like the father. 
She therefore demonstrates a transitional moment in contemporary thought whereby a turn to 
death-facing entangles what Morton refers to as ‘the ecological thought’ in the difficulties that
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precede it; the human, defining itself as posthuman, thereby defines itself as human 
nonetheless.80
Death-facing, in the novels considered so far, appears as an experimental 
reconceptualising of the (Western) self. Atwood takes a set of possible subject modes and 
forces them through a dialectic process to produce a collaborative posthuman politic, yet 
returns to language as a site of profound uncertainty with regard to human exceptionalism and 
the dangers of linear thought. McCarthy strips back all political concerns—although they 
remain strongly implicated—to the subject as bare life, yet in retracting all discourse seems 
only to emphasise its pervasiveness in the living world. Winterson holds up a mirror to the 
reader’s own immersion in the contemporary moment, playing death-facing off against the 
different ways it may be avoided or problematised. So far, then, each of these novels retain a 
strong sense of death-facing as a metaphysical problem, while the political implications of its 
function as discourse mainly appear as stage-setting. Of the three, Atwood’s trilogy draws the 
political most strongly into focus. Amitav Ghosh’s novel, to which I next turn, largely 
extracts the question of death-facing from its embroilment in Western linear-minded capitalist 
modes and corresponding metaphysics, allowing a broader sense of its implications to appear. 
In doing so, it amends the terms of material and discursive death, considering the material in 
terms of a Marxist economics and the discursive as manifesting a destructive linearity mainly 
within its Western hegemonic forms.
80 Morton, The Ecological Thought, p 135.
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Chapter 5: Death and the Speculative Real in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry 
Tide
Amitav Ghosh’s 2004 novel The Hungry Tide brings to the exploration of the death-facing 
paradigm a set of problems that are only gestured toward in the novels examined so far.81 As 
Jacques Derrida states, there are ‘cultures of death’, and what is made clearer in The Hungry 
Tide is that the death-facing paradigm is a specific response to a globalising capitalist mode, 
wherein the ideological and the material appear as mutually disengaged.82 In placing the 
paradigm into a context that does not demand it, as occurs in this novel, a host of complexities 
emerge, exposing the heterogeneity of global problematics incurred by western hegemonic 
responses to environmental issues. This also draws attention to death’s aporia: on one hand, to 
face death is to dissolve binaries; on the other, it creates the potential for more binaries, based 
on death’s perpetual discursivity. Hence, as the subject realigns with its own mortality—this 
being a personal acknowledgement of the materiality of existence—it does so as a response to 
collective conceptions of death; the subject translates death-facing as an ethical act, so 
returning it to the realm of ideology. The Hungry Tide illustrates the outcome of this problem. 
In the novel, the paradigmatic call for the human to face its own mortality on environmentalist 
grounds is imported into a specific socio-geographical space, the Sundarbans region in the 
Bay of Bengal. Here—it is illustrated—death is already immanent in people’s lives. In the 
precarious tidal ecology of the Sundarbans, also home to the ‘man-eating’ Bengal Tiger, a 
broader environmentalist imperative—along with its death-facing element—appears as 
incongruent with the lives of the regions’ inhabitants. In one frame the tiger is endangered and 
requires safeguarding; in another it kills and is killed. This problematising of death-facing is 
supported in the novel by its thematic use of Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duino Elegies (1923), 
several of which challenge the reader to face, rather than avoid, death’s real possibility, while 
the elegies’ coda returns to a problematising of death as incomprehensible.83 As the novel 
traces a turning of the death-facing paradigm from the ethical to the tragic, it raises a 
corresponding set of questions about the realms of language and the material and death’s 
relation to both—a dual set of concerns that reflects the aporia at the heart of the death-facing 
paradigm.
81 Amitav Ghosh, The Hungry Tide (London: Harper Collins, 2005).
82 Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 41. For further discussions see
Chapter Four.
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Most notably, the novel places a strong emphasis on the material within an otherwise 
predominantly linguistic domain, this emphasis being the key point of interest in this reading. 
Language, a recurrent theme in all the novels I examine, is both that by which (some) humans 
have long held themselves in differentiation from the nonhuman world, and, at the same time, 
the medium by which human discourses on death inevitably—and problematically—take 
form. In Atwood’s The Year o f the Flood, Crake claims the concept of immortality to be a 
consequence of grammar, because one is always alive (as the pronoun T ) inside the sentence 
in which one considers one’s own death. In The Road, a poignant sense of the human as 
almost denuded by death’s imminence is seen in McCarthy’s limiting of his apostrophe use to 
first-person contractions. However, in The Hungry Tide, meaning’s reliance on language 
tends conversely to be reduced, while language itself gives up some of its linear disposition. 
Hence, in the novel, myths are conceived in geological form, while the ‘pinging’ of dolphin 
‘echoes’ reveals language to be ‘only a bag of tricks’ (159). Even ‘death’ is spoken mainly 
through narrative events—in the characters’ acts and experiences—more so than by its textual 
signifier. Death appears in the mood of the tide as it lifts and drowns, in the ominous image of 
the paw-print in the sand of a nearby tiger. Nonetheless, the novel simultaneously sustains an 
acute awareness of words as its medium, a medium that shapes both lives and fiction; hence 
the mud-banks of the tide-country are 'shaped not only by rivers o f silt, but also rivers o f 
language ’ (247). The question of the power of language to shape human conceptions remains 
a preoccupation in the novel and has implications that Ghosh considers elsewhere; for 
example, in his essay ‘Wild Fictions’, he discusses ‘the doctrine of nature’s exclusivity’—an 
urban desire for pristine environments that proves indifferent to the realities of a region’s 
indigenous peoples, thereby facilitating bureaucratic abuses of power.84 So, while The Hungry 
Tide is continuously concerned with, as Laura White describes it, the layering and validating 
of different ‘ways of knowing’, through which it strongly illustrates its materialist 
intervention, the power of language remains a phenomenon that, perhaps intentionally—if 
also inevitably, the novel never fully surmounts.85 It ultimately sustains a set of questions that 
revolve around the material (often translated in Marxist terms, making death-facing political), 
and language (often, in this novel, considered in poetic terms), right through to its ending. 
Yet, this ending, despite being the most successful of the novels I examine in terms of 
presenting a cohesive materialist solution, remains oddly unsatisfactory. My reading of
84 Amitav Ghosh, ‘Wild Fictions’ Outlook.india.com (December 22,2008) 
<http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx7239276-l> [accessed 7 September 2013].
85 Laura A. White, ‘Novel Vision: Seeing the Sunderbans through Ghosh’s Tne Hungry Tide' interdisciplinary Studies in 
Literature and Environment 20 3  (Summer 2013), 513-531, p. 522.
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Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide is based on three characters and the differing parts they play in 
relation to the novel’s distinct materialist explorations. The first of these is Piya, a young 
American cetologist of Bengali heritage who travels to Ghosh’s fictional Sundarbans island, 
Lusibari, to study the Irrawaddy (river) dolphin, which she claims she would give up her life 
to protect. The next is the late Nirmal, husband of Nilima and self-professed Marxist and 
lover of poetry; Nirmal’s notebook, left to his nephew Kanai, brings to the narrative a back- 
history of human settlement in the Sundarbans and also provides the novel’s thematic 
engagement with Rilke’s Duino Elegies. The third character is local fisherman, Fokir, who is 
employed as a guide on Piya’s dolphin survey. Fokir protects Piya from death on several 
occasions, on the last occasion at the cost of his own life. These characters between them 
carry the novel’s engagement with a paradigm of death-facing. Piya demonstrates its cultural 
delimitations; Nirmal illustrates its material-discursive tensions through his dual interest in 
Marxism and poetry; and Fokir becomes its embodiment—his intimacy with the landscape 
enabling him to save Piya by facing his own death.
In examining these characters I explore how the novel sets about illustrating and 
countering the risks inherent in the discursive nature of death-facing as an environmentalist 
paradigm. On one hand, death-facing is already a turn from the discursive toward the 
material; on the other—at least from a Derridean standpoint—the discursive nature of death 
can never fully be overcome, for we cannot escape the ‘bio-anthropo-thanato-theology’ of our 
own Being-toward-death (as Derrida puts it).86 Hence the paradigm of death-facing remains 
unable to overcome its own discursivity, a problem only exacerbated by its appearance in 
novelistic form. Such is the conundrum that this novel seems quite self-consciously to 
consider, whilst, in doing so, also bringing forward the material in the discursive with a good 
deal of success, making visible layers of material detail about lives and living practices 
alongside its corresponding set of environmentalist concerns. It is this ‘making visible’ that is 
of particular interest in this chapter, since the material rupture this produces functions, 
crucially, to insist on the contingent nature of discourse.
To explore this, I first sketch out a Foucauldian biopolitical view of the novel, which I 
then interrogate from a speculative materialist perspective. While Michel Foucault is often 
considered a poststructuralist thinker—not that he labelled himself as such—his work also 
retains materialist elements. The materiality of the thanatopolitical space his biopolitics opens 
up creates a specific opportunity for a speculative materialist interrogation. Specifically, The 
Hungry Tide's transnational context provides a platform by which to illustrate what occurs
86 Derrida, Aporias, p. 79; also see Chapter Three, p. 88.
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when the death-facing paradigm is translated across differentiated cultural spaces, as made 
tangible (or potentially so) by a contingent biopolitics. By turning to the speculative 
materialists at this point, the material content of the death-facing paradigm is made available 
for scrutiny in a way that earlier poststructuralist thinkers—including Foucault—only gesture 
towards. To this end, the main theoretical approach in this chapter involves an incorporation 
of the work of two speculative materialists: Quentin Meillassoux, whose debut work After 
Finitude has driven much recent speculative theory; and Martin Hâgglund who disagrees with 
Meillassoux about the implications of a materialist ontology, specifically in relation to the 
question of death-facing.87 While Meillassoux seeks to make thinkable the radical outside of 
thought, Hâgglund repositions death within the material life of thought itself. My aim in this 
chapter is to make two observations. The first is that this novel, like each of the novels I 
examine, engages in a theoretical struggle to break out of post-Kantian thought into a new 
apprehension of the world as real. The second is that it also offers the most successful 
depiction of a material death-facing, not by escaping the discursive but by paying a more 
radical heed to it in the first place. Nonetheless, in its closing pages, the novel seems only to 
affirm the continuing paradox of death-facing, producing a similar effect to the novels 
examined so far. I begin the chapter with an overview of the novel and critical responses to it, 
followed by an outline of my theoretical approach as I develop it in this chapter. I then move 
on to a short synopsis and my textual analysis, which focuses mainly on three key characters 
in the novel, Piya, Nirmal and Fokir, as indicated above.
Amitav Ghosh is the author of eight novels to date, as well as a range of essays and other non- 
fictional works. The Hungry Tide, awarded the 2004 Crossword Book Prize, is his sixth novel. 
Bom in Kolkata (then Calcutta) and educated in Delhi, Ghosh gained a PhD in social 
anthropology from Oxford University, and has taught at a number of academic institutions in 
India and the US. His seventh novel, Sea o f Poppies (2009), was shortlisted for the Man 
Booker Prize, and he was also the joint recipient—controversially—of the Dan David Award
87 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: an Essay on the Necessity o f  Contingency, trans. by Ray Brassier (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2012); Martin Kaggiund, Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique o f  Meillassoux % in The Speculative Turn, 
ed. by Levi Bryant and others (Melbourne: re .press, 2011).
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with Margaret Atwood in 2010, as well as having received the Padma Shri in India in 2007.88 
He currently lives in New York.89
Ghosh’s fiction generally is very much politically, historically, and geographically 
engaged, and revolves around such issues as the hegemonies of colonialism and neo­
colonialism and the ‘porosity of cultural boundaries’, issues that are also reflective of his 
anthropological training.90 At the same time, his fiction tends to hone in on the individual; as 
Nayar Pramod states, ‘Ghosh is interested in the ways in which the violence of history, 
geography and politics alters lives’.91 Ghosh also writes across borders in terms of genre, and 
his is style is generally postmodern. According to Pablo Mukherjee, Ghosh’s approach to 
writing on ‘issues of migrancy, diaspora, the disruptive and constitutive flows of global 
colonial and neo-colonial capital’ results in ‘nothing less than’ an ‘ecology’ of 
postcolonialism’.92 Such a thought perhaps provides an opening into how we might consider 
The Hungry Tide; for, while it represents the introduction into Ghosh’s work of a distinct 
emphasis on environmental concerns, this is placed in equal measure with an ongoing focus 
on the lives of people and the processes of history. The Hungry Tide, in effect, is an 
environmental crisis novel, but rather than fetishize the death of humanity or the destruction 
of the landscape, it instead hones in more closely to examine the effects of political and 
cultural hegemonies on both the lives of people and the nonhuman world. Through this, the 
novel offers some insight into the effects of dominant discourses in shaping events, as well as 
considering the possible effects for human and nonhuman alike of reconceptualising such 
practices of discourse.
Unsurprisingly, then, critical attention to the novel also crosses boundaries. While the 
majority of readings of the novel are located within cultural and postcolonial studies, 
reflecting a body of scholarship already familiar with Ghosh’s work, the novel has also 
attracted a number of readings by ecocritics. Correspondingly, it is also of interest to those 
whose work incorporates both environmental and postcolonial concerns, those in the currently 
small but expanding arena of postcolonial ecocriticism (dubbed ecopoco). Here, a key focus is
88 Ghosh and Atwood were jointly urged not to accept this award, presented by the University o f  Tel Aviv, in order to comply 
with a ‘cultural campaign o f isolation against Israel’. Atwood’s website contains lengthy dialogue about what both felt were 
the reasons to accept the award, in a spirit o f ‘reaching out’ across nations. ‘The Dan David Prize, Speech and Context’, 
Margaret Atwood, The Year o f  the Flood  (May 9, 2010) <http://marg09.wordpress.com/2010/05/09/the-dan-david-prize- 
speech-and-the-context/> [accessed 13 August 2013].
89 I.E. Luebering, ‘Amitav Ghosh’, Encyclopaedia Britannica
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1537377/Amitav-Ghosh> [accessed 12 September 2013].
90 Robert Dixon, ‘Travelling in the West: The Writing o f Amitav Ghosh’ in Amitav Ghosh: A Critical Companion ed. by 
Tabish Kahair (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003), p. 10.
91 Nayar Pramod, in John. C. Howley, Amitav Ghosh: An Introduction (New Delhi: Foundation Books, 2005), preface.
92 Pablo Mukheijee, ‘Surfing The Second waves: Amitav Ghosh’s Tide Counny’, New Formations 59 (2006), 144-57, p.
148.
155
on examining a new wave of literature which, while its focus ‘is primarily on the natural 
environment’, as Michael Sen explains, also ‘encourages an association between cultural, 
political, economic and ecological concerns’.93 Such literature opens up a valuable set of 
avenues for environmental criticism, as is often argued in readings of Ghosh’s novel. Robert 
P. Marzec for example, remarking on the foreclosure of resources for ecocriticism caused by 
an erosion of philosophical enquiry (poststructuralist theory), goes on to highlight what he 
describes as a concern, in modem fictions such as this novel of Ghosh’s, with questions of 
representation. He suggests that critical enquiry into this concern might be of value for 
ecocriticism as it strives to establish ‘more sustainable’ conceptions of the human and the 
nonhuman.94
This broad combination of environmental, political and global concerns, as seen in 
The Hungry Tide, is also of course what generates its specific contribution to this dissertation. 
While death (if anything is) is a universal phenomenon, our conceptions of death as material 
fact as it is represented in discourse can by no means be generalised. The historical nature of 
the death-facing paradigm thus makes clear the value of exploring its appearance in such 
novels as The Hungry Tide, as it explores the problematics of discursive boundaries in a range 
of discourses.
Readings of the novel often frame its material rupture (as I refer to it) in terms of the novel’s 
emphasis on the local and its depiction of a certain intimacy between the human, the 
landscape and its ecology. Socio-cultural readings tend to explore the political implications of 
this, whereas ecocritical readings are more inclined to relate it to the novel’s interweaving of 
human and nonhuman narratives. Mukheijee, for example, sees the novel as illustrating how 
local ecologies come to be overlooked by ‘idealist notions of universal progress’, such as 
Piya’s ‘environmentalism’ or Nirmal’s ‘would-be Marxism’, while Rajender Kaur finds a 
response to this in the novel’s positing of a ‘cautiously ... ecotopian vision’, which, supported 
by ‘transcultural collaborative networks’, allows ‘local communities and global institutions 
work together towards mutually compatible goals’.95 Divya Anand, on the other hand, sees a 
biocentrism at work in the novel’s use of water as both ‘metaphor’ and ‘material presence’, 
arguing that water is ‘more than a passive recipient of both social and physical changes’, for it
93 Malcolm Sen, ‘Spatial Justice: The Ecological Imperative and Postcolonial Development’, Journal o f  Postcolonial Writing 
45.4 (2009), 365-377, p. 365.
94 Robert P. Marzec ‘Speaking Before the Environment: Modem Fiction and the Ecological’, Modern Fiction Studies 55.3 
(Fall 2009), 419-442, p. 422.
95 Mukheijee, p. 151; Rajender Kaur, ‘Home Is Where the Oraceiia Are’ Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and  
Environment 14.1 (Summer 2007), pp. 137-138.
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also exercises ‘its potential to transform the physical space and in turn alter the social order’.96 
These two broad positions, of course, interrelate, as is discussed in a reading by Sen. Sen 
suggests that The Hungry Tide creates ‘a hybrid interdependence of anthropocentrism [...] and 
biocentrism’, which makes the novel both ‘a product of human expression (cultural and 
political narratives)’ and ‘inherently non-dependent on humanity (an environmental, 
geographical fact)’.97 It is this interdisciplinarity, Sen argues, that enables the novel to 
illustrate that ‘it is often the local inhabitant’ in whom ‘an ‘epic mutability’ is resolved’.98 A 
third broad approach is to unite biocentric and anthropocentric concerns in the individual, 
whereby it is the individual’s transformation—generally that of the cosmopolitan elite—that 
enacts the resolution. For Terri Tomsky, the agent of this transformation is ‘affect’, occurring 
as a result of the elite’s ‘personal witnessing’.99 Marzec, perhaps not dissimilarly, describes 
Piya’s struggle to ‘create a new consciousness’ as being based on her ‘new knowledge of the 
area’, placing her in a more appropriate subject-mode of ‘inhabitancy’.100 Yet he also 
questions the novel’s seemingly orderly ending, suggesting that Piya's character is ‘not 
allowed to stand as some kind of Thoreauvian individualist ideal’.101 Rather, her 
environmentalist solution is made suspect by the novel’s parallel retelling of the Morichjhâpi 
massacre, in which the brutal cleansing of refugee settlers is justified by the region’s 
designation for tiger conservation. Helen Tiffin and Graham Huggan point out a further and 
related problematic, which is that the focus of the novel’s joined-up and locally-inflected 
environmentalist solution revolves around Piya’s ‘relatively easy’ dolphin project, whereas it 
is the question of the man-eating and endangered Bengal Tiger (and related international 
environmentalist pressures on the Indian government) that poses the greatest set of dilemmas 
throughout the novel—dilemmas that are by no means fully resolved.102
This chapter’s theoretical approach aims to account for the novel’s conscious interest in 
materialism(s)—including in its economic forms, its particular engagement with the death- 
facing paradigm, and the sense of irresolution that nonetheless lingers at the novel’s ending. 
The readings I discuss above also point to the novel’s layering of discourses and perspectives.
96 Divya Anand, 'Words on Water: Nature and Agency in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide' Concentric: Literary and  
Cultural Studies 34.1 (March 2008), 21-44, p. 24.
97 Sen, p. 368.
98 Ibid., p. 374.
99 Terri Tomsky, 'Amitav Ghosh’s Anxious Witnessing and the Ethics o f  Action in The Hungry Tide’, Journal o f  
Commonwealth Literature 44.1 (2009), 53-65, Abstract.
100 Marzec, p. 433.
10‘ Ibid., p. 433.
!C2 Graham Huggan and Helen lim n , rostcoioniaiecocriticism : Literature, Animals, Environment (London: Routledge,
2010), p. 188.
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The first step in theoretical terms is to link this socio-spatial aspect with the death-facing 
paradigm, thereby illustrating how it functions in the novel, which I achieve initially by 
drawing on Foucault’s biopolitics. Foucault’s emphasis on ‘making live’ and ‘letting die’ as 
characteristic of the modem mode of power, replacing a classic sovereign mode of ‘letting 
live’ and ‘making die’, produces a transition whereby life enters history, placing death on a 
plane of avoidance.103 As I discuss in my introduction, Stuart J. Murray draws attention to the 
way this ‘valorising of life’ incurs an indirect cost for those who are correspondingly ‘let 
die’—a phenomenon that Murray refers to as ‘the biopolitical hegemony of the west’.104 The 
Hungry Tide evokes a sense of this western biopolitical hegemony via the incoming Piya, 
although she is Bengali by birth, and in its broader tracing of India’s colonial past within the 
history of its present. Yet, a biopolitical structure is also apparent in the novel’s engagement 
with contemporary discourses that bring the nonhuman into the frame of consideration. The 
death-facing paradigm, as a specific response to environmental crisis, can be said to draw 
attention to a valorising of human life against a ‘letting die’ of the «owhuman realm. By 
placing this environmental biopolitics in conflict with a transnational biopolitics, The Hungry 
Tide succeeds in illustrating the way Western environmentalisms may manifest as neo­
colonialisms.
The second stage of the theoretical approach is an exploration of the novel’s use of 
materialist techniques within this complex biopolitical structure. Here, the novel appears to 
explore the gap between those for whom death is placed on a plane of avoidance and those, 
effectively, who are ‘let die’ (whether human or nonhuman). In emphasising the capacity of 
non-linguistic events to communicate and impact upon life’s processes, the novel brings into 
focus lives and meanings that are otherwise hidden. At the same time, the novel keeps in mind 
the power of discourse, illustrating that what we choose to say, and how we say it, ‘matters’ 
(to recall Karen Barad).105 This dual utilisation of the discursive and the material works in 
tandem with the novel’s characterisation of the death-facing paradigm, and it is here that I 
turn to the work of Hâgglund and Meillassoux. In particular, through them, I seek to raise a 
query around the death-facing paradigm within the dissertation as a whole, explored in 
relation to Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide, as to whether a materialist death-facing is possible.
103 See Michel Foucault, "''Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Colle'ge de France, 1975-1976, trans. David Macey 
(New York: Picador, 2003), pp. 241-247.
104 Murray, ‘Thanatopolitics: The Living from the Dead’, Stuart J. Murray, ‘Thanatopolitics: The Living from the Dead’, 
Stuart J. Murray website <http://stuartjmurray.com/research/thanatopolitics-2/> [accessed 19 August, 2013].
105 See Karen Barad, Tosthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding o f  How Matter Comes to Matter’, Signs 28. 3, 
Gender and Science: New Issues (Spring 2003), 801-831, p. 803.
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Meillassoux’s After Finitude represents a rigorous—if in some ways problematic— 
intervention, in contemporary French and Continental philosophy, into the fideism (reliance 
on faith) of post-Kantian thought.106 Meillassoux seeks to establish that it is possible for 
thought to have knowledge of that which it cannot directly access. This is not just to suppose 
that that which lies outside our perception—what Meillassoux calls the ‘in itself—has the 
possibility to exist (faith), but to know it.107 This imperative to reconcile thought and the 
absolute is intended to overcome what he refers to as correlationism, summarised by Peter 
Hallward as the idea that ‘we cannot think any reality independently of thought itself.108 
Meillassoux’s route to achieving this involves a complex of stages including a 
‘mathematization of the world’, derived in part from a rethinking of the Galilean-Copemican 
revolution.109 But it is the role that Meillassoux’s conception of time plays in this—to which I 
now turn—that brings him into conflict with Hâgglund in relation to the question of death- 
facing.
The key point of reference around which Meillassoux builds his argument is the 
problem of ancestrality and what he calls the “arche-fossil”.110 The idea of the arche-fossil 
refers to the kinds of empirical evidences of the material world that are discernible via the 
tools of science, and yet which exist(ed) entirely outside of our capacity to witness (and thus 
know) them. An example he gives is the light from a star, which indicates the residue of an 
existence vastly external to the spatio-temporal frame of the present.111 Another example 
might be the existence of the present world billions of years before the emergence of human 
(or any form of) life. Meillassoux states: ‘To think ancestrality is to think a world without 
thought’.112 Meillassoux breaks down (at length) our difficulties with grasping this into 
conceptual components, thereby illustrating his non-correlative means to acknowledge ‘that 
which is prior to givenness in its entirety’.113 The result is what he calls ‘speculative’ 
thinking; this being ‘every type of thinking that claims to be able to access some form of 
absolute’, as differentiated from metaphysics which, he says, claims to do the same but 
‘through the principle of sufficient reason’.114
106 Kant’s transcendental philosophy saw knowledge o f  the absolute as unattainable, and thus placed faith in its stead. See 
Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason (1781), trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929), p. 29.
107 Meillassoux, p. 1.
108 Meillassoux, p. 128; Peter Hallward, ‘Anything is Possible’, in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Bryant and others 
(Melbourne: re.press, 2011), p.135. Meillassoux himself defines the correlationist as one who believes that ‘we only ever 
have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other’. 
Meillassoux, p. 38.
109 Meillassoux, p. 116.
110 Ibid., p. 10; see also p. 143.
1,1 Ibid., p. 10.
112 Meillassoux, p. 28.
113 Ibid., p. 20 (emphasis in original).
114 Ibid., p. 34.
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Where this begins to look problematic—in Hâgglund’s view among others—is in its 
reliance on an idea that Meillassoux calls ‘hyper-Chaos’. As Adrian Johnson (somewhat 
disparagingly) explains, Meillassoux asserts:
the existence of a specific ultimate real as underlying material reality: a time of 
discontinuous points of instantaneity which, at any point, could, in a gratuitous, 
lawless, and reasonless manner ungovemed by anything ... scramble and reorder ex 
nihilo the cause-and-effect patterns of the physical universe in any way whatsoever 
and entirely without constraints imposed by past states of affairs both actual and 
possible/potential. This temporal absolute of ground-zero contingency, as a necessarily 
contingent, non-factically-factical groundless ground, is Meillassouxian hyper- 
Chaos.115
Meillassoux’s own account is an extension of Hume’s claim that human reason can neither 
account for, nor comprehend, all possible worldly eventualities.116 Meillassoux states:
We must grasp how the ultimate absence of reason, which we will refer to as 
‘unreason’, is an absolute ontological property, and not the mark of the finitude of our 
knowledge. From this perspective, the failure of the principle of reason follows, quite 
simply, from the falsity (and even from the absolute falsity) of such a principle -  for 
the truth is that there is no reason for anything to be or to remain thus and so rather 
than otherwise, and this applies as much to the laws that govern the world as to the 
things of the world. Everything could actually collapse: from trees to stars, from stars 
to laws, from physical laws to logical laws; and this not by virtue of some superior law 
whereby everything is destined to perish, but by virtue of the absence of any superior 
law capable of preserving anything, no matter what, from perishing.117
In making this leap from finitude to ontology, Meillassoux effectively rewrites Hume’s 
proposal that ultimate causes are ‘totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry’, so that it
115 Adrian Johnson, ‘Hume’s Revenge: Â Dieu, Meillassoux’, in The Speculative Turn ed. by Bryant and others, p. 97.
116 Hallward usefully summarises Hume: ‘Hume argued that pure reasoning a priori cannot suffice to prove that a given effect 
must always and necessarily follow from a given cause. There is no reason why one and the same cause should not give rise 
to “a hundred different events’” ; see Haiiward, in The Speculative Turn ed. by Bryant and others, p. 131.
117 Meillassoux, p. 53.
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is no longer not just that possible effects are endless and unknowable, but—as Hallward puts 
it—they ‘might emerge on the basis of no causes at all’.118
Hâgglund critiques this aspect of Meillassoux’s work from a materialist perspective. 
His concern is with the idea that anything is possible whereby even the succession of time 
might end and go backwards, making possible the emergence of the divine—which (he says) 
Meillassoux himself envisages—and the resurrection of the dead.119 Hâgglund thus sees 
Meillassoux’s theory as being based on a human hope for immortality.120 Alain Badiou, 
although mostly supportive of Meillassoux’s work (Meillassoux being his student), expresses 
a similar concern, suggesting that a ‘political weakness’ occurs in the ‘lack of proper 
engagement with the present’.121 According to Badiou, for Meillassoux ‘the future will 
decide and perhaps the dead will make the final judgment’; whereas, for Badiou, the question 
ought rather to be: ‘how is the Real of the present deployed for the future’.122
Hâgglund’s ‘radical atheism’ takes a firmer hold of the principle of the succession of 
time. Objecting to Meillassoux’s use of the ‘wholly other’, Hâgglund suggests that 
Meillassoux has misinterpreted Derrida, whose concept of alterity, he says, is ‘indissociable 
from the condition of temporality that exposes every instance to destruction’; hence for 
Derrida, the ‘wholly other’ {tout autre) ‘does not refer to the positive infinity of the divine but 
to the radical finitude of every other’.123 Reality’s subjection to the ‘violent passage of time’, 
says Hâgglund, is thus ‘absolutely irreducible’.124 Hâgglund’s point, based on a Derridean 
notion of survivre, is that death is always already a part of life. It is not that we first live and 
then die, but that life already contains its own eventual death; as Derrida puts it, life is a 
‘temporary reprieve’.125 All this leads to a claim by Hâgglund that is of particular interest, not 
just for this chapter but for the dissertation as a whole. Not only is immortality not a 
possibility, he argues, it is also not desirable; for the desire for immortality is itself, he 
suggests, ‘motivated by a desire for mortal survival that precedes it and contradicts it from 
within’; hence even our desire for immortality is a function of survival.126
118 From Hume’s Enquiry, 45, cited by Hallward from Meillassoux’s own citation o f Hume {After Finitude, p. 91). Hallward, 
in The Speculative Turn ed. by Bryant and others, pp. 131-132; Hallward, in The Speculative Turn ed. by Bryant and others, 
p. 132.
119 Hâgglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique o f Meillassoux’, in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Bryant and 
others, p. 116. Here, Hâgglund refers to Meillassoux, ‘Spectral Dilemma’, Collapse 4 (2008), p. 269.
120 Hâgglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism: A Critique o f Meillassoux’, in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Bryant and 
others, p. 116.
121 Alain Badiou, ‘Interview: Alain Badiou and Ben Woodard’, in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Biyant and others, p. 20.
122 Ibid., p. 20.
123 Hâgglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism’, pp. 115-116.
124 Ibid., p. 116.
125 Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview. An Interview with Jean Bimbaum, trans. by Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 2-25.
126 Hâgglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism’ in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Bryant and others, p. 116.
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This differentiation has important political implications, which Hâgglund goes on to 
draw out based on his principle of the arche-materiality of time. This idea, he explains, differs 
to Meillassoux’s speculative logic whereby the temporal is privileged over the spatial. For 
Hâgglund, time is contingent on a spatial materiality. Hence, where Meillassoux may 
speculate on a potential ‘peaceful state of being’, where time’s ‘pure virtuality’ has the 
capacity to ‘make anything happen’, Hâgglund argues that there can be ‘no line of flight from 
the exigencies of the natural world and its [...] demands’.127 Nor would such a flight be 
desirable. He states:
The radical atheist argument is not simply that such a peaceful state of being is 
impossible to actualize, as if it were a desirable, albeit unattainable end. Rather, the 
logic of radical atheism challenges the very idea that it is desirable to overcome 
violence and speciality. A completely reconciled life—which would not be haunted 
by any ghosts—would be nothing but complete death, since it would eliminate every 
trace of survival.128
Hâgglund argues that this interpretation of desire is invaluable for the analysis of social 
struggle from a materialist perspective. Rather than dismissing disagreements fought on the 
grounds of—say—religious ideals, all competing positions in situations of conflict can be 
understood as efforts for survival. This may not tell us who is right, he adds; rather it asks us 
to look more closely at the material situation. Radical atheism in this way recalls us, he says, 
‘to the material base of time, desire and politics’.129
The value of this for the present chapter and for the dissertation as a whole is its 
envisaging of death-facing as a politico-material engagement with the world. While attention 
is drawn in Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide to the tragic impositions of hegemonic forces, it is also 
drawn, along with this, to multiple ways of knowing. On Hâgglund’s view, these represent 
various modes of survival and the material existences of people within the discourses they 
deploy. In this chapter, this differentiation between an acknowledgement of death as 
contained within life and the Meillassouxian claim that we can know a world without thought 
is explored in relation to the novel’s concern with the discursive in the material. While the 
novel moves the reader into an engagement with material spaces, at the same time it keeps in 
play the question of the power of story. As we reach the closing pages, the novel seems
127 Ibid. p. 129.
128 Ibid. p. 129.
129 Ibid. p. 129.
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almost to relinquish the sense of the material that it has worked so hard to depict, giving way 
instead to a sense of closure that is also unconvincing. I consider in this chapter whether this 
is inevitable, or whether—following its successful deployment of a range of discourses—the 
novel ends up somehow disengaging with death, and with the corresponding political struggle 
described by Hâgglund, thereby arriving at a ‘state of peacefulness’ more like that depicted as 
‘possible’ by Meillassoux (see note 47 above).
The novel’s storyline, to give a brief synopsis at this point, centres on the combined question 
of human and nonhuman inhabitancy of India’s Sundarbans region. Lusibari, the novel’s 
fictional island, is located in the Sundarbans—a tidal mangrove forest region in the Bay of 
Bengal, bordering West Bengal and Bangladesh. In the tidal ecology of the Sundarbans, 
islands are repeatedly submerged and reformed, while storms batter the region. With its rich 
biodiversity, the Sundarbans today is a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a reserve for the 
Bengal Tiger. As the novel depicts, various islands of the region have also been intermittently 
inhabited by local populations, who find themselves at constant risk of attack by tigers, 
among other animals. The novel is about the region’s wildlife and ecology, but it is also 
about its peoples and their lives. Moreover, it is about the conflicts that arise between the lives 
of people and wider efforts to protect of the natural world.
In exploring this, the novel makes use of two events in India’s history. The first 
revolves around Scottish businessman Daniel Hamilton, a historical figure who in the early 
twentieth century purchased thousands of Sundarbans acres in which to develop his dream of 
the ideal community, inviting settlers to take up his offer of free land and cooperative 
living.130 However, we read in the novel, through Nirmal’s notebook, of his and Nilima’s 
shock, when, on arriving in Lusibari in the seventies, they encounter the profound destitution 
of the island’s inhabitants. Difficulties with farming, due to land-reclamation measures having 
fallen into disrepair since Hamilton’s death, mean that people are turning to the forest for 
food, where they often fall prey to the tigers. In the narrative present, twenty years later, the 
islanders are benefitted by the Badabon Trust, an NGO set up by Nirmal and Nilima to 
provide such facilities as a local hospital. Even so, as Nilima tells Piya, deaths caused by 
tigers remain frequent, with numbers far exceeding government figures. The novel also 
depicts the story of the Morichjhâpi massacre of 1979, an historical event that occurred after 
the settling of a Sundarbans island by tens of thousands of Hindu Bengali refugees, displaced
130 According to Amitav Ghosh, his ‘father’s “middle-elucr-brothcr” [...] was the last manager o f the Hamilton estate in 
Gosaba’. See Amitav Ghosh website <http://amitavghosh.conVblog/?p=141 > [accessed 27 May 2014].
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in the break-up of East and West Pakistan. Having set up their communities in tiger 
conservation territory, the settlers were ordered to leave by the Left Front government, from 
whom they had expected support. When they refused to move, officials were sent in and the 
settlers besieged and then killed, the women also raped. Ghosh’s depiction of this event in 
fiction has served to draw public attention to an otherwise little known tragedy, exposing the 
risks that inhere in the global expansion of environmentalist movements, in this case arising 
through international pressures on the Indian Government to safeguard the Bengal Tiger—it is 
worth further noting that India’s Project Tiger, founded only a few years prior to the 
Morichjhâpi incident, is funded largely by such bodies as the World Wildlife Fund.131 The 
novel’s incorporation of these two events provides a platform for its explorations of the 
broader issues, out of which conflicts between humans and the nonhuman world arise.
While the novel’s socio-political context is thus complex and broadly drawn, its main 
storyline is rather more straightforward. In the narrative present, Piya and Kanai arrive 
simultaneously in Lusibari. Piya has travelled based on her plans to study the rare Irrawaddy 
dolphin. Kanai, a middle-aged translator from Delhi, has made the journey (somewhat 
reluctantly, as he sees Lusibari as backward and uncivilised) in response to his aunt’s 
(Nilima’s) invitation to collect his late uncle’s notebook, which was left to him but has only 
now been found after twenty years. Throughout the novel, Kanai reads the notebook in 
sections and his feelings for Piya grow. Piya, however, is more drawn to the fisherman Fokir 
with his intimate knowledge of the Sundarbans landscape—a knowledge not appreciated by 
his wife, who regrets his lack of ambition. It is as Fokir is working as a guide for Piya’s 
dolphin survey that a violent storm occurs and he dies saving her.
As mentioned earlier, the novel’s reflection on death-facing, depicted in part via its 
characterisations, is also conveyed through its thematic use of Rilke’s Duino Elegies, as 
presented in Nirmal’s notebook. The Elegies consider death as an obstacle for human 
engagement with life, on one hand proposing a facing of death square-on, yet on the other 
concluding with what Torsten Pettersson describes as a sense of ‘puzzlement rather than 
positive insights’.132 Because the Elegies' poetic exploration of a material engagement with 
death is primarily an aspect of Nirmal’s contribution to the novel as a whole, I examine the 
Elegies specifically within my analysis of Nirmal’s characterisation. At the same time, much 
as Nirmal’s notebook is dispersed throughout the narrative in stages, the Elegies should also
131 See ‘Past, Present and Future’, Project Tiger India website <http://projecttiger.nic.in/past.htm> [accessed 15 October 
2013].
137 Torsten Pettersson TnlemalizaLion and Death: A Reinterpretation o f Kiike’s "Uuineser tiiegien”’ The Modern Language 
Review  94.3 (July 1999), 731-743, p. 732.
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be understood as a motif that interweaves the novel as a whole, and thus only carried by 
Nirmal’s own writings.
The three characters, Piya, Nirmal and Fokir, each bring to bear an aspect of the 
novel’s broader socio-political context, in turn contributing to the novel’s concern with the 
role of death-facing. The combination of the three characterisations enables the novel to 
deliver a complex admonition about the dangers of overlooking the material aspect of death- 
facing, even as it illustrates the role of the discourse as an inexorable phenomenon of the 
human in its world.
Piya
If the death-facing paradigm—as outlined in this dissertation—envisages a turn to death- 
facing as a legitimate response to environmental crisis, in The Hungry Tide it is Piya, in the 
first instance, who embodies it. However, as it is imported via Piya into Lusibari, it appears as 
incongruent, since death is already faced in Lusibari on a day-to-day basis. In this section I 
explore this misalignment, which the novel carries over from Piya to the Morichjhâpi 
incident. Piya is an individual with environmentalist interests, and not a representative of any 
environmentalist group as such; nonetheless her willingness to sacrifice herself for the 
Irrawaddy Dolphin is juxtaposed in the novel with the slaughter of refugees at Morichjhâpi on 
the grounds of saving the Bengal Tiger. In this section I also consider Piya’s constant 
reflections on the function and limits of language, which occur alongside the novel’s gradual 
overwriting of her discursive understanding of death-facing with its material counterpart— 
Piya nearly loses her life in the Sundarbans on several occasions, which has the effect of 
gradually converting her death-facing mode into one of survival. Finally I explore Piya’s role 
in the novel’s ending.
Piya’s importing of the death-facing paradigm emerges late in the novel and becomes
apparent in relation to a particular incident: her witnessing of an attack on a tiger, which is
trapped, speared in the eye and then burned alive, having wandered into a village. Clearly this
depiction of a revenge killing is intended as distressing and provocative in terms of the issues
it raises. The scene is followed by an intense dialogue between Piya and Kanai, in which Piya
expresses her horror, both at the killing of the tiger and at the way this killing appears as an
every-day act for those involved. She is particularly distressed at Fokir’s claim (translated for
her by Kanai) that tigers come into villages because they ‘want to die’ (295). Kanai tells her
that Fokir is not ‘some grass-roots ecologist’; he then points out that people have had to Team
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to take such killings in their stride’ (297), reminding Piya of the larger picture and of her own 
complicity in the event:
‘it was people like you,’ said Kanai, ‘who made a push to protect the wildlife here, 
without regard for the human costs. And I’m complicit because people like me -  
Indians of my class that is -  have chosen to hide these costs, basically in order to curry 
favour with their Western patrons’. (301)
The conversation then moves onto another level, explicitly referencing the death-facing 
paradigm via Piya’s response to Kanai. Her insistence that humans should not be valued more 
than other species sharing the same habitat is first countered by Kanai’s remarking: ‘that’s all 
very well but it’s not you who’s paying the price in lost lives’ (301). However, Piya then 
claims that she would give her own life if she thought that to do so would ‘make the rivers 
safe again for the Irrawaddy dolphin’ (301). The articulation of this sentiment alongside the 
clash between human and tiger that has just occurred very much problematises death-facing, 
highlighting the negligibility of difference between ‘I am prepared to die to save the 
nonhuman’ and ‘you must die to save the nonhuman’—as depicted in the Morichjhâpi 
incident.
While Piya’s character, linked to the Morichjhâpi incident, represents the dangers of
discourses in transit and the risk of epistemic violence, she also stands as a site of personal
(although in some ways limited) transformation, the trajectory for which has its starting point
in her deep green ethics and continues via her ongoing enquiry into the problem of language.
Throughout the novel, Piya pursues a question that is concerned with what we can know, and
whether this ‘what we can know’ relies on language (concluding that it does not). Early on in
the novel she remembers being summoned, as a young girl, by her mother (who died when
Piya was young), and finds it strange that she cannot recall the sounds of the words (‘were
they in English or Bengali?’ [94]) but can remember their meaning and intent. Piya carries
this line of questioning over, first to the dolphins, and then to Fokir, neither of whose
language she can speak or understand (Piya has all but lost her Bengali, while Fokir speaks no
English.). Yet Piya perceives these two situations differently. She is fascinated by dolphin
communication, by ‘the idea that to “see” was also to “speak” to others of your kind, where
simply to exist was to communicate’ (159), but, for the most part, she experiences an
‘immeasurable distance’ between herself and Fokir, putting her inability to know what he is
thinking down, not to their lack of a shared language, but to her sense that ‘human beings
[come] equipped, as a species, with the means of shutting each other out’ (159). Human
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language, in comparison to dolphin communication—Piya concludes—is just a ‘bag of tricks’ 
that fools you into ‘believing that you could see through the eyes of another being’ (159). 
Piya’s stance at this point, with its emphasis on nonverbal and nonhuman communication, 
seems strongly ecocentric and carries elements of the posthuman. It indicates an open- 
mindedness where Piya seems willing to acknowledge the existence of a real beyond her 
capacity to perceive it. At the same time, Piya’s views are positioned in the novel as 
discursively located, as operating from within a culturally and temporally contingent, deep 
green environmentalist—and also death-facing—paradigm. What she sees, knows and 
believes is thus placed in question as it is carried into a differing context.
This dual representation of Piya—along with her potential for transformation—can be 
viewed as illustrative of the problematic relationship between environmentalist discourse and 
the idea of truth or the real, whereby the very claim that environmental crisis is real is 
contained within discourse all the same. Environmentalisms can be said to necessarily rely on 
an assumption that a real exists regardless of humanity, even as it includes us: a real without 
which, furthermore, we would have no being. It is the challenge of the real (the potential 
consequences of global warming, say), that incentivises environmentalisms in the first place. 
Yet acknowledging that environmentalisms are also discursive ideas is important, since as 
The Hungry Tide suggests, this not only makes them vulnerable to attack, but to error and 
misuse—awareness of which is also imperative. Partly through Piya, The Hungry Tide 
actively explores this problem of how to manage the real of environmental crisis, alongside its 
discourses and the risks these involve.
Meillassoux’s use of a mathématisation in his quest to reconcile ‘thought’ and ‘the 
absolute’ provides a starting point for observing this exploration in the novel. Meillassoux 
turns to mathematics as a route to depicting possible realities that fall outside the scope of 
human interpretability: that which is mathematically describable must imply a possible 
reality. As Fabio Gironi states, this mathématisation:
is not simply a useful heuristic tool for scientific theorising or a means for technical 
control of nature, but opens up a completely new view of the universe, revealing a 
“glacial world” organised according to a set of indifferent coordinates whose zero 
point is no longer the human being, operating an irreversible laceration between 
thought and the world.133
133 Fabio Giruni, ‘Meiiiassuux's Speculative Philosophy o f Science: Contingency and Mathematics', Fli 22 (2011), 25-60, p. 
34; Gironi cites Meillassoux, p. 115.
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The value of this notably posthumanist theorisation for environmentalisms is evident; it also 
fits Piya’s sense that a real beyond her perception exists. A difficulty emerges, however, in 
that Meillassoux’s use of a mathématisation process is also what leads to his idea of hyper- 
Chaos, mathematics being—for Meillassoux—both the language of contingency and the only 
metaphysical necessity. For Gironi the problem here—although in the end he defends 
Meillassoux—is a reliance on the arbitrariness of mathematics.134 Hâgglund’s objection, 
however, is that contingency itself requires time and space in which to operate, and, for 
Hâgglund, from a materialist perspective, time is a spatial unfolding of death (hence he views 
life as survival). Hâgglund therefore objects to Meillassoux’s assumption that even time itself 
may collapse within the (mathematical) possibilities of his contingent world, since 
contingency is itself temporally generated in the first place.135
In The Hungry Tide, it is not enough that Piya possesses a willingness to face death, 
based on her discursively formed (posthumanist) ideas about what might exist beyond her 
awareness. Rather than leave things at a Meillassouxian, mathematically driven theorising that 
‘anything might be possible’, which according to Badiou is to abandon the political—and 
which in turn, in the novel, results in tragedy (see notes 39 and 42 above), Piya is forced by 
the narrative to encounter death, and thus time and contingency, directly. Where the novel’s 
turn to the material is often described by critics in terms of Piya’s involvement with landscape 
and community, here I consider such a materialisation specifically in terms of her death- 
facing.
Piya faces death on several occasions and each time she survives. The first occasion 
occurs when, arriving in the region of Lusibari via a hired launch, she falls overboard into the 
silted swamp. Fokir, who at this point is a stranger, jumps overboard to save her, not only 
pulling her from the water but resuscitating her by sucking the silt from her lungs—along 
with some inhaled vomit. Thus from the very moment of arrival in Lusibari, Piya encounters 
what it means to face death in actuality, as survival, rather than as an ethical position on 
environmentalist grounds. A day or two later, a second death-facing occurs. Piya is now on 
Fokir’s smaller fishing boat, having escaped the hands of the corrupt launch owners. As she 
leans over the side to lower her depth-sounder into the water, Fokir unexpectedly leaps over, 
pulling her back from the water and away from the jaws of a crocodile the size of the boat. 
These two occasions together, the near-drowning and the crocodile attack, traumatise Piya so
134 GiiOiii, p. 39-40.
135 Hâgglund, ‘Radical Atheist Materialism’ in The Speculative Turn, ed. by Levi Bryant and others, p. 129.
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that she is caused to reflect on the real possibility of death. Later, safe in her room in the 
house of Kanai’s aunt, Nilima, Piya sinks back into a chair and, recalling events, starts to 
engage with death-fear as a physical experience:
She saw once again the wrenching, twisting motion of the reptile’s head as its jaws 
closed over the spot where her wrist had been ... She imagined the tug that would have 
pulled her below the surface and the momentary release before the jaws closed again, 
around her midsection, pulling her into those swift, eerily glowing depths where the 
sunlight had no orientation and there was neither up nor down. She remembered her 
panic falling from the launch, and it made her think if the numbing horror that would 
accompany the awareness that you were imprisoned in a grasp from which there was 
no escape. (194)
Piya’s reflection on her experiences is central to her increasing material engagement with life, 
an engagement that also gradually aligns her more closely with Hagglund’s notion of material 
time, which envisages life as always already containing death, not just as an idea, but as an 
aspect of its material becoming or survival.
In between these two death-facing events, Piya also witnesses a ceremony conducted 
by Fokir at the shrine of Bon Bibi on the island of Gaijontola, her involvement with which 
places her in symbolic relation with the region’s mythology. The legend of Bon Bibi is an 
articulation of the Lusibarians’ conception of death, in which the Irrawaddy dolphin plays a 
role. According to this legend, by calling upon the goddess Bon Bibi—a syncretic figure who 
reflects the geology and history of the region by bringing together Islamic and Hindu 
mythology—one might enlist protection from Dokkhin Rai, the demon king who has power 
over life and who often takes the form of a tiger.136 The dolphins or ‘shusuk’ (235) who 
frequent the shores at Gaijontola, meanwhile, are viewed as the messengers of Bon Bibi. 
Thus, in studying the dolphins, Piya is unwittingly engaged with the survival aspect of the 
legend. Piya watches the ceremony with interest but little comprehension. As they 
subsequently leave the island, Fokir points to a tiger footprint in the sand, by which he means 
that a tiger has been close but has not harmed them. While neither Piya nor the reader is able, 
at this point, to fully comprehend Fokir’s meaning, the novel goes on to gradually disclose 
more about the legend.
136 Kaur, p. 135.
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If Hagglund’s theory of ‘radical atheism’ proposes viewing religious practices (and 
culture generally) as means of survival, rather than being dismissive of their contents, the 
narrative’s gradual unfolding of the Bob Bibi legend also seems to reflect such a view (see 
note 49 above). Its incorporation of the legend appears to emphasise the legend’s function 
more so than its content. Mid-way through the novel, in an excerpt from Nirmal’s notebook, 
Nirmal is taken to Gaijontola by a friend, Horen; with them is Fokir as a young boy. As 
Horen rows towards the shore, he asks Nirmal whether he can yëe/ the fea r \  saying ‘it’s the 
fear that protects you', it’s what keeps you alive. Without it the danger doubles ’ (244). At the 
shrine on the island, Horen then recites a mantra, which tells the story of Duhkey, the boy 
who is abandoned on the island to be ‘devoured by the tiger-demon, Dokkhin Rai’, but who 
calls upon and is rescued by Bon Bibi (246). In the later stages of the novel, a second, related 
event occurs. Fokir abandons Kanai on the island, ‘not because he wanted him to be dead but 
because he wanted him to be judged’ (327). Before abandoning him, Fokir asks him if he can 
‘feel the fear’ (322). When Kanai says he cannot, Fokir first tries to taunt him into fearing, 
and then runs off, forcing him to face the danger alone. In The Hungry Tide, the reader is thus 
directed to view the Bon Bibi legend as engendering a deliberate drawing forth and facing of 
fear via self-exposure to danger. Death-facing, then, for the Sundarbans inhabitants, is 
depicted as a means to withstand, or to acknowledge, death’s real possibility.
Piya is correspondingly made to face death one more time in the novel, this last event 
having the deepest impact on her, since, although she survives, it is at the cost of Fokir’s life. 
The Sundarbans region is prone to cyclones, and it is only because Piya and her crew— 
including Fokir—are out on a dolphin survey that they do not receive the warning of the 
impending storm. Hence, when the launch crew realise the danger (seeing many vessels 
heading inland), and after waiting as long as they can, they head inland without Piya and 
Fokir. When Fokir eventually realises the danger himself he takes Piya onto a nearby island, 
strapping them both to the branches of a tree. As the storm rages, it is only the protection of 
Fokir’s body pinned behind hers that enables Piya to survive. Fokir’s death is a tragic bonding 
that ostensibly imprints all he has represented for Piya, physically, onto her. By the time she 
realises he is dead, he seems to have become part of her:
Their bodies were so close, so finely merged, that she could feel the impact of 
everything hitting him, she could sense the blows raining down on his back. She could 
feel the bones of his cheeks as if they had been superimposed on her own; it was as if 
the storm had given them what life could not; it had fused them together and made 
them one. (390)
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For Piya (we will come to Fokir later), a key outcome of this episode is that she encounters 
directly an ethical dilemma that haunts environmentalisms, which is that the pursuit of one set 
of egalitarian actions can inadvertently—or for that matter might consciously—cause harm 
elsewhere. Fokir’s life ends up becoming subsumed in and consumed by Piya’s own desire to 
study the Irrawaddy dolphin. Piya’s subsequent guilt, however, is no rejection—by the 
novel—of environmentalisms ; rather, it illustrates a concern with the way personal, social and 
environmental agendas are inter-reliant and must be mutually considered. If the novel forms a 
meditation on the idea that human and other lives inevitably fall to the hunger of the tide, the 
episode of Fokir’s death seems to indicate that this tide is also, at times, the tide of human 
will. A further outcome for Piya, meanwhile, is a closing of the immeasurable distance 
between herself and Fokir. Piya’s direct and tragic witnessing of Fokir’s death, regardless of 
her part in it, thus completes her encounter with the meaning of death-facing, and 
correspondingly completes the transformation that her character undergoes.
At the same time, however, the imprinting upon Piya of a direct experience of material
death also draws attention to the aporia of death that lies at the heart of the death-facing
paradigm, constantly problematising it. Here, a material facing of death opens up rather than
closes a binary logic, where the personal trace toward the material, as is enacted in death-
facing, is always, too, a response to a collective experience of death. Hence, while Piya’s role
in the novel’s ending might be read as central to its conclusions, it might alternatively be read
as being central just to one strand of the storyline. After Fokir’s death, Piya leaves Lusibari,
only to return having raised the necessary funds to set up a longer-term dolphin project. As
noted in most readings, this ‘returning’ Piya actively enlists the support and involvement of
the local people, explaining to Nilima, with whom she hopes to collaborate: T don’t want to
do the kind of work that places the burden of conservation on those who can least afford it’
(397). This illustration, via Piya, of the importance of considering and engaging with the local
context is a key statement in the novel—one that is reflected, too, in other of Ghosh’s works.
In line with this, Piya’s transformation can be viewed in relation to Hagglund’s claim: that
death is already a part of life, and not just the event that ends it; hence it is not immortality
that we crave but survival (see note 46 above). Piya’s actions point towards a corresponding
emphasis on real on-the-ground politics that engage fully with the situation at hand. Yet,
despite the novel’s bringing to earth (so to speak) of one of its two main elites, its overly-neat
ending ostensibly loses grip of its own engagement with broader issues. Piya’s individual
response seems hardly to touch such overarching concerns as the blindness of globalising
enterprises and the related consequences of western hegemonies, even if the inference made—
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that they must engage with local contexts—is cogent in itself. It also, as Huggan and Tiffin 
point out, ignores the more intractable problem of the endangered but also man-eating Bengal 
Tiger in favour of Piya’s rather less problematic dolphin solution.
It seems that to explore these omissions, or at least how and why they occur, we must 
look beyond Piya. I next examine Nirmal’s characterisation as tied up in his dual interest in 
Marxism and poetry, through which I hope to draw out some complexities that begin to 
complicate our conceptions of Piya’s death-facing. However it is beyond that—in the novel’s 
portrayal of Fokir—that the reader’s thoughts might be drawn away from the sense of a 
problematic ending, through the way Fokir’s outcome returns our thoughts to the question of 
ongoing struggle.
Nirmal
Nirmal’s contribution to the story is significant, despite his narrative presence being 
secondary. As with that of the boy’s mother in The Road, Nirmal’s death occurs outside of the 
novel’s main storyline, in this case twenty or so years prior to the narrative present. We learn 
about him mainly through a combination of his notebook and the recollections of his wife and 
nephew, these following on from a couple of short, initial, analeptic sections. Nirmal really 
only speaks to the narrative present via his notebook; hence his characterisation appears to 
form a distinct discursive layer in the text. While this ultimately highlights the textuality of 
any characterisation, it more specifically emphasises Nirmal’s role in the novel’s tandem 
questioning of textuality and materialism, which he fulfils through his dual interest in poetry 
and Marxism. In this section I outline the roles his character plays, paying particular attention 
to his interest in poetry, since the Elegies, through his use of them, form an important theme 
in the novel, supplementing its meditations on death. I also explore the way Nirmal acts as 
focaliser for various representations of the real, such as the geographical real of the landscape, 
or the lives of the settlers at Morichjhâpi. His descriptions have a strong influence on the 
storyline, despite, or perhaps due to, the textual emphasis of their framing.
The novel opens into a brief chapter that depicts Kanai on a train, on his way to 
Lusibari, and reading a short piece by his uncle Nirmal that has been sent on ahead to him by 
his aunt. This particular piece provides a poetic description of the Sundarbans that draws on 
imageries of beauty and death, depicting the frailty of humans and the resilience of the natural 
world. Nirmal writes:
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At no moment can human beings have any doubt of the terrain’s hostility to their 
presence, of its cunning or resourcefulness, of its determination to destroy or expel 
them. Every year dozens of people perish in the embrace of that dense foliage, killed 
by tigers, snakes and crocodiles. (8)
This depiction of the Sundarbans as untamed and perhaps untameable illustrates how the 
novel’s biocentrism, observed by some critics, is initially constructed via Nirmal’s writings.137 
Such biocentrism is conveyed too, although differently, via Fokir, who it turns out—as will be 
later discussed—is closely associated with Nirmal as child. Throughout the novel, Nirmal’s 
writings continue to depict the shapes and formations of the landscape and of human 
engagement with it, always seeking to emphasise the material real, while using poetic 
language to do so.
This first encounter for the reader with the Sundarbans is next complemented by 
Nirmal’s first reference to Rainer Maria Rilke, whom he refers to thereafter as, simply, ‘The 
Poet’. Nirmal’s use of Rilke serves to undermine easy relations of the human with its world. 
He writes:
as with Rilke’s catkins hanging from the hazel and the spring rain upon the dark earth, 
when we behold the lowering tide
‘we, who have always thought o f joy 
as rising ...feel the emotion 
that almost amazes us 
when a happy thing falls'. (8)
Here, Nirmal quotes the final coda at the end of the Tenth (last) Elegy, which—in the poem— 
marks its closure by reiterating its opening point that death is a question-mark for humanity, 
overwriting the poem’s interim resolutions. This first engagement with ‘the Poet’ thus places 
a statement on death’s ‘impossibility’ within the opening pages of the novel, and at the same 
time locates human existence in a particular relation with the natural or nonhuman world. This 
uncertainty about death discloses our vulnerability to the material nature of our own 
existence, and it is through Nirmal’s fascination with ‘the Poet’ that this vulnerability is 
addressed, in the novel, in poetic form.
137 Sen, p. 368.
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This initial poetic insistence on human vulnerability sets the tone for Nirmal’s ongoing 
exploration of a material / poetic dichotomy, which is remarked on by Kanai, when he and 
Piya are discussing his uncle out on the launch. Piya asks him about the notebook, and Kanai 
begins to explain Nirmal’s involvement at Morichjhâpi—a central focus of the notebook. 
According to Kanai, Nilima—who actively discourages Nirmal’s involvement with the 
Morichjhâpi settlers—would say that Nirmal could not ‘let go of the idea of revolution’ (282). 
For Kanai, however, Nirmal was ‘possessed more by words than by politics’. ‘There are 
people who live through poetry’ says Kanai, ‘and he was one of them’ (282). Piya— 
immediately picking up the narrative thread at work—remarks on this ‘odd combination’ of 
‘poetry and Marxism’ (282), leading Kanai to attempt to further explain his uncle. He was 
non-materialistic, on one hand, Kanai explains, but on the other he saw himself as a ‘historical 
materialist’; ‘He hunted down facts in the way a magpie collects shiny things. Yet when he 
strung them together, somehow they did become stories -  of a kind’ (283). Since the novel 
works in layers, Nirmal himself also explores, through his notebook, the questions that the 
notebook itself represents. An example of this is seen when, in the notebook, he asks: ‘What 
do myths and geology have in common?’ (180)—a question Nirmal envisages he will put to 
the children at Morichjhâpi, should he be appointed (as he hopes) as schoolmaster there. He 
proceeds to draw parallels between the discursivity of myths and the ‘strangeness’ (to use 
Timothy Morton’s sense of the word) of the nonhuman realm:138
‘[...] Look at the size o f their heroes, how immense they are -  heavenly deities on one 
hand, and on the other, the titanic stirrings o f the earth itself -  both equally 
otherworldly, equally remote from us ... And then, o f course there is the scale o f time — 
yugas and epochs, Kaliyuga and the Quaternary. And yet -  mind this! -  in both, these 
vast durations are telescoped in such a way as to permit the telling o f a story ’. (180)
Nirmal next considers how the features of the landscape—a river, for example—can become 
the inspiration for mythmaking, even if the myth, in turn, might never fully grasp its subject. 
The lesson he sees here (for the children he imagines) is encapsulated, as usual, via ‘the Poet’: 
“‘To sing about someone you love is one thing; but, oh, / the blood’s hidden guilty 
river god is something else’” (182). This disjunction between the real and the discursive is 
one that Nirmal captures repeatedly via narrative as well as poetic means. For example—
138 Morion implies the radical impossibility o f  knowing other using the term 'strange strangers’. See Morton, The Ecological 
Thought, pp. 14 -15 ,17-19 ,38-50 .
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again in his notebook—he describes an occasion when, out on a boat, he is reading a story to 
Horen about a priest caught in a storm. When Horen interjects with a claim that storms are the 
work of Dokkhin Rai, Nirmal writes: T grew impatient and said, ‘Horen!’ A storm is an 
atmospheric disturbance: it has neither intention nor motive’ (147). Yet Nirmal’s frustration 
at a naive adherence to the stories with which we explain our world belies his own 
engagement with discursive patterns. The character of Nirmal thus functions to challenge our 
conceptions of the function of language in relation to the world, the disjunction he discerns 
remaining poetic, even as it also indicates or designates the real.
Correspondingly, Nirmal’s depiction of aesthetic gaps between the ideological and the 
material also works the other way around, producing a reflective space that emphasises a 
Romantic engagement of the self with the natural. This is often apparent in his depiction of 
environmental concerns, when, on several occasions, he invites the reader to consider the 
landscape or the natural world either as more powerful than humanity, or as vulnerable to 
human presence. He also relates changing perceptions of the nonhuman world to minds that 
change, notably through a growing awareness of mortality:
Age teaches you to recognize the signs o f death. You do not see them suddenly; you 
become aware o f them very slowly over a period o f many, many years. Now it was as 
i f  I  could see those signs everywhere, not just in myself, but in this place that I  had 
lived in for almost thirty years. The birds were vanishing, the fish were dwindling and 
from day to day the land was being reclaimed by the sea. What would it take to 
submerge the tide country? Not much -  a miniscule change in the level o f the sea 
would be enough. (215)
Here, it is Nirmal’s own condition (aging) that enables him to perceive death as it appears
around him, suggesting a subjective effect reminiscent of Meillassoux’s correlationism.
However, this increasing death-awareness might alternatively return us to Hagglund’s notion
of survival. For Hâgglund, it is when we acknowledge survival as being integral, not just to
human lives but to the temporal material becoming of the world, thus to all things—as Nirmal
does here—that we acknowledge the real beyond human thought. That being the case, Nirmal
represents, not just the problem of a post-Kantian subjectivity, or correlationism—as
Meillassoux defines and understands it, but also such contemporary challenges to it as the
(re)tum to death-thinking, as considered in this dissertation.
Nirmal’s function in the novel is generally understood as one of generating awareness
of the refugee massacre at Morichjhâpi, and as thereby giving a voice to the subaltern; yet this
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grappling with the discursive and the real might suggest that the central cog in Nirmal’s 
writings is not the Morichjhâpi incident, for all its importance to the novel as a whole, but ‘the 
words of the Poet’—the Duino Elegies.139 Nirmal is engaged with a depiction of human 
alienation from death that amounts to a difficulty with fully inhabiting the world, and 
correspondingly with the question of how this difficulty might be surmounted. This is 
paralleled in the Elegies. As the opening lines of the Fourth Elegy read:
We are not attuned, not at one, we lack the instinct 
of migrant birds. Late, we get left standing -  
abruptly we launch ourselves into the wind 
only to go plummeting down into the water 
that does not care for us. At once, we feel ourselves 
both wither and flower. Somewhere else, lions 
roam unaware of any weakness of their majesty.140
This sense of alienation, which, in the Tenth Elegy, is also presented as a characteristic of the 
modem West—a symptom of a ‘market of consolation’, is then countered in the same Tenth 
Elegy with a turn to ‘the real’:
behind the last board plastered with posters for 
Neversaydie bitter that tastes sweet to drinkers 
as long as they chew fresh distractions with i t ... 
immediately beyond the board, right behind it, 
it gets real. Children play and lovers 
hold each other seriously, out of the way, 
in the sparse grass, and dogs obey their nature.141
In his notebook, Nirmal seems to grasp each of these two lyric moments in order to articulate 
the gap that appears between them. As part of this, he functions as a focaliser for instances of 
this real: the landscape, its geology and its disappearing creatures, the lives of the settlers at 
Morichjhâpi. His writings here pay close attention to material detail, the effect of which is to
139 Nishi Pulugurtha ‘Refugees, Settlers, and Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide’ in Local Natures, Global Responsibilities: 
Ecocritical Perspectives on the New English Literatures, ed. by Lorenz Volkmann and others (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), p. 
84.
140 Rainer Maria Rilke, Tne Duino Elegies, irans. by Ivlartyn Crucefix (London: Enimarmon Press, 2011), p. 37.
141 Rilke, p. 77.
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reduce a problematic sense of alienation. Yet as Nirmal brings to narrative attention a set of 
real-world problems, his own characterisation retains a textuality that in the novel is also 
contrasted with the immediacy of characters of the narrative present, such as Piya and Kanai, 
who are significantly more ‘real’ for the reader. Such varying layers of reality and textuality, 
along with Nirmal’s engagement with the Duino Elegies, are ultimately turned back to the 
question of death-facing as the site of this ongoing difficulty.
With this tension established, we might now turn to consider more closely Nirmal’s 
depiction of the Morichjhâpi massacre, which, as a historical episode, carries considerable 
potency in the novel as well as being specifically tied—not to death-facing per se—but to the 
question of death-facing as an idea. Although being an observer of the real, Nirmal also 
illustrates death’s aporetic contingency in his own discursivity. When Nirmal first visits the 
settlers at Morichjhâpi, he is oveqoyed (we learn from his notebook) by what he sees as a 
grassroots proletariat victory in the making, devoid of the need for ideological theorising. He 
describes it as an ‘astonishing spectacle, as though an entire civilisation had suddenly 
sprouted in the mud’ (191). ‘Saltpans had been created, tubewells had been planted, water had 
been dammed for the farming of fish, a bakery had started up, boat-builders had set up 
workshops, a pottery had been founded’ (191), and so on. Along with this detailed account, 
Nirmal reflects on his own poetic process, as usual in accord with the ideas of ‘the Poet’.
How better can we praise the world but by doing what the Poet would have us do: 
by speaking o f potters and ropemakers, by telling o f
‘some simple thing shaped for generation after generation 
until it lives in our hands and in our eyes, and it's ours ’. (193)
Nirmal’s encounter with the Morichjhâpi settlers also awakens his long-held socialist 
inclinations. He is excited by the settlers’ campaign to counter government opposition to their 
presence, and by their enlisting of the support of Kolkata intelligentsia to raise public 
awareness of their plight. He is profoundly moved that he should ‘live to see’ this 
‘experiment’, which has been ‘imagined not by those with learning and power, but by those 
without’ (171). In Nirmal’s eyes, the Morichjhâpi settlement is a utopia, a ‘place of true 
freedom for the country’s most oppressed’ (191). Here, Nirmal’s enthused response to the 
Morichjhâpi settlement can be seen to emphasise both a close narrative engagement with the 
material function of survival for the settlers in the Sundarbans landscape, and his own 
socialist convictions.
Layers of complexity begin to materialise, however, as a contrast is drawn between 
Nirmal’s strong urge to support the settlement and his wife, Nilima’s, refusal to do so. As 
their opposing positions are explored and clarified, Nirmal’s two-dimensional response to the 
Morichjhâpi settlers is overlaid for the reader with a three-dimensional view that must 
consider, too, the grounds upon which Nilima’s position stands. Nirmal’s anger at the 
government’s directive to disallow the settlement begins to appear complicated by an 
increasing strand of naivety in his characterisation, as he also simply cannot fathom such a 
response, given (as he points out to Nilima) that only sixty years earlier Hamilton was 
permitted to develop the settlement at Lusibari. He also simply cannot fathom the failure of 
his old Marxist friends in Calcutta (as it was then) to support the settlers at Morichjhâpi. 
Nilima reminds him that people and situations change over time. She sees Nirmal’s faith in 
the greater cause and people who might uphold it as misguided and foolish. Her concern is 
(also) with facts on the ground, which are that she could lose hard-earned governmental 
support of her Trust should she support the Morichjhâpi settlers, the consequences for the 
inhabitants of Lusibari being potentially devastating. She warns Nirmal not to continue with 
his support of the settlers at Morichjhâpi, but Nirmal does so in secret. The outcome for 
Nirmal and Nilima is a breakdown of marital trust and friendship, followed by Nirmal’s loss 
of mental stability, and his death.
This collapse is significant in terms of the complexities it draws attention to. As far as 
the characterisation of Nirmal is concerned, this is not so much a critique of his Marxism— 
Ghosh himself has been referred to as a ‘disillusioned Marxist’ and Nirmal appears to present 
certain aspects of such a position—as a comment on his indulgence in levels of ideological 
theorising that he considers himself to be free from.142 Nilima highlights this by accusing 
Nirmal of not being practical. ‘7b build something is not the same as dreaming o f it’, she tells 
him. ‘Building is always a matter o f well-chosen compromises’ (214). It is Nilima, we read, 
whose hard work generated the success of the Badabon Trust, with no practical help from 
Nirmal, for all his ideological theorising. As Tomsky points out, Nirmal’s interest in the 
unfolding of events at Morichjhâpi is energised by his ‘nostalgic attachment’ to the ‘the idea 
of revolutions’, meaning that he might be accused of overlooking the refugees’ more 
fundamental need—simply for land upon which to live, as Nilima points out to him.143 This 
problematising of Nirmal’s character is further compounded when we discover (although only
142 Robbie B.H. Gob, ‘The Return o f the Scientist: Essential Knowledge and Global Tribalism in Amitav Ghosh’s The 
Hungry Tide and The Calcutta Chromosome' in Narrating Race: Asia, (Trans)Nationalism, Social Change, ed. by Robbie 
B.H. Goh (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), p. 57.
143 Tomsky, p. 59.
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late in the novel) the extent of Nirmal’s poetic infatuation with Fokir’s mother, Kusum, one of 
the Morichjhâpi settlers, which provides a further grounds for his enduring fascination with 
the settlement.
We might, however, view this portrayal of Nirmal the other way around—as a 
depiction of the challenges that confront social change. It is, after all, Nirmal who narrates the 
novel’s fictionalising of the Morichjhâpi incident, a fictionalising that in real terms has 
functioned to bring the event out of obscurity—although such an effect, of course, lies beyond 
the scope of the narrative itself. Tomsky, seemingly acknowledging the context and outcomes 
of the novel’s publication, views Nirmal as ‘a solitary figure’ who ‘challenges the silencing of 
history’, a view that—historical matters aside—might reposition the naivety produced around 
Nirmal’s characterisation as simply that which accompanies his refusal to comply with the 
historical norm, whereby even his old Marxist friends betray the Morichjhâpi refugees.144 
Highlighted from this perspective is the way the pressures of the real often defeat ideological 
endeavour. Accordingly, Mukherjee reads the characterisation of Nilima as demonstrating the 
‘pragmatism of the liberal elite’ who ‘cannot envisage any meaningful devolution of 
power’.145 Through this shift in perspective, the functioning of dominant discourses also 
becomes evident, turning Nirmal indeed into a solitary figure of opposition. These alternative 
perspectives on Nirmal’s characterisation, as he engages with the Morichjhâpi affair, perhaps, 
though, best serve to reinforce the ongoing question mark he places in the narrative. His 
depiction of the mind’s discursive engagement with the material situations it grasps illustrates 
this engagement as either problematic or essential, depending on where one stands, but, more 
importantly, Nirmal’s pursuit of the discursive variously makes visible the layers of 
complexity that might otherwise be concealed or overlooked.
This effect is most strikingly drawn at the point where the novel’s account of the 
Morichjhâpi incident brings Piya’s death-facing imperative into juxtaposition with the 
environmentalist imperative to save the Bengal Tiger. Within the narrative build-up to the 
massacre, Fokir’s mother, Kusum, explains the message that is being given to the settlers by 
the government officials:
‘[...] the worst part was not the hunger or thirst. It was to sit here, helpless, and listen 
to the policemen making their announcements ... “This island has to be saved for its 
trees, it has to be saved for its animals, it is a part o f a forest reserve, it belongs to a 
project to save tigers, which is paid for by people around the world. ” Every day,
Tomsky, pp. 58-59.
145 Mukherjee, p. 151.
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sitting here, with hunger gnawing in our bellies, we would listen to these words, over 
and over again. Who are these people, I  wondered, who love animals so much that 
they are willing to kill us for them? [...] ’. (261)
Here, the death-facing paradigm’s central ideological point—that the safeguarding of the 
nonhuman world must rely on human preparedness to face death—is plainly depicted. From 
this point on, Nirmal’s localising of the event increasingly takes prominence, providing an 
enhanced narrative engagement with material detail that is emphasised by Nirmal’s increasing 
need, on one hand, to capture the situation in writing, and the failure, on the other, of his 
writing implements as first his pen runs out of ink and then his pencil is reduced to a stub. A 
shift is thus implied, whereby the moment-to-moment material details of the situation are 
deemed to take over. Meanwhile Nirmal’s own witnessing hones in on an increased attention 
to the discursive moment, leaving the socio-political and historical complexities at work 
behind such scenario—the complexities of India’s past at work in the actions of its present 
government, or the increasing awareness of ecological compromise that drives globalising 
environmentalist movements such as the World Wildlife Fund—to fall into the background. 
This omission, at this stage in the narrative, seems only to amplify the novel’s portrayal of the 
effects of hegemonic discourse at work, drawing attention to the way vanishing context gives 
way to non-representational spaces. Where Hâgglund calls for attention to material details 
based on an underlying desire for survival, it is the complexes of such hidden spaces, as 
brought to attention by the novel’s layering of the discursive and the material, to which he 
refers.
Fokir
If the characterisation of Nirmal has, above all, demonstrated the complex relationship 
between our discursive engagement with the world and its events, Fokir depicts a loss of 
representation that appears only recoverable in a materialist mode. Whereas Nirmal’s voice is 
discursive in that he speaks from an archive of the past, Fokir’s voice, since he does not speak 
the language of the novel, is excluded, at least from the narrative present. Fokir is often thus 
viewed as a subaltern figure, his relative (narrative) silence, together with his illiteracy and 
simple lifestyle, being symbolic of his greater subaltern silence. Fokir nonetheless plays a 
primary role in demonstrating a materialist death-facing to Piya and Kanai, the novel’s two 
main elites. In repositioning the death-facing paradigm, he demonstrates a gap between 
romanticised ideas of ecological harmony, and the real matter of living and dying within the
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challenging, ecologically diverse, environment of the Sundarbans. If death-facing is intended 
to mean—as it does for the Gardeners in Atwood’s trilogy—participating in natural cycles or 
enabling nature in its becoming, then these ‘cycles’ and this ‘becoming’ turn out not to be 
harmonious states (qua Meillassoux), but continuing forms of survival. If death structures 
time and space, then life is haunted by death; it is our knowing this—for Hâgglund, and as 
demonstrated by Fokir—that is the starting point for all that is yet to be done. In this section I 
explore Fokir’s role in depicting a return to material death as he saves Piya on three 
occasions, the last at the cost of his own life. With this, I consider, too, Fokir’s general 
reception as an idealised figure with transformative functions. While Fokir’s death, at the end 
of the novel, tends to provide a key component of this idealising, in my reading I consider this 
death, rather (or at least primarily), as signalling the reality that death-facing poses: that death 
is, in material terms, a real possibility.
Fokir’s own understanding of death as a force in life is instilled in him initially by Nirmal, 
followed soon after by his own mother’s death at Morichjhâpi. Although our first encounter 
with Fokir occurs in the narrative present, at the point when he saves Piya from drowning, his 
back-story is gradually mapped out for us, bringing our earliest chronological encounter with 
him to a meeting with retired schoolteacher, Nirmal. Fokir, a boy of five, is delivered 
temporarily into Nirmal’s hands while his mother—unsuccessfully—seeks support from 
Nilima for the settlers at Morichjhâpi. Within this short visit, in a chapter entitled ‘Storms’, 
which is also an excerpt from Nirmal’s notebook, Nirmal conveys a powerful and devastating 
lesson to the boy. Nirmal takes Fokir onto the roof and asks him what he can see. The boy’s 
answer is: 7  see the bâdh, Saar' (202). Although his initial intention is to encourage the 
boy’s skills of observation, Nirmal proceeds to also instil in the boy a sense of the 
vulnerability of humans to the greater strength of the landscape. The bâdh is the embankment, 
built by the tidelands settlers, to keep sea waters from flooding the lands. Nirmal urges the 
boy to consider its weaknesses, emphasising not just the way humans take control of the 
landscape, but the way this landscape may so easily take back this control:
‘[...J See how frail it is, how fragile. Look at the waters that flow past it and how 
limitless they are, how patient, how quietly they bide their time. Just to look at it is to 
know why the waters must prevail, later i f  not sooner [...] ’. (205)
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Nirmal then asks the boy to look for signs of damage to the bâdh, explaining each sign with 
an historic example of a devastating storm. He also asks Fokir to ‘listen’, drawing his 
attention to the sound of the ‘multitudes of crabs’ that are ‘burrowing into’ the bâdh’s 
foundations (206). The sense conveyed here, that sooner or later the natural world will outdo 
and outlive the schemes of humanity, is one runs consistently throughout the novel, from the 
past through to the present, illustrating death-facing not as a Romantic composting of the self, 
but simply as an acknowledgement of the way things are: lands can be swamped; husbands 
can be killed; lives can be ruined. Nirmal concludes Fokir’s lesson by asking the boy whom 
one might turn to when the bâdh finally gives way. When Fokir cannot think of an answer, 
Nirmal, drifting back into poetics, tells him: ‘Neither angels nor men will hear us, and as for 
the animals, they won 7 hear us either’ (206). This, Nirmal continues, is ‘Because, o f what the 
Poet says, Fokir, because the animals
“already know by instinct 
we ’re not comfortably at home 
in our translated world”. (206)
In this rooftop discussion, Nirmal has thus instilled in the young Fokir, not just the idea that 
humanity is frail and cannot be relied upon, but a strongly materialist understanding of the 
world, one that views construction—whether the construction of the bâdh or the construction 
of human meaning—as a form of folly that can have no real lasting traction in the wider 
nonhuman world.
In the narrative present, the adult Fokir is a fisherman who lives by catching crabs, a 
trade he also teaches his son, Tutul. His humble occupation is both derided by his wife, who 
finds her husband’s lack of ambition and his illiteracy frustrating, and romanticised by Piya 
(at least for the larger part of the novel) for whom he is marvellously at one with the natural 
world. The simplicity of Fokir’s lifestyle is commented on in most readings of the novel; for 
example, Victor Li describes Fokir’s understanding of the world as ‘instinctive, natural and 
mystical’, in contrast with the ‘literate, modem rationality’ represented by Nirmal, Kanai and 
Piya.146 While the novel does make such a contrast, one might suggest that it also offers 
sufficient narrative complexity that the drawing of obvious points is rendered questionable. 
For a start, Fokir’s simplicity seems often to be depicted as simply an effect of his narrative 
silence, a language barrier leading his presence in the novel to appear as disengaged. Fokir’s
146 Victor Li ‘Nccrcidcalism, or the Subaltern's Sacrificial Death’, Interventions: International Journal o f  Postcolonial 
Studies 11:3 (2009), 275-292, p. 288.
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silence is nonetheless also important to the narrative as it amplifies his material presence, 
forcing attention onto his actions and allowing the novel to emphasise the gap between 
perception on one hand and interpretation on the other. Once one adds certain observations, 
such as the way Fokir prefers—as Mukherjee notes—to stay away from human settlements, 
spending ‘as much time as he can on the rivers’, and the way that he ‘feels out of place 
everywhere’ (as his wife explains to Kanai) (133), a more complex picture of Fokir 
emerges.147 Fokir’s experiences among the refugees at Morichjhâpi, culminating in his 
mother’s rape and murder by government officials, clearly do identify him—at least 
provisionally—as a subaltern figure. After all, as Kaur notes, Fokir ‘and his people’ clearly 
‘reflect the suffering underside of global collaborative networks’.148 Fokir only survives 
because Horen, friend of Nirmal and relative of Kusum and the boy, removes him from the 
island by boat, the day before the massacre occurs. Yet, Fokir’s childhood exchanges with the 
old schoolteacher also add to, thereby altering, this subaltern identity. A poetic (although not a 
Romantic) form of non-anthropocentric agency appears to be embedded in Fokir’s character, 
altering his relationship with the very question of survival, in turn posing an inverted 
challenge to dominant discourses: it is the globalising West, it turns out, that is required to re­
learn death-facing. Meanwhile, Fokir’s lessons from Nirmal about the necessary frailty of 
humans and the ‘monstrous appetite of the crabs and the tides, the winds and the storms’ 
(206), combined with his real experiences of loss (his mother) and his witnessing of events at 
Morichjhâpi, might well result in his becoming something of a loner who fishes for crabs and 
avoids the constructions of humanity, as a part of his own survival process.
Whatever our reading of Fokir, a key feature of his characterisation is his dramatic 
death at the end of the novel as he straps himself behind Piya in the branches of a tree, losing 
his life as he protects her from the storm. In readings that view Fokir as a subaltern figure, this 
presents a specific set of significances. Crucial to this is the way, having lost his life 
protecting Piya, Fokir is then enabled to ‘live on’ in Lusibari, partly because Piya’s GIS 
(satellite-based Geographical Information System), which survives the storm, preserves a 
record of all their trips in the waterways, and partly because she decides to name her dolphin 
project after him. Li’s reading takes such a route. He considers Gayatri Spivak’s well-known 
claim (one that potentially dismantles my own reading) that ‘subalterns are defaced, even as 
they are disclosed’149 and suggests, slightly differently, that, ‘the immortalization of the
147 Mukherjee, p. 150.
148 Kaur, p. 136.
149 Here, Li cites from and discusses Gayatri Spivak's A Critique o f  Fostcoioniai Reason: Toward a History o f  the Vanishing 
Present (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1999, 310); Li, p. 278.
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subaltern involves a troubling logic of sacrifice and necroidealization that replaces the 
messiness and ambiguity of struggle with the reassurance of an aestheticized political ideal.150
Li goes on to discuss the way the subaltern ‘has to die in order to serve as an 
irreducible idea’, to be ‘perfected as a concept so pure no living referent can contradict or 
complicate it’.151 Arguing that death, rather than allowing an appropriation of secrets or a 
colonising of subaltern space, instead ‘safeguards subaltern secrecy, singularity, and space’, 
Li sees Fokir’s death as leading to ‘a form of regeneration as his spirit lives on in Piya and his 
name is memorialized in her project’.152 Such a reading, in effect, places its emphasis on the 
surface or formal narrative response to the subaltern figure in specific relation to the death 
event. In the case of The Hungry Tide, the reading is thus based on Piya’s own 
transformation, which has little to do with Fokir and everything to do with what she feels she 
has learned from him, including her sense of guilt at his death. While the novel does present 
the situation this way, and while Piya’s transformation has significance in itself, the difficulty 
with such a reading, it seems, is that it is anchored to—and therefore fails to remark on—the 
novel’s somewhat unsatisfactory ending.
If one considers Fokir more specifically in relation to the questions considered in the 
dissertation, thus in relation to death-facing, then his death—like that of the mother in The 
Road—can be viewed, not as a sacrifice to be idealised, but as a material enacting of death- 
facing. Thus, rather than read the novel in terms of Piya’s—albeit laudable—decision in the 
closing pages to involve the locals in her environmentalist project, Fokir’s death might remind 
us, simply, that death is always there, meaning that there is no easy solution to the questions 
the novel poses. As Huggan and Tiffin point out, for example, the question remains as to how 
the Bengal Tiger might be safeguarded without overwriting the real lives of people.153 One 
might just as well ask how the lives of people can be safeguarded without overwriting the real 
lives of Bengal Tigers. Understanding Fokir does not require us to naively appropriate his 
subaltern space with the false presumption that we can explain him. It is enough, working 
from Hagglund’s materialism, to view his life—as any other—in terms of his desire for 
survival. It is here that we find the key to what Piya has learned, and perhaps even uncover 
some satisfaction in the novel’s ending. The value of acknowledging death’s material aspect, 
death as such, rather than holding to a purely discursive—thus potentially blind—death- 
facing, is that the egalitarian question of the desire for survival all round emerges as a political
150 Li, p. 275.
151 Li, p. 276.
1<i- Ibid., p. 291.
153 Huggan and Tiffin, p. 188.
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difficulty. It is this difficulty, furthermore, that in the end must be faced. The capturing of 
Fokir’s knowledge in Piya’s GIS, conversely, which symbolically places him in the stars to 
shine down as a ‘pure referent’, is, more than anything, a reminder of the limits of our 
constructed world. Even understanding that the function of such imagery is to inspire 
resolution is not, in itself, to enact any such resolution. Hence, what Li refers to as ‘the 
messiness and ambiguity of struggle’, which he points out is avoided by the logic of sacrifice 
and the ‘reassurance of an aestheticized political ideal’, can be reopened where Fokir is read 
as, simply—in Hagglund’s understanding of the term—a survivor.154
* * *
Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide reconsiders the question of death-facing by testing and developing 
its material aspect as a means to engage with the struggles of actual lives. The real possibility 
of death can be viewed as one face of Derrida’s aporia, as discussed in relation to McCarthy’s 
The Road. The Road provides an opportunity to focus on the anthropological aspect of death- 
thinking, bringing to attention the complexities concealed behind discursive thinking, and so 
illustrating why ecological thinking is difficult to do. This difficulty of how to engage with, 
perform or enact what Morton calls the ‘ecological thought’155 is demonstrated in all the 
novels examined. Ghosh’s novel, however, turns our attention more distinctly to its material 
potentiality, delineating a closer engagement with the challenges of the real.
In The Hungry Tide, we see this illustrated through the combined characterisations of 
Piya, Nirmal and Fokir. In Piya, the difficulty emerges that, because of death’s inevitable 
discursivity (its anthropological aspect), death-facing cannot, in itself, be assumed to provide 
an escape from temporal and cultural contingencies; in fact it functions to reveal them. While 
it is Piya who must repeatedly face death’s material possibility, Nirmal—despite and through 
his engagement with the poet, Rilke—provides an unresolved discursive meditation of the 
question of materiality, drawing to attention its inexorable struggle with the discursive, and 
taking a poetic route as a means to distinguish between the two. It is Fokir, though, whose 
death, I have suggested, more clearly depicts a distinction between death’s discursive and 
material aspects—at least potentially so. Where we remain, as does Piya, witness to Fokir’s 
death as a temporal event, we seem to limit our engagement to the interpretive, whereas, if we 
consider Fokir’s life as being, in itself, an ongoing struggle with ever-present death—thus
154 Li, p. 275.
155 See Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 135.
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viewing his life’s meaning simply as one of survival—then we are able at least to 
acknowledge the struggle that lies beyond us within the real.
This distinction, made in relation to Fokir’s death, is where the novel most closely 
illustrates the difference between Meillassoux’s speculative realism and Hagglund’s atheist 
materialism. With this, the novel correspondingly invites the reader throughout its pages to 
acknowledge the reality of material struggle, which Hâgglund, via his focus on survival, also 
seeks to give traction to. Most of the time, this is successfully achieved, it often being Nirmal 
who directs attention to the material world, making it visible through his emphasis on 
attention to detail—especially in relation to events at Morichjhâpi as juxtaposed with Piya’s 
death-facing. Nirmal also, though, highlights the textual nature of any attempt to explain 
death and the material, illustrating the way discourse is always contingent. Nirmal’s use, in 
his notebook, of the temporal narrative structure of story emphasises this, while his poetic 
engagement with Rilke’s Elegies tends to undo it, perhaps illustrating that poetic form might 
better convey Hagglund’s materialism.
One might suggest that what occurs at the end of the novel is a complete breakdown in 
this carefully crafted depiction of death’s aporia. As Fokir dies, the novel’s sense of struggle 
seems to vanish, leaving the reader with Piya’s somewhat bland, if laudable, resolution which 
is based in part on her idealising of Fokir. Among various readings of this, Tomsky’s 
suggestion, that the ‘flawed’ utopian ending is a conscious sign of the return of the author and 
a ‘necessary reminder of the story’s textuality’, seems the closest to mine.156 One might 
suggest that Fokir’s death viewed as utopian—or in Li’s terms as idealised—calls up the 
‘peacefulness’ depicted in Meillassoux’s work, his opening to other that envisages a temporal- 
contingent ‘anything is possible’ idea (see notes 39 and 40 above). It takes a certain leap, 
then, to revisit this other in terms of the struggle Hâgglund proposes. It cannot be depicted, 
but it can be known to the extent that it is implied. Hence by implication, the political struggle 
is rendered apparent. Even so, its implication relies on the discourse that precedes and shapes 
our knowing of it.
156 Tomsky, pp. 63-64.
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Conclusion
In this strand of contemporary environmental crisis fiction, the depiction of death as imminent 
is more than just a means by which to threaten disaster should we fail to change our ways. Of 
course, it functions this way too. What I have referred to as ‘the death-facing paradigm’ 
appears as a primarily anti-modemist declaration that runaway corporatism and the capitalist 
machinery is on track for disaster. It fundamentally contests the idea that growth is the means 
by which to alleviate either poverty or ecological destruction. It thus pursues an ecologist, as 
described by Andrew Dobson, rather than an environmentalist framework. It also, therefore, 
enlists its mode of response (death-facing) within the monumental gap that appears between 
today’s continuing absence of an effective response, and an envisioned ‘changed world’. One 
of Dobson’s concerns, however, is that delivering messages of ‘impending catastrophe’ (by 
whatever means) is not necessarily the way to ‘induce social change’.157 An initial question, 
therefore, in relation to this fiction and the death-facing paradigm it represents, is whether it is 
guilty of simply exacerbating the problem by fetishizing death, or whether the nuances of its 
death-facing might also be worth some exploration. I hope to have indicated the latter.
My investigation of death-facing in this fiction indicates the sheer breadth of issues to 
which death-facing gives rise. Taken together, my readings depict these novels as 
interrogating (aspects of) a history of Western thought on the human subject, in relation to 
concerns of the present. This may well be because, standing today at a particular moment 
when ‘environment’ emerges as a category of thought, the gap between the present and its 
resolution appears too vast to mentally accommodate in terms of action. Where might one 
start? One of the insights of Timothy Clark’s work is to point to the ‘derangements of scale’ 
that occur, whereby, ‘a sentence about the possible collapse of civilization can end, no less 
solemnly, with the injunction never to fill the kettle more than necessary when making tea’, 
or, a ‘motorist buying a slightly less destructive make of car is now “saving the planet’” .158 
By depicting humanity’s possible demise due to its impacts on the planet, these novels clearly 
do place the reader in the kind of impossible situation to which Clark refers. Similarly, the 
message in some of the novels that death is organically beneficial to ongoing life may be 
appreciated by some—including myself (on the whole)—yet it nonetheless places the reader, 
again, in an impossible situation, since, read literally, it appears to demand their voluntary
157 Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought, Fourth Edition (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1-4; p. 103.
158 Timothy Clark, ‘Derangements o f  Scale’, in Telemorphosis: Theory in the Era o f  Climate Change, Vol. 1, ed. by Tom 
Cohen (Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2012) <http://quod.libumich.edu/o/ohp/l 0539563.0001.001/1 :8/—telemorphosis- 
iheory-in-the-era-of-ciimate-change-voi-1 ?rgn=div 1 ; vie w=miitext> [accessed 2 June 2014].
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demise. In either case, death-facing gives rise to ‘impossibility’ and at the same time—and 
therefore—emits discourse.
While these novels therefore clearly do set up a problematic dynamic for the reader, 
they also engage in an idea about death-facing as an interrogation of the question, ‘Who are 
we today?’. It is here that the novels can be read as exploring our fears and self-doubts, the 
possibilities we envisage, and the ways these may relate to the broader political scene at a 
time of environmental crisis. This exploration occurs in juxtaposition to a new question, 
‘Where do we go from here?’, as it arises in relation to ‘environmental crisis’ as a new 
thought category. Environmental crisis creates a new problem for the human, whose 
subjective T  is already undermined by poststructuralists across the late twentieth century. A 
cumulative sense of our necessary self-erasure as a delinquent species is placed into newly 
accentuated conflict with the demand for our efforts to change—which require our agency, 
insight, and other such capacities. How might we at once both reinforce and delete ourselves? 
Such seems to be the question—and not just in fiction—at a time of environmental crisis.
For the already decentred subject, this becomes both a personal and a political 
question. On one hand, the individual is necessarily implicated, since death is always 
‘possible’ for the self, as Jacques Derrida notes and as (assumedly) any philosopher would 
agree.159 On the other hand, his saying so does not in the end detract from the political context 
into which death-facing falls, and in some ways gestures towards or even relies on it. Michel 
Foucault, who denies that death-evasion is a result of some (then) ‘new anxiety’ that ‘makes 
death unbearable for our society’, sees death instead as ‘power’s limit’.160 This emphasises 
the patterns of power to which the body-politic is subject. As such, the tension, today, 
between the demand for an individual response to environmental crisis and a collective 
(political) response seems appositely represented in death’s aporia. The fiction examined 
depicts environmental crisis as reinstating this aporia, where it juxtaposes the individual with 
hegemonic forms.
But within this, this fiction nonetheless pursues a quest for the real that is signalled in 
its emphasis on death-facing. This shift from fezAh-avoidance to àtaXh-facing replicates—as I 
hope to have demonstrated—a parallel theoretical shift whereby a concern with language is to 
an extent overtaken by the material quest that challenges it. Death-facing seems to imply 
something different or new in an epistemological domain; the empirical denotation of
159 For Derrida see discussions in Chapter Three.
160 According to Foucault, ‘death is power’s limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes the most secret aspect o f  
existence, the most “private’"; see Michel Foucault, 'Right o f  Death and Power over Life’ in The Foucault Reader: An 
Introduction to Foucault’s Thought, ed. by Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin, 1984), p. 261.
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‘knowledge’ is newly challenged and emphasised at a time of environmental crisis. Is climate- 
change real! Past decades may have taught us that we become egalitarian by acknowledging 
our own finitude—an idea that sustains in the figure of the ecological posthuman. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein puts this well when discussing the possibility of thought beyond the human. We 
shouldn’t say, he suggests, that animals don’t talk and therefore they don’t think; we should 
simply say that they don’t talk.161 Yet, this finitude is now, itself, further complicated. One 
might argue that it is also our drive to know—the ‘will to knowledge’ as Foucault puts it— 
that has led to the discovery of our impacts on the planet. Discovering the advent of pollution 
or climate change differs qualitatively to discovering a person to (supposedly) fit a category 
by virtue of assigning it to them (such as ‘mad’ or ‘homosexual’).162 To discover climate 
change is to encounter the real beyond the self and effectively beyond (albeit implicated by) 
the discursive power-structures of humans. Even climate change deniers must agree that 
species are diminishing, lands are being deforested, and oceans are being polluted, whether or 
not they assign to it any importance. These events exist both beyond us and because of us 
simultaneously. The momentous aesthetic shift represented in the life-world of the subject, as 
‘the environment’ takes categorical form—or appears as hyperobject, as Timothy Morton puts 
it—seems to underlie much of theory’s more recent developments, also provoking any 
number of questions, complexities and contradictions.163
In its depictions of the human subject at a time of environmental crisis, the fiction 
discussed in this dissertation correspondingly appears to draw on a range of theoretical ideas 
that infiltrate contemporary thought from the late twentieth and into the twenty-first century. 
Whilst the theories I have applied are largely distinct—Judith Butler, for example, works in 
quite a different way to, say, Cary Wolfe—they can nonetheless be clustered around a 
question of death. Through their engagement with death these novels interrogate a particular 
philosophical trajectory that both includes and reaches beyond a poststructuralist and, more 
generally speaking, a postmodern domain of thought. My aim has been to demonstrate some 
key examples of this trajectory’s theoretical moments, and the concerns to which they relate 
in the novels examined.
161 Wittgenstein is discussing ‘language games’, whereby our knowledge o f  is formed o f our interactions that include but are 
not limited to language. He states: ‘It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And 
this means: “they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.” But—they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not 
use language—if we except the most primitive forms of language.— Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are 
as much a part o f  our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing’. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical 
Investigations 25. 3rd Edition (New York: Macmillan: 1958).
162 Michel Foucault, The History o f  Sexuality: The Will to Know v. 1 (London: Penguin, 1998).
Timothy Morton, Hyperobjecis: Philosophy and Ecology After the End o f  the World (London: University o f  Minnesota 
Press, 2013). pp. 2, 7,99-133; pp. 2, 99; pp. 130-135; p. 99; see also discussions in this dissertation, p. 29.
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All the novels examined pertain to a similar twenty-first century contemporary 
moment, while being variously in dialogue with the ideas of such thinkers as Foucault, Butler, 
Derrida, and various others, both discussed and not discussed. What distinguishes such 
thinkers, in relation to my investigation, is their differing relatedness to (a) death, and (b) the 
emergent category of environment (the world, the object). In Chapter Two, I consider the way 
Margaret Atwood’s heavily satirical trilogy, in exploring possibilities for a post-capitalist 
world, revolves around a poststructuralist concern with agency and ethics. What can the 
decentred subject do and how? But also, what are the new demands on agency for the subject 
in an environmental crisis world? The shifting aesthetics of the subject are described in 
Morton’s concept, ‘the ecological thought’.164 Where Butler responds to a problem of agency 
and ethics in Foucault’s work, Morton illustrates how the call of the hyperobject in the 
subject-field newly interpellates the subject in the contemporary moment. Thus, death-facing 
in Atwood’s trilogy can be considered in terms of Morton’s ‘turning to the object’.165 Yet a 
question about the role and function of language looms large at the end of Atwood’s trilogy— 
a question that recurs in one way or another in each of the novels examined. This indicates a 
difficulty with conceptualising a turn to the material, unless this conceptualisation’s reliance 
on discursive practices is retained. This is in some sense an inevitable problem for the human 
as it is for its medium of literature, and perhaps most especially fiction. In Chapter Three, 
Derrida’s death as aporia illustrates the relation between death and life—or at least the ways 
we habitually think such a binary—and demonstrates a material death-facing as always 
reinstating the discursive, the anthropological. But, since death is universal (if anything is), 
then no solution to today’s challenges can discount its function; furthermore, the extent of 
these challenges seems to demand its reconsideration. Derrida’s final refocusing to ‘life’ (as 
survival) is re-translated in both the fourth chapter (Cary Wolfe) and the fifth chapter (Martin 
Hâgglund).166 However, Wolfe and Hâgglund seem more clearly to demonstrate how death 
might be considered, not just as always present in life but as a function of its spatial (Wolfe) 
and temporal (Hâgglund) structure. Posthumanist theorists such as Karen Barad are therefore 
able to work with the human whilst discounting the human, and to include language and 
agencies and even ethics in a collection of material-discursive practices that might or might 
not be human. The risk is that this very theorisation becomes just another item among endless
164 See Timothy Morton, The Ecological Thought (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 135.
165 Morton, Hyperobjects, pp. 22, 174.
166 Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: The Last Interview. An Interview with Jean Bimbaum, trans. by Pascale-Anne 
Brault and Michael Naas (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp, 24-25, 52.
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discursive practices; this is of course also its value, hence the aptness of the title of Barad’s 
book: Meeting the Universe Halfway.161
As the novels examined variously engage with this trajectory of ideas, they all retain a 
concern with language in relation to the question of how death (or environmental crisis) might 
be faced. While some of the novels devote more narrative time to dealing with the interior 
subject and its relations with death and discourse, some focus more on the spatio-temporal 
arena in which crisis occurs. Cormac McCarthy’s The Road reduces the human subject to 
virtually bare life, as its physical arena is destroyed. Jeanette Winterson’s The Stone Gods 
also pursues a concern with the interior subject, returning death as ‘possibility’ for the 
individual, having demonstrated its posthuman potentiality. All of the novels nonetheless 
locate their subjects in a world in which capitalist forms of power impact on human lives and 
agencies, with corresponding impacts to the nonhuman world. That is, environmental harms 
are demonstrated as outcomes of hegemonic forces, and not as personal evils.
Yet, on the whole, all the novels also remain concerned with re-conceptualising the 
subject as individual, while thinking through its relations to a world that always exceeds it. 
The individual plays a discursive role in the human collective, which in turn newly 
acknowledges the world as hyperobject. As this personal role is explored, it nonetheless 
appears to remain limited in real terms. In the novels of three of the four authors, this is 
overcome by strong layers of narrative abstraction. In Atwood’s trilogy, the dominant 
hegemonies are toppled but only because Crake wipes out vast swathes of humanity, the main 
survivors being the death-facing God’s Gardeners. In McCarthy’s The Road, the reader is 
forced to face a world that is beyond repair. In Winterson’s The Stone Gods, individual 
possibility is demonstrated in relation to the spatial and temporal vastness of the universe. 
These three novels insist on—while also interrogating—death-facing, yet generally say little 
about what death-facing might mean beyond its application to a death-evading Western 
consciousness, even as they demonstrate environmental crisis as a global concern. Oryx fades 
from Atwood’s trilogy after the first book, although she is the strongest (and weakest) voice 
of the real. Her silence, like that of Fokir in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide, might remind 
the reader that agencies rely on discursive forms, but also, in the Foucauldian sense, that 
discursive forms operate within or comprise systems of power. While each of the novels uses 
some strategy to indicate an elsewhere to the West, Ghosh’s novel most successfully invites 
the reader into a less abstracted and thus less generalised global consciousness. Actual lives of
167 Karen Barad, Meeting ike Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement o f  Matter and Meaning (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007), p. 181.
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humans and nonhumans are drawn in closer detail, whilst the transnational operations of 
discursive forms of power are also translated with clarity. Death-facing as conceptualised by 
Hâgglund produces, it seems, more scope for an egalitarian conception of death as universal 
phenomenon. But even Ghosh’s novel retracts to a question about the function of language, 
which it declines to resolve in the last instance.
Overall, the novels examined depict a contemporary paradigm of death-facing as a 
response to the death-evasion of the West and subsequent harms to the nonhuman world. At 
the same time, they both assume and interrogate the assumptions of an antimodemist stance. 
This suggests that the authors, all of whom are mature and have thus lived through the late 
twentieth century with its socio-political moods and concerns, continue to incorporate some 
of the lessons of poststructuralism, even as they observe and engage with current thought that 
pushes beyond it. Of course, maturity in years also increases the possibilities of contemplating 
questions of mortality. Clearly, death-facing involves a recognition of the subject’s relative 
insignificance in relation to the larger temporal or spatial picture, as well as its commonality 
with it. However, perhaps the overriding concern, in these novels, remains one of the role and 
function of language at a time of environmental crisis and within a theoretical material turn. 
Each of the novels, in depicting death-facing as a means for the subject to respond 
efficaciously to its world, seems to retain a difficulty with language that continues to 
undermine. This is perhaps a problem that fiction must always have with death. It can only 
ever figure death as discursive: as trespass.168 Thus any fictional depiction of the death-facing 
human is always already in retreat from its own meanings.
168 Derrida, Aporias, p. 24.
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